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An Enquiry in Comparative Jurisprudence 
Similarity and Disparity between dharma, ZZ, and nomos
ABSTRACT
This enquiry deals with comparative jurisprudence in a 
cross-cultural perspective. Three most prominent indigenous 
conceptions, the topoi of dharma, ZZ, and nomos, are subse­
quently investigated and accordingly juxtaposed. Their forma­
tive and post-formative periods, the last roughly until between 
200 B.C. and 200 A.D., are taken into consideration. No doubt, 
all three topoi represent significant world conceptions, a 
deeper understanding of which is prerequisite for an appro­
priate treatment. The enquiry commences with the Hindu Indian 
tradition of dharma avoiding as far as possible a descriptive 
vocabulary that is largely borrowed from an Occidental termi­
nology; the same applies for the topos of ZZ. Due to a still 
widely-observable ignorance of Hindu Indian jurisprudence, 
dharma figures in the centre of interest, and is therefore 
treated comparatively comprehensively. Next, considerable care 
is taken to focus on the Chinese ZZ^ j and thirdly an essentially 
philosophic description of the ancient Greek topos of nomos is 
juxtaposed to the preceeding. As this implicit comparison re­
veals to an attentive observer, vague correspondences among 
fundamental disparities outweigh the similarity between the 
three topoi. Though dharma and ZZ can be described as regulative 
ways of life, dharma is for India (Hinduism) what ZZ is for 
China, and both are counterparts of what nomos was and became, 
the externally imposed constitutional (legal) order of society. 
After terminating the formative period, where a slight similar­
ity exists in an imagination of order between nomos and, dharma, 
while in China the imagination of harmony prevails instead, the 
topos of dharma is seen to be promoted under the presupposition 
of its provision of an overarching order, fit to work as an 
obligatory signpost through man's life, whereas the initial 
ritual and ceremonial l-c-conducts became after their extension 
into all social spheres the consolidated, socially created and 
accepted way of life.
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PREFACE
Often, a legal world-order has been postulated in what­
soever a sense, yet without taking those decisive disparities 
into careful consideration which a comparison of basic 'legal' 
conceptions of different cultures reveals. In order to throw 
some light on those presumably deep rooted incongruities I 
have attempted to compare dharma, It , and nomos, the indigen­
ous (regulative) topoi as I preferred to say of Hindu India, 
China, and ancient Greece. A three-cornered cross-cultural 
enquiry in Comparative Jurisprudence, as far as I know, has 
not been undertaken. However, it seems that in this way a 
necessary contribution can be made to introduce a theoreti­
cally-established inter-cultural process of 'legal' under­
standing. Incidentally, we may become more sensi-Hve to the 
many intra-culturally emerging obstacles that hamper such 
endeavours. Last but not least we may also increasingly realize 
that the nomos-bound Occidental culture is not universally 
valid or transferable and applicable.
Glaring disparities between the topoi of dharma, LL, and 
nomos which by far outweigh their similarities cannot be 
minimized and must be taken into account, if an inter-cultural 
process of 'legal' understanding can be meaningful to all 
parties involved.
This enquiry takes for granted, and apparently verifies 
that "a system of law is hardly meaningful except within the 
bosom of the civilization which gave birth to it.'1* Therefore,
I have attempted to pay careful attention to those non-Occi­
dental "systems" which are still little known to an Occidental 
audience.
It was in 1979, when under the leadership of Professor 
Derrett (London) the volume on "Beitrage zu Indischem Rechts- 
denken" appeared as the first of a series of "Studien zu Nicht- 
europaischen Rechtstheorien", edited by Theodor Viehweg 
(Mainz) and myself, that plans matured to study some important
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aspects of the Indian (Hindu) 'legal' tradition under the 
supervision of Professor Derrett, simultaneously continuing 
my studies in Comparative (Legal and Social) Philosophy. 
Eventually, I fixed upon the determination to engage in the 
present enquiry, putting scruples aside based on my own in­
sufficiencies relative to the difficult task ahead.
Now, having finished that particular assignment for the 
time being, assuredly still incomplete and with many defi­
ciencies, I am greatly indebted to my teacher J. Duncan M. 
Derrett who first of all gave me the chance to undertake such 
a piece of work. Whenever necessary he encouraged my progress; 
without his unceasing kind interest and many valuable sugges­
tions this work would be still unfinished. Furthermore, I owe 
thanks to Joseph Needham who inspired my Chinese studies when 
I had the opportunity to meet him in Cambridge 1978; later 
contacts and my continuous study of his "Science and Civili­
sation in China" kept me close to the Chinese culture. As to 
the man behind his books, I owe much inspiration to Marcel 
Granet. I also wish to repeat my gratitude to my teacher in 
Legal Philosophy, Theodor Viehweg (Mainz) who has been support­
ing my studies since many years, and to Alwin Diemer (Diissel- 
dorf)** to whom I owe the opportunity to teach Comparative 
Philosophy with an increasing number of interested students.
* J.D.M. Derrett, Essays in Classical and Modern Hindu L a w , 
vol. II, (Leiden, 1977), p. XV.
** Professor Diemer is at present President de la Federation 
Internationale des Societes de Philosophie, and as such 
he took personal interest in the progress of my enquiry.
-  9 -
INTRODUCTION
1. This enquiry aims at presenting a contribution to Com­
parative Jurisprudence in a three-cornered cross-cultural 
perspective. Therefore, three most prominent indigenous con­
ceptions, the topoi of dharma, Li, and nomos, are investi­
gated seriatim and accordingly juxtaposed.
Topoi as I have preferred to say are distinct from concepts 
and may be regarded as 'undefined' or 'undefinable' logoi, 
or as signposts to what is still open to an appropriate 
interpretation.
Of all three topoi, their formative and post-formative periods, 
the last roughly until between 200 B.C. and 200 A.D., are 
taken into a more or less cursory consideration. The chosen 
procedure is designed to disclose implicitly, and in § 16 
explicitly, significant similarities and disparities between 
dharma, Li, and nomos against their respective cultural back­
grounds. To be sure, considerable caution has to be applied 
in order to avoid imposing Occidental concepts upon a de­
scription of two non-Occidental topoi, admittedly a difficult 
task with still unsatisfactory results. However, this enquiry 
may be taken as a beginning and an experiment too within the 
little explored field of comparative transcultural jurispru­
dence or, as one may say, intercultural legal philosophy.
2. In a first part the enquiry seeks to represent the topos 
of dharma as being available from its Hindu Indian tradition.
A comparatively comprehensive treatment is devoted to it under 
the presupposition that dharma, as a by no means negligible 
factor of Hindu jurisprudence, is still widely unknown out­
side its own tradition, in particular to Western jurists and 
legal philosophers. Not only a want of information is observ­
able, also a distinctive terminology and deep rooted conven- 
ventions of thought with their corresponding notions of struc­
ture hamper an appropriate representation of dharma; for in­
stance, the often unsuitable, random or arbitrary utilization
-  10 -
of the English word 'law', a cas.e which Joseph Needham has 
already pointed out concerning China. Of course, this applies 
for the Chinese situation too, certainly even stronger with 
respect to the peculiarities of the Chinese language. Like­
wise, an understanding of the ancient Greek nomos risks to 
be presented in the perspective of Roman legal thinking which 
does no justice to the Greeks' theory and practice of nomos.
With suitable restrictions the topos of dharma figures after 
a brief exposition (§§ 1-3) within the context of sruti in­
cluding the conceptions of rta and karma (§§ 4-7). Subse­
quently attention is paid to the nature and relevance of 
smrti in 'promoting' dharma (§ 8), and to the sources and 
interpretation of dharma (§ 9). Next the constituents of 
dharma, varna and asrama (§ 10), then svadharma, sadharana- 
dharma, and purusartha are considered (§ 11) as well as 
rajadharma (§ 12). Finally, dharma and vyavahara are envisaged 
with relation to the problem of 'law' and custom (caritra), 
in § 13.
In what follows in part two, by purely formal analogy with 
part one, there is a cursory description of the ancient Chinese 
topos of Li (§ 14), and subsequently, rather briefly, a treat­
ment of the ancient Greek topos of nomos (§ 15). Both topoi are 
characterized in their respective formative and post-formative 
periods. A conclusion (§ 16) attempts to point out explicitly 
what we may consider as similar and disparate between these 
three topoi, particularly in view of their 'jurisprudential' 
substance and merit.
3. The following are main results of the enquiry: Vague cor­
respondences among fundamental disparities outweigh the simi­
larity between dharma, L i , and nomos. U/yi\9& being prepared for
what I call Leerstellen, i.e, empty spaces where a cross-
cultural comparison produces a zero response, it seems that
the similarity between dharma and Li amounts to both topoi 
being existent as wholesome regulative ways of life, while 
the topos of nomos can be grasped in substance as something
like the externally imposed constitutional order of society.
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Comparatively we can say that dh.arma is for India (Hinduism) 
what ZZ is for China, and both are counterparts of what 
nomos was and became in the course of its development. In 
contrast, neither the topos of dharma nor the topos of ZZ 
has taken a course comparable to the development of the topos 
of nomos; instead the smrtis in India disclose what I call a 
'promotion' (never an innovation) of what was present at the 
formative period of dharma; and the topos of ZX shows in the 
post-formative period an increasing 'extension' of its prac­
tice into all social spheres, and is principally free, in con­
trast to the topoi of dharma and nomos, from supernatural con­
siderations, so that eventually ZX appears consolidated as the 
socially created and accepted way of life. Both dharma and ZZ 
establish a long continuity of a unity of practice and theory.
Originally, the topoi of dharma and nomos share the imagin­
ation of cosmic order, however with differences as to exposi­
tion and preservation, whereas ^-conduct is designed to prac­
tise a conception of an all-embracing harmony, the effect of 
which can be observed, in contrast to dharma and nomos, in a 
strong preference for a diallagmatic society where litigation 
should be the exception, or at best superfluous. As to the 
topos of dharma in contrast to both the other topoi, one can 
speak of a pre-ordained (and inescapable) way of life, pro­
viding sufficient and suitable conflict-solving rules without 
losing the link to the many and diverse customs all over Hindu 
India under the unaffected and overarching rule of sanatana 
(eternal) dharma.
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PART ONE
ORIGIN AND 'PROMOTION' OF DHARMA 
§ 1 Prolegomena
I. The origin of dharma can be traced back into the 
very beginning of the Indian cultural tradition. In follow­
ing these traces it appears to us that over 3000 years ago 
the ancient intellectual and emotive powers faced a criti­
cal problem. Although it seems not too intricate and com­
plex, it is highly significant for their world orientation, 
both to comprehend and to explain in convenient expressions 
of their language whence they had once come and where they 
were bound for, as well as where they had to make their 
living and to care for coming generations. Their original 
endeavours in finding their way have a naturally 'real' 
and an 'ideal', imaginative perspective, the latter of which, 
existing only in their vision, created an outlook wherein 
almost all of the later 'promotion' had its commencement 
and 'sensible' pattern.
Obviously it is extremely difficult to distinguish 
between a perspective of reality and one of ideality, to 
determine between facts and imagination, i.e. what can be 
proven by factual experience and acknowledgement, and what 
can be merely probable according to the understanding of 
our own days. As conduct and belief intermingle so do reality 
and ideality (imaginative vision). Any clearcut distinction 
applying the hermeneutical tool in too rigid a manner may 
incautiously separate what belongs together and fits our 
image more adequately, and our idea of a remote beginning.
-  13 -
II. As early as in the Rgveda (c. 1500 - 1000 B.C.)
the topos of dharma, as I prefer to say, comes into focus. 
Here, the assumption and application of topos or topoi is 
made to denote a special method of approach to a foreign 
culture. To this extent topoi are characteristically chosen 
to promote a critical process of cross-cultural understand­
ing.
In the realm of cross-cultural enquiries and compari-
2
sons methodical precaution is basic. Especially such ex­
pressions which are referred to as concepts or terms invoke 
(often falsely) the idea of distinctly defined or definable 
notions. Topoi, on the other hand, do not provoke ideas of 
defined or exactly definable notions; it is generally as­
sumed that they denote unlimited, infinite expressions of 
a thought.
The assumption of topoi denies any expression the readi­
ness to be grasped generally in an abstract (or ab-solute) 
sense, and thus being open to an inadequate a-situative 
understanding. In other words: topoi are empty vessels which 
are bound to be filled as often as a change of situation 
calls for it.
This seems especially to be the case with dharma, 
because dharma, as it is open to general characterization 
(and to many meanings) nevertheless defies all efforts at
3
definition. The furthest I should go at the outset of this
1. Evidently "... we should clear our minds of irrelevant 
aspects of concepts native to our own environment, ..."
J. Duncan M. Derrett, The Concept of Duty in Ancient 
Indian Jurisprudence ..., in: W.D. 0 'Flaherty/J.D.M. 
Derrett (eds.), The Concept of Duty in South Asia,
(New Delhi, 1978), p. 18.
2. Cf. Reinhard May, Problematik chinesischen Rechtsver- 
standnisses, in: ARSP LXVI/2 (1980), pp. 193-206.
3. Cf. Betty Heimann, Studien zur Eigenart indischen Den- 
kens, (Tubingen, 1930), pp. 13, 15 ("Am Anfang jedweder 
Erkenntnis steht fiir den Inder ein anschaulicher Komplex, 
niemals ein Begriff." p. 13).
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enquiry is to presume now that the topos of dharma figures 
variously as a signpost on man's way through his individual 
and communal life. And apparently the topos of dharma is 
more or less a creation of man in action rather than in 
mere contemplation.
III. Unfortunately, the historical scene to be de­
picted within the circumstances of a text (the Rgveda) be­
longing to the remote past supplies us only with few data 
from which we may gather some practices referring to the 
topos of dharma in the perspective of reality, possibly not 
incoherent with the etymological explanations of the ex­
pression dharma.
The topos of dharma appears on the scene yet unverbal­
ized when the Aryan invaders of the Indian subcontinent had 
settled and started to organize a community life of their 
own pattern derived from their own inventive capabilities. 
Such a community life had to be stable enough to secure 
their present and future existence.
The following characteristics focus briefly on their 
communal organization and practical arrangements, all of 
which can be shown and be supported by illustrating their 
beliefs and imagination already present in the hymns of 
the Rgveda.
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§ 2 The Origin of dharma and the'Historical Situation
I. According to historians a dominant feature of the
Aryan tribal community is the division between the monopoly
of governmental leadership, both in war and peace, and that
of spiritual leadership in sacrificial rituals as between
king (raja) and priest (brahmana, esp. the purohita) thus
2conforming to the visionary 'truth1 of the rsis who are 
said to have 'heard' the hymns of the Vedas, i.e. broadly 
speaking, the whole contents of what came to be known as 
sruti and what henceforth has been orally transmitted by 
Brahmanas (vulgarity 'Brahmins') from generation to gener-
3
ation. "The hymns composed by their priests in their new 
home were carefully handed down by word of mouth, and early 
in the 1st millennium B.C. were collected and arranged. They 
were still not committed to writing, but by now they were 
looked on as so sacred that even minor alterations in their
4
text were not permitted, ..." This arrangement or func­
tional type of order can be seen as a decisive and direc­
tional beginning. It was widely esteemed and consistently 
stabilized by mutual aid and acknowledgement on the part 
of the raja and the brahmana.
1. Vide Dietmar Rothermund, Grundzilge der indischen Ge- 
schichte, (Darmstadt, 1976), p. 24.
2. Margaret and James Stutley, A Dictionary of Hinduism, 
cit. Diet, of H . , (London, 1977), ibid. Rsi(s): "The 
rsis of the RV may be regarded as an elite group of Vedic 
priestly families, whose literary gifts and knowledge
of sacred lore are chiefly represented in the hymns of 
the RV."
✓
3. Vide ibid., Sruti.
4. A.L. Basham, The Wonder that was India, 3rd. rev. edn., 
(London, 1967), p. 30. Cf. Fischer Weltgeschichte, Indien, 
ch. 3 by Friedrich Wilhelm, (Frankfurt am Main, 1967),
p . 29.
5. Vide Dietmar Rothermund, ibid., p. 24; J. Duncan M. 
Derrett, Rajadharma, in: Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 
XXXV, 1975-6, pp. 597-609, esp. pp. 606-7, with additional 
bibliography, pp. 608-9.
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II. Special attention should be given to the fact 
that the raja1s power was additionally limited (though not 
constitutionally limited) by the sabha and samiti  ^ who 
exerted much influence on the raja whose position was nei­
ther divine nor absolute, yet hereditary as a rule. On the
whole his position (even granted the religious functions of 
7
the king) was dissimilar to that of the priest whose relig­
ious function being greatly appreciated for its imaginative 
results gained ever more importance and was soon of utmost 
prominence. The well-being of the whole community in all 
natural and supernatural respects came to be seen in the 
light of his function. This holds true of the original three 
divisions of the community. "When the Aryans first came to 
India they were divided into three social classes, the war­
riors or aristocracy, the priests and the common people.
g
There was no consciousness of caste ..."
Only by the end of the Rgvedic period a new fourfold
g
division had been inaugurated, the four great varnas to 
be explained as a vertical interdependent stratification of 
community classes, marking an all-embracing system of order 
properly upheld, ideally sanctified, and inspired by an over­
arching regulative power of the regularly repeated primeval
10sacrifice under the guidance of the brahmana .
6. On the sabha and the samiti vide J.W. Spellman, Political 
Theory of Ancient India, (Oxford, 1964), pp. 92-96. Cf. 
also A.L. Basham, op.cit., p. 33. Romila Thapar,
A History of India, (Harmondsworth, 1966), pp. 36 f. Also 
P.V. Kane, History of Dharmasastra, (Poona, 1930-1962,
2nd ed. 1968), vol. Ill, ch. Ill, p. 92.
7. Vide J.D.M. Derrett, Bhu-Bharana, Bhu-Palana, Bhu-Bhojana: 
An Indian Conundrum, in: Derrett, Essays in Classical and 
Modern Hindu Law, vol. I, (Leiden, 1976), pp. 33-49, with 
further references; as Derrett explains, the king's func­
tion was to maintain, to protect, and to enjoy the earth, 
pp. 35-37.
8. Romila Thapar, op.cit., p. 37.
9. A.L. Basham, op.cit., p. 35.
10. Vide SBE, vol. XXXII, Vedic Hymns, part I: Rgveda X, 90.
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III. By now the topos of order was clearly realized 
and already in high esteem. It was seriously taken for grant­
ed that man had the task to move into regular actions with 
calculable results, to behave in a constant manner so that 
man could be sure of the support of the gods who themselves 
were believed to behave correspondingly (i.e. subject to the 
principle of reciprocation) in answer to the regularly con­
ducted sacrificial 'deed' or act (cf. idea of karma(n), 
infra).
This reality of order (at least a strong sense for 
order) in connection with its perceived usefulness (phala, 
the fruit of every action) was interwoven with the vision 
of gods regulating unseen questions, including mundane 
affairs (with the probability of enjoying even tangible 
phala), for the benefit of man, thus bringing into man's 
consciousness the topos of dharman and that of rtam (infra), 
through a variety of expressions with a power of communica­
tive refinements.
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§ 3 Etymology and Meaning of dharma
I. The traces of dharma refer back on the one hand 
to rta and on the other hand to dharman but also to the 
expression vrata. There is one passage in the Rgveda where 
they occur together:
"'O wise Mitra and Varuna! you naturally 
(or according to your fixed rule of conduct) 
[dharmana] guard your ordinances [vrata] 
with the wonderful power of an asura, you rule 
over (or illumine) the whole world according 
to the principle of cosmic order [rtena], 
you establish the sun, that is (like) a
i
brilliant chariot, in the heaven'."
From this central passage we learn (despite some differences 
in existing translations) how all three topoi are used to 
indicate an all-embracing idea of action and order to co­
ordinate the visible and invisible phenomena. Moreover, 
we encounter the role of Mitra and Varuna, both early and 
mighty Vedic gods, who are especially concerned with con­
tracts and agreements. But before I turn to this passage 
in detail, some brief remarks on the word-origin, the for­
mation and meaning of rta, vrata, and especially of dharma 
may seem suitable to complete the 'factual' side under 
which the origin of dharma can be investigated and visualized
1. RV V, 63, 7; trans. P.V. Kane, The word vrata in the
Rgveda, in: J. of the Bombay Branch ot the Royal Asiatic 
Society 29 (1954) / pp. 1-28, p. 27. Cf. the German trans­
lation by P. Horsch, Vom Schopfungsmythos zum Weltgesetz, 
in: Asiatische Studien XXI (1967) , pp. 31-61, p. 42 where 
dharman is translated with Gesetz.
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Rta discloses according to.Horsch the meaning of
2"Kosmisch-Kultischer Wahrheit und Ordnung" , it stands for
3
the "universal cosmic order" and as such it refers to a 
'principium' (i.e. the primary and fundamental element, a 
basis), the immanent universal order, pre-existent without
4
being externally determined by any other force. Rta may be 
regarded as a force ' eo ipso'; "The gods came afterwards,
5
with the creation of this universe" (RV X, 129, 6) . So to
say, subsequently, vrata appeared on the worldly scene 
meaning "Gebot" (imperative) , or according to Kane con­
veying the notion of "the laws or ordinances supposed to be
7
laid down by individual gods or by all the gods" .
2. P. Horsch, ubi cit., p. 40; vide also ibid., p. 44:
"Von r = "gehen" ergibt sich rta = "Gang"." (Regel- und 
GleichmaBigkeit der phanomenalen Welt werden so andeut- 
bar.) Vide also R.T.H. Griffith, The Hymns of the Rig- 
veda, vols. I-IV, (Benares, 1889-1892), p. 2, fn. 8: 
"Everything in the universe which is conceived as showing 
regularity of action may be said to have the rita for 
its principle."
3. Kane, The word vrata ..., ubi cit., p. 28; cf. the same, 
History of Dharmas5stra, 2nd. ed., (Poona, 1968), vol.
IV, sec. I, ch. I, pp. 1-7; cf. also Heinrich Liiders, 
Varuna, Bd. I, (Gottingen, 1951), pp. 24-25.
4. Cf. Betty Heimann, Facets of Indian Thought, (London, 
1964), p. 37.
5. The Rig Veda, An Anthology, selected, translated and
annotated by W.D. O'Flaherty, (Harmondsworth, 1981), 
p. 25. Cf. V.M. Apte, Rta in the Rgveda, in: Annals of 
the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute (ABORI),
Poona, XXIII, (1941/3), pp. 55-60, pp. 55-6.
6. Horsch, op. cit., p. 42; vide Diet, of H., ubi cit., 
p. 339 (vrata): "The 'Will', from the root vr, sig­
nifying the exercise of the will", with further references.
7. Kane, op.cit., p. 28.
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II. In contrast to rta and-vrata, dharman (the Vedic 
term) has several spheres of denotation and a wider scope 
of .meaning. To P. Horsch we owe a careful and learned in­
vestigation, drawing our attention to the following as-
8 ✓ ✓ 
pects, namely to the mythical origin of dharman, to dharman
in a cosmical, ritual sense, and an ethical-social sense,
finally to dharman covering the meaning of "Gesetz, Recht
und Pflicht"9 .
Dharman stems from the verbal root dhr which means to
  10  —uphold, to support, to nourish, i.e. "that which forms a
11foundation and upholds" . From this root a "nomen actio- 
1 2nis" (neuter) is built, always to be met with as dharman
13 14in the Rgveda meaning "upholding (or sustenance)", etc.
In the masculine gender it is to be taken as "nomen agen-
13 16tis" meaning "supporter, upholder or sustainer" . As
1 7such it is not used more than four times in the Rgveda, 
eventually to disappear from the scene except for its usage
8. Vide Horsch, op.cit., pp. 32, 36, 39, 41.
9. Horsch, ibid., p. 44.
10. Vide P.V. Kane, History of Dharmasastra, (henceforth 
HD), ubi cit., p. 1; cf. Horsch, ibid., p. 32.
11. Diet, of H . , p. 76.
12. Horsch, ibid., p. 32.
13. Vide Kane, The word vrata ..., op.cit., p. 26: "In some
passages dharman is in the masculine gender and gener­
ally an adjective." Cf. Horsch, ibid., p. 32.
14. R.C. Hazra, Dharma - Its Early Meaning and Scope, in:
Our Heritage (Calcutta), vol. VII (1959), pp. 15-35, 
p. 17 with fn. 13; see also p. 16 (bottom); Kane, HD, 
p. 1: "In most cases the meaning of dharman is 'relTg- 
ious ordinances or rites' ...".
15. Horsch, op.cit.„ p. 32.
16. Hazra, op.cit., p. 17.
17. Vide Horsch, o p .cit., p. 45, with reference to the 
Rgveda I, 187, 1 / IX, 97, 23 / X, 21, 3 / X, 92, 2.
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—  18in later Samhitas and in the Brahmanas.
• •
So far we may conclude on the origin of dharma with
the first summarizing remark by P. Horsch in his above
mentioned article, thus leading over simultaneously from
the perspective of reality to that of ideality, the imagin
ary visions of the ancient tradition: "Der Ursprung des
dharman-Begriffes liegt im Schopfungsmythos vom Auseinander
halten (vi-dhr-) und Stiitzen (dhr-) von Himmel und Erde,
wodurch aus der urzeitlichen Undifferenziertheit des wan-
1 9kenden Chaos Ordnung und "Halt" geschaffen wurde."
18. Vide Hazra, op.cit., p. 17.
19. Vide Horsch, op.cit., p. 60; in other words: a trans­
formation process from chaos to cosmos took place by 
means of vi-dhr and dhr effectuating a worldly stabil­
ity between sky and earth.
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§ 4 Early Imagination’of rta and dharma
I. The Rgvedic expressions just referred to (presum­
ably not fixed in written form before the end of the second 
century B.C.) work out in distinct topoi, the visionary 
background of which comes to the surface of sruti (what was 
'heard') and is viable to the degree that they draw back 
our own imagination into their world of vision, on the one 
hand to that of rta (and vrata) and on the other to that of 
dharman. With sruti (esp. with the Rgveda as foremost) we 
are thus enabled to be close to the origin of dharma.
The creation-my.th reveals the active part of the gods 
(subsequently after the creation (vide supra)), the part of 
Mitra and Varuna who were believed to act as guarantees of 
dharma once the basis (rta) has been laid (not without the 
chance of permanence). The 'ideality of dharma' as a 'po- 
tentia' available to prevent the world's falling back into 
the primordial chaos (or at least disorder) is vividly 
supported by man's imagination of the most prominent Rgve­
dic god Varuna.
II. The early Vedic gods seem to have no apparent and
palpable individual or manifest personal shape (although
there may be in some respects a kind of personal god and
personified abstracta exerting power over man) . And there
is no question of their issuing 'commandments'. They also
occupied no fixed position, and there existed no kind of a
2
hierarchical structured Pantheon. The Rgveda determines
3the role of Varuna in many instances. He is believed to
1. Cf. J. Gonda, Die Religionen Indiens, Bd. I, (Stuttqart, 
1960), p. 29.
2. Cf. L. Petech, Indien bis zur Mitte des 6. Jahrhunderts, 
in: Weltgeschichte, 2. Bd., hg. v. Golo Mann und Alfred 
HeuB, (Frankfurt a.M./Berlin, 1962), p. 372.
3. Cf. Diet, of H . , op.cit., pp. 323 f ("His responsibility 
for law and order also extended to sacrificial procedure/ 
a duty shared by Mitra, Agni and Indra, ..." (p. 324)).
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be the protector of rta (which though having been material-
4
ized never existed as a person). Moreover Varuna is said 
to ‘have fastened the sky in the seat of rta ["dharayam 
divam sadana rtasya"]. And is also believed to have the 
ability to separate false from true (RV X, 124, 5)^, hence 
he measures out the many forms of the Law ["rtasya"] (RV X, 
124, 3)7 .
g
Varuna (and Mitra) preside over and guard rta, the 
indicator of regularity in the 'rta-world1 (rta being sub­
stance and efficiency, i.e. the 'causa' and as such that 
which makes a thing what it is, here in efficient operation 
(cf. RV V, 15, 2)).
Punishment secures the sustenance of dharma for the
9
sake of rta and its feared dissolution (RV X, 89, 6-7).
The tendency of man's consciousness towards gods as a su­
perior state of consciousness is to be identified with his
strong desire to actively support the gods by means of
. . 10sacrifices.
4. Vide Heinrich Liiders, Varun a , Bd. I, (Gottingen, 1951), 
p p . 13, 24.
5. RV IV, 42, 4 (quoted after Liiders, ibid. , p. 25).
6. Cf. The Rig Veda (O'Flaherty) o p .cit., p. 111; cf. Betty 
Heimann, Studien zur Eigenart indischen Denkens, (Tu­
bingen, 1930), p. 27.
7. Cf. The Rig Veda (O'Flaherty) ibid.
8. Vide on the role of Varuna with respect to 'legal' topoi 
as follows, The Rig Veda, op.cit., V, 85; VII, 86/88/89; 
II, 28, 6 ('Varuna, emperor of Order', trans. O'Flaherty, 
ubi cit., p. 218). Cf. also A.L. Basham, The Wonder that 
was India, ubi cit., p. 236; Horsch, Vom Schopfungsmythos
. . . , ubi cit., p. 41. Also in the Atharvaveda III, IV, 16, 
1 (ed. SBE XLII, trans. Bloomfield), Varuna appears as 
great guardian.
9. Vide RV IV, 5, 4; cf. the translations of H. Oldenberg 
in: Vedic Hymns, Part II, SBE, vol. XLVI, p. 335, and 
O'Flaherty, op.cit., p. 114.
10. Vide RV X, 51, 5, trans. O'Flaherty, op.cit., p. 108.
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III. What can man do to assure himself of rta which
was held to be existent for his benefit? Once this question
arose the answer was easily to be found in man's orderly
11conducted sacrifices , especially by offering what one 
cherishes to equalize taking by giving and vice versa. Cor­
rectly conducted sacrifices are to be regarded as the 'pre­
ordered ' way of human behaviour to secure rta in all worldly 
affairs.
The interdependence of rta and sacrifice obviously had
a strong effect on the gradual 'promotion' of dharma and
the later decline of the consciousness of rta. Here, at the
beginning of the early imagination of order, rta was in the
1 2highest esteem. Rta, "born from heat as it blazed up" ,
cannot be changed, but it can be harmed by any deviating
1 3action (an adharmic action). To escape this danger man 
will follow the prescribed rta as "the gods followed the 
laws of Rita"^.
11. Vide RV I, 75, 5, trans. Oldenberg, op.cit. , where a 
strong desire is expressed by asking the assistance of 
(the god) Agni to intensify the importance of the sacri­
fice: "Sacrifice for us to Mitra and Varuna. Sacrifice 
to the gods (a sacrifice conforming to) the Great Rita. 
Sacrifice, 0 Agni, to thy own house."
12. RV X, 190, 1, trans. O'Flaherty, The Rig Veda, op.cit., 
p. 34.
13. Vide A. Kunst, Use and Misuse of Dharma, p. 7, in: The
Concept of Duty in South Asia, ed. by W.D. O'Flaherty
and J. Duncan M. Derrett, (New Dehlhi, 1978), pp. 3-17;
cf. H. Oldenberg, Die Religion des Veda, (Stuttgart-
Berlin, 1923), p. 195: "Die Vorgange, deren stetes Sich-
gleichbleiben oder deren regelmaBige Wiederkehr die Vor-
stellung der Ordnung erweckt, gehorchen dem Rta oder
ihr Geschehen ist Rta."
•
14. RV I, 65, 3, trans. H. Oldenberg, Vedic Hymns, 
op.cit., p. 54.
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The Atharvaveda places even-more emphasis on the
1 5interdependence of rta and the sacrifice to gods, draw­
ing attention to man in the world bound for an active life
1 6to support the earth, and also to be still aware of the gods 
who, "releasing the sun and the ritam (the divine order of 
the universe) from darkness and from grahi, did take them 
out of s in"^.
IV. To sum up, the early imagination of rta may be
described as follows: Rta denotes a topos of a first,
basic, regular and general order apprehending what is man's
1 8phenomenal (natural) surrounding. Irregular phenomena 
are placed in a distinct manner and thus structured into a 
form of regularity, in other words, complexity is reduced 
into simpler 'entities' (or better 'topoi'), mainly to ob­
viate man's anxiety of the danger of the inexplicable. This 
process is underlined by the role of gods who are believed 
(at this early period) to give visible or invisible examples 
of dharma to take hold of whatever is existing in order 
(rta) and lead man into an evergrowing consciousness of his 
own active but ordered way of life.
15. Vide Hymns of the Atharva-Veda X, XI, 7, 17, translated 
by M. Bloomfield, SBE, vol. XLII, p. 228: "Order (rita), 
truth (satya), creative fervour (tapas) , sovereignty, 
ascetism, law and works; past, future, strength, and 
prosperity, are in the ukkhishta-force in force." - 
Ukkhishta (ucchis^a): the remainder of the sacrifice, 
held to be the immanent cause of all what exists (vide 
Diet. of H ., ubi cit., p. 309).
16. Vide Atharva-Veda, X, XII, I, 1, op. cit., p. 199.
17. Ibid., AV I, II, 10, 8, p. 15. Grahi means (generally) 
'Seizers' (vide Diet, of H. , op.cit.,P- 104).
18. Cf. A. Kunst, Use and Misuse of Dharma, ubi cit., p. 6: 
"In the rta are enclosed all the elements of exist­
ence ..."
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§ 5 From rta to the Dominating«Vedic Imagination of dharma
I . The Vedic imagination - so remote and often incom­
prehensible - seems to convey the expression dharman as a 
complex but central topos of action, conduct, ordinance, of 
regularity and order to be discovered in innumerable situ­
ations of the imaginary setting of early sruti. To pursue 
all denotations in detail would be almost impossible, yet, 
if undertaken, it would be hopelessly difficult "to assign 
a definite meaning to this word in all these passages" . 
However, the complexity of dharman may be viewed at this 
stage in three aspects.
As we have seen already, dharman, the Rgvedic expression, 
described and communicated (sometimes alongside with rta) 
the very first step in human imagination, the step from 
chaos to cosmos, i.e. from plain disorder to clearly per­
ceptible order. Henceforth dharman, according to this vision, 
was urgently needed to prevent a falling back into destruc­
tive chaos. Under such a manifest necessity dharman was 
effectively visualized as a general motif of actual efficacy 
in three distinctive aspects. These aspects exclude dharman 
as depicted - only once - in the Rgveda in a personified
shape, which, however, is neither a personified creator nor
o
a personal god, remaining eventually altogether without 
effectiveness.^
II. The three aspects might be viewed, if taken as 
different stages of human consciousness, in gradual shifts 
and overlappings; in my opinion, they relate to a
1. Kane, HD, p. 2; p. 3: "'Dharma' occurring hundreds of 
times in Samhitas, Brahmanas and other Upanisads."
2. Vide Kunst, op.cit. , p. 5 referring to RV 8, 35, 13.
3. Vide Kunst, ibid., p. 5: "In later Epic and Puranic 
literature Dharma as a person was often the focus of 
various mythical motifs."
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complex topos without clear-cut .distinctions, more or less 
intertwined. The first aspect gets hold of dharman (often 
taking recourse to rta) as an extroverted presentation of 
natural (environmental) phenomena incorporating the most 
active and eminent parts of nature. It may be assumed that 
this aspect, turning outwards after some process of vision­
ary diffusion (within the very early human imagination) was 
subdued, and initiated newly shaped visions, now expressive­
ly communicated, e.g. in the Rgveda:
"Sky and earth, these two who are good for
everyone, hold the Order and bear the poet
of space (the sun, in the space between sky
and earth). Between the two goddesses the
two bowls that give birth magnificently, the
pure sun god moves according to the laws of
4
nature" (fixed decrees ["dharmana"]. Or:
"Moving along his paths in the middle realm
of space, he does not rest even for a single
day. Friend of the waters, first-born keeper
of the law ["rtava"], where was he born? What
5
was he created from?"
III. The second aspect of (Vedic) dharman displays a 
re-presented extroversion of natural and human phenomena, 
dissipating manifest 'entities' into effective visions.
The third aspect marks a deviation from mere phenomenal 
re-presentation of man's surrounding world to the sphere 
of 'pure' knowledge and the realm of human affairs, coagu­
lated, partly abstract, partly concrete in visible relations
4. The Rig Veda I, 160, 1 (0'Flaherty), ubi cit., p. 203.
5. Ibid., p. 176, RV X, 168, 3 (a hymn to Vata, "a par­
ticular violent and concrete form of the wind" 
(O'Flaherty, ibid., p. 175)).
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and activities.^
Further to the second aspect, where dharman already 
bears a tendency to coagulations, an illustration is 
wanted:
"The earth is propped up by truth; the sky 
is propped up by the sun. Through the Law 
the Adityas stand firm ["rtenadityas 
tlsthanti"].^
According to man's vision sacrifices are believed to 
support man's position within the many uncontrolled forces; 
however, they are imagined to be only then effective if 
they are performed in a fixed and devotional manner, working 
in correspondence with the conception of rta. Thus, the 
position of man is held to be strong and durable as long 
as the necessary emphasis is laid on the all-effective rit-
g
ual acts. No violations of the established ritual fixations
6. Cf. P. Horsch, op.cit., pp. 48 f, he speaks of five 
steps in the evolution of dharma, whereas I shall prefer 
to take four (general) aspects of one topos into con­
sideration, vide infra.
7. The Rig Veda X, 85, 1 (O'Flaherty, ubi cit., p. 267), 
cf. ibid., VI, 55, 1, and VIII, 48, 8 (pp. 194, 135).
I exclude consideration of proto-archaeological theories 
of the Earth-mound and primaeval Tree or Pillar, active 
in India before the time of the Buddha.
8. Vide Rig Veda X, 90, 16 (or I, 164, 50), ibid., p. 31: 
"With the sacrifice the gods sacrificed to the sacrifice. 
These were the first ritual laws" ("Literally, the 
dharmas, a protean word that here designates the arche­
typal patterns of behaviour established during this first 
sacrifice to serve as the model for all future sacri­
fices" (O'Flaherty, ibid., p. 32)); cf. Hazra, op.cit., 
p. 17.
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9
were tolerated, since uneasy anticipations of dissolution
and devastating disorder were inevitable. Additionally the
early visioned link between human beings and 1 super1-human
beings (as there are 'gods' and/or 'phenomenal entities')
by means of dharman had a powerful influence on later human
10affairs and relations.
IV. The above mentioned third aspect of dharman dis­
closes the preparational stage of minor transitions com-
11m e n c m g  with the Brahmanas, although already visible in
the Atharvaveda (the last portion of the whole Vedic corpus),
1 2where dharman (nomen actionis) is transformed into dharma.
Yet, finally and explicitly, the smrtis focus on a 
fourth aspect of (the now) dharma, although, here too, a 
transitional period of preparation has to be noticed and 
taken into some consideration. This period opens up with 
Upanisadic imagination, to be closed (eventually) with what 
is called sruti, but to continue into a new period of dharma
9. Vide RV III, 3, 1 (Oldenberg, op.cit., p. 232); VIII, 
48, 9 (O'Flaherty, ubi cit., p. 135). This accords with 
traditional exposition of the Indian culture and is 
repeated constantly. It is influenced by occidental 
theories, especially of ancient Rome, and presumably 
has no original intracultural authentication. For ex­
ample, it must be borne in mind that 'penances' could 
cure many defects in a ritual sequence, a fact I need 
not pursue here.
10. Vide, The Rig Veda I, 179, 2 ("For even the men of the 
past, who acted according to the Law and talked about 
the Law with the gods, ..." (O'Flaherty, ubi cit.,
p. 251)); Kunst, op.cit., p. 7, refers to an identifica­
tion of dharma with action - in other words, focussing 
on dharma as grounded in the ritual act itself and be­
coming thus re-presented present, i.e. effective.
11. Vide Hazra, op.cit., pp. 18 f; Horsch, op.cit., p. 61.
12. Vide Horsch, ibid., pp. 49, 61 ("Umformung des Nomen 
actionis dharman in das Abstraktum dharmah").
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with what will be called smrtl, -and being retropsectively
referred to as a source of dharma (the second in importance
after sruti in the four-stages hierarchy of sources). The
sutra-s are (in general) those works which mark within a
distinct setting transition and separation of sruti and
smrti. By this period rta has been taken up and 'preserved'
1 3in dharma, present in its second and third aspect, whereas
1 4vrata had come to be restricted.
V. Over a period of about 300 years until c. 500 B.C. 
the Upanisads (at the close of sruti) pay much attention to 
dharma as supreme and firm force of the world, of nature 
and life showing signs of shifting emphasis towards the life 
of man in almost all of its aspects.
"Dharma is the stay of the whole world; in 
society people approach the most ardent fol­
lower of dharma; by Dharma (they) remove sin;
everything rests on Dharma; so (people) de-
1 5clare Dharma to be most excellent."
Furthermore dharma is the all-embracing, life imparting
13. Vide Kunst, op.cit., p. 8.
14. Vide Kane, The word vrata ..., ubi cit., p. 28
("... vrata came to be restricted to religious rites, 
vows and rules of conduct to be observed by a person
as a member of a certain society or body or as an
individual."). Cf. on meaning and understanding Paul 
Hacker, Vrata, in; Nachrichten d. Akademie d. Wissen- 
schaften in Gottingen, I. Philol.-hist. Klasse, 1973, 
Nr. 5, pp. 113, 118, 121, 133.
15. Vide Taittiriya-aranyaka X, 63, 1 (cit. after Hazra, 
op.cit., p. 19); vide also the explanation given by 
F,M. Muller in his introduction p. XXVII of The Upani-
shads, trans. by F. Max Muller, part II, (New Delhi
trepr.)), 1975, vol. XV of the SBE.
-  31 -
1 6support of the world. To be aware of the Vedic tradition 
is to submit to the truth (the Vedic truth, the true 'knowl­
edge1 , i.e. the Veda) and to do one's duty which implies to 
practise dharma in the sense of not being negligent of what 
has reached this present age from primordial times. The 
Taittiriya-aranyaka-Upanisad is explicit in demanding the 
teacher to instruct the pupil:
"'Say what is true [satya]1 Do thy duty 
[dharma]I Do not neglect the study of the 
Veda! After having brought to thy teacher 
his proper reward, do not cut off the line 
of children! Do not swerve from the truth
1 7
[satya]! Do not swerve from duty [dharma]! ..."
No doubt the Upanisads link old Vedic imagination of
dharma (sometimes in a conglomeration of all three aspects)
with new insights into the due necessities of practical
life. This gradually increasing awareness stretches also in
deep insight far beyond the sacrificial and mere ritual activ-
1 8ities which were imposed on the part of the Brahmanas.
16. Thus the Brhadaranyaka-Upanisad I, 5, 23, (cit. after 
F.M. Muller, ubi cit., p. 98) states: "'He from whom 
the sun rises, and into whom it sets' (he verily rises 
from the breath, and sets in the breath) - 'Him the 
Devas made the law ((dharma))', ..." From the trans­
lation of^R.E. Hume, Thirteen Principal Upanishads, 
(London, 1931, 1975), p. 91, it is clear that this 
very passage forms parts of a verse long antedating 
the ancient Upanisads itself.
17. TU I, 11, 1 (cit. after F.M. Muller, ubi cit., p. 52), 
further on in I, 11, 2 and 4 directing attention at 
the significance of good works and the conduct of Brah­
manas to be looked upon as guidance to one's own conduct.
18. vide e.g. Aitareya-aranyaka II, 3, 2, 1-5 (after the 
trans. of F.M. Muller, The Upanishads, part I, (New 
Delhi (repr.)), 1975, pp. 222 f (SBE, vol. I ),
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It is quite true that the Upanisads in most of their 
parts place a strong e w p h aziz on profound spiritual 
imaginations, but they do not neglect careful attention to 
the practical side of this world's living beings. The 
Chandogya-Upanisad leaves no doubt about it:
"'When one obtains bliss (in oneself), then
one performs duties. One who does not obtain
bliss, does not perform duties. Only he who
1 9obtains bliss, performs duties."
Out of circles of similar (though probably later) reflections 
on man's worldly obligations the idea of Karma arrives at 
the surface of post-Vedic teaching and attaches even more 
importance to the now viable imagination of dharma.
19. ChU VII, 22, 1 (cit. after the trans. of F.M. Muller,
Khandogya-Upanishad , in: SBE, vol. I, ubi cit., p. 122).
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§ 6 The Idea of karma in Relation to dharma
I. Karma (see below) is doubtless a cornerstone of
Indian thinking; it attaches irreversible responsibility on
the individual as member of one part of the community.
Dharma, being separated according to the Chandogya-Upani- 
2
sad into three branches (indicating three stages or 
asrama-s), is seen with respect to the individual karma 
whereas the idea of karma is only working in constant regard 
to the all-embracing function of dharma. So far dharma 
may be considered as bifunctional, on the one hand in a 
sense of conducting one's own affairs in response to those 
actions which are unmistakenly held to sustain (idealiter) 
the age-old regularity of acts 'consecrated' by Vedic im­
aginations, and on the other hand as an inner-compulsive 
force to attain what has to be done involving one's future 
destiny for good or bad; hence individual conduct is distin­
guished between fulfillment of dharma or the reverse 
(a-dharma). This bifunctionality exposes at this stage a 
fourth aspect of dharma as it is conveyed (still enveloped) 
in a statement of the Brhadaranyaka-Upanisad, saying:
"Law (dharma) is the Kshatra (power) of the 
Kshatra, therefore there is nothing higher 
than the Law. Thenceforth even a weak man 
rules a stronger with the help of the Law, 
as with the help of a king. Thus the Law 
is what is called true. And if a man declares
1. Cf. Kunst, op.cit., p. 8; I leave aside here the var­
ieties of karma (retribution) theory evinced in the 
Indian public at different places and times. Vide also 
R. Panikkar, The law of karman and the historical dimen­
sion of man, in: Philosophy East and West XXII (1972), 
pp. 25-43, 27 f, 30. hr karrtQ ( m o ), vide , i y\{ra.
2. Vide the trans. by F.M. Muller, Khandogya-Upanishad II, 
23, ’1-2, in: The Upanishads, part I, ubi cit. , p^ 3b.
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what is true, they say he declares the Law; 
and if he declares the Law, they say he de-
3
clares what is true. Thus both are the same."
II. Some more remarks on the (intrinsic) imagination 
of karma should suffice to indicate the shift from the third 
aspect of dharma which was already drawing attention to the 
more general side of human affairs, namely to the many de­
tailed precepts and special rules in the widening scope of 
the 'super-sovereignty' of dharma (according to the just 
mentioned Upanisadic statement).
To begin with, karma (karman) simply means act, action,
performance, business, irrespective of purpose, but (accord-
4
ing to the Upanisads) emphasizing the aspect of its result. 
For an individual performing an act karma implies all conse­
quences whensoever, positively and negatively. Karma throws 
an effective stress on action pertinent to everyday-life.
On the scenery of sruti in general karma appears more or 
less distinctly in the Brahmanas where the expression is used 
to denote, the ritual act of the sacrificial performance
5
(karmakanda).■ • • —
The Upanisads extended its conception and transferred 
their peculiar imagination successfully on to the whole scale 
of human activities in order to create the consciousness of
3. Brhadaranya-Upanishad I, 4, 14 (cit. after F.M. Muller, 
ubi cit., p. 89); cf. TU I, 11, 1 (cit. sup.). The equa­
tion of dharma with truth surfaces in the rules of judic­
ial procedure: a trial based on dharma is based on truth 
(e.g. confessions and admissions).
4. Vide Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary,
(repr. New Delhi, 1979), p. 258.
5. Vide Dictionary of Hinduism, ubi cit., pp. 142 f; 
Monier-Williams, ibid., p. 258.
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man's life as within a constant .and irreversible process
(karmamarga). The vision of samsara took over the linkage
£
of 'pure' (or neutral) acts with their results. Lastly
"the doctrine of Karma came to be systematized in the broader
7
concept of Dharma" stipulating individual responsibility
g
for the sake of social order. And man's achievements are
o
evaluated in relation to dharma. 'Dharmic' karma as well
6. Vide the following Upanisads (cit. after F.M. Muller,
The Upanishads, parts I, il, ubi cit.): Svetasvatara 
Upanishad (considered to be a genuine Upanisad of the 
Black Yajur Veda, and one of the oldest of its kind (vide 
Diet, of H , ubi cit., p. 296)) V, 11-12 ("By means of 
thoughts, touching, seeing, and passions the incarnate 
Self assumes successively in various places various forms, 
in accordance with his deeds, just as the body grows when 
food and drink are poured into it." (V, 11)); Brhadaran- 
yaka-Upanishad III, 2, 13 ("... and what they said was’ 
karman (work), what they praised was karman, viz. that a 
man becomes good by good work, and bad by bad work."
("What is intended", explains F.M. Muller, ibid., "is 
that the sagisara continues by means of karman, while kar­
man by itself never leads to moksha.")); Maitrayana- 
Brahmana-Upanishad I, 4 ("In such a world as this, what
is the use of the enjoyment of pleasures, if he who has 
fed on them is seen to return (to this world) again and 
again!"); Katha-Upanishad I, 3, 7-8 ("'He who has no under­
standing and who is unmindful and always impure ... enters 
into the round of births.' 'But he who has understanding, 
who is mindful and always pure ... he is not born 
again.'"); Kaushitaki-Upanishad I, 2 ("And according to 
his deeds and according to his knowledge he is born 
again ...").
7. R. Thapar, op.cit., p. 46.
8. Cf. H. Hartel, Indien, in: Weltgeschichte, Summa Histo- 
rica, hg. v. Golo Mann u.a., (1965), (Frankfurt a.M./ 
Berlin, 1980), p. 207; A.L. Herman, An Introduction to 
Indian Thought, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1976), p. 138.
9. Cf. F. Edgerton, The Beginnings of Indian Philosophy, 
(London, 1965), p. 30; P.T. Raju, The Concept of Man in 
Indian Thought, in: S. Radhakrishnan / P.T. Raju (eds.),
The Concept of Man. A Study in Comparative Philosophy, 
(London, 2nd ed., 1966), pp. 233 f, 260.
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as 1a-dharmic' karma work automatically, sustaining or dis­
arraying or even destroying, cause d 'unseen' (adrsta) effccl-s, Jf. 
karma sustains (in the sense of dharma), it may finally lead 
to moksa (release out of samsara, the circle of life, death, 
and rebirth). To sum up: Karma without dharma would be void, 
and dharma without karma would be ineffective.
III. Before closing this chapter I still have to men­
tion one additional point concerning Upanisadic teaching, 
obviously a point in some controversy. There is a certain 
probability of opposition to the Vedas indicated by means 
of meditations on the relationships of Brahman and Atman, 
and on the realization of both, which may lead to the as­
sumption as if Upanisadic thinking as a whole abounds in 
overstressing 'meta-physical' and 'meta-practical' 'medita­
tion' leaving aside what I have pointed out as karmamarga. 
However, apart from jnanamarga (the way of knowledge (jnana)) 
which at a first glance seems to be in opposition to karma­
marga , there is a highly significant, sometimes hidden con­
nection between both 'ways' (marga-s). Thus, the Vajasaneyi- 
Samhita-Upanishad (Isa-Upanisad) 9 reads:
"All who worship what is not real knowledge
(good works), enter into blind darkness:
those who delight in real knowledge, enter,
10as it were, into greater darkness."
10. Trans, after F.M. Muller, The Upanishads, part I, ubi 
cit., p. 312; cf. (the identical) Brihadaranyaka-Upani- 
shad IV, 4, 10 (trans. F.M. Muller, ibid., part II, p. 
177); cf. also Taittiriyaka-Upanishad I, 9, 1 (trans. 
F.M. Muller, ibid., part II, p. 51. Another useful ex­
planation concerning jnanamarga and karmamarga is that 
(according to Kane) knowledge and lack of knowledge are 
irrelevant in apprehending the ultimate.
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From this passage we may guess, in accordance with F. Max
11Muller's explanations , that both ways do exist indepen­
dently, but work only effectively on the basis of their 
finally hidden interdependence, and man must keep to this 
interdependence through his own way of balancing work and 
knowledge.
Concerning the Vedas (the 'sacred' fountain of all 
knowledge), they stressed the sacrificial acts not merely 
as a voluntary (kamya) activity but also as an inevitable 
obligation to hold up universal order, and they’did so ac­
cording to their imagination that "the correct performance
of sacrifices brought earthly increase and assured comfort
1 2in the heavens above, the ideal of Vedic man" . To be sure, 
they do not neglect that in which the Upanisads take so 
strong an interest, namely jnanamarga  ^^ , yet not so strong­
ly as to disregard the significance of the necessary sacri­
ficial acts. Not in an antithesis do they refer with empha­
sis on jnanamarga, but to balance the ritual side in general 
and to induce man to follow up this path as his respective 
asrama calls for it.
11. Vide F.M. Muller, The Upanishads, part I, ubi cit., 
pp. 314-320; vide also, ibid., pp. 200-201. From the 
Mundaka-Upanishad (trans. F.M. Muller, ibid., part II)
we may grasp already the importance of the four asrama-s, 
namely, that "a man may a hundred times restrain his 
breath, etc., but without the Upanishad his ignorance 
does not cease. Nor is it right to continue for ever in 
the performance of sacrificial and other good works, if 
one w ishes to obtain the highest knowledge of Brahman. 
The Sannyasin alone, who has given up everything, is 
qualified to know and to become Brahman" (F.M. Muller, 
ibid., p. XXVI).
12. K.M. Sen, Hinduism, (Harmondsworth, 1961, 1981), p. 46; 
cf. Khandogya-Upanishad (trans. F.M. Muller, ubi cit., 
part I) esp. I, 1, 10; II, 24, 2.
13. Vide e.g. Maitrayana-Upanishad VI, 33, 1-11 (trans.
F.M. Muller, ubi cit., part II).
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IV. Pertinent to the spiritual constellation of the 
last 500 years B.C. dharma suggests an understanding that 
comes in its first and second aspect mentioned close to the 
German expression 'Gesetz', i.e. to a 'fixum' (or, as said 
above, to a coagulation), according to a special inefface­
able pre-arrangement. However, the Vedas (samhitas), in 
allowing no separation between divine and human spheres,
"do not even include a single positive precept which could
1 4be used directly as a rule of conduct" . While the third 
aspect of dharma takes account of the relation of karma­
marga and jnanamarga the fourth aspect discloses the whole 
range of human behaviour with respect to sustaining man and 
society in their constant tendency to fall back into dis­
order, i.e. to fall short of dharma; beyond this, but still
firmly grounding on the Vedas, all those efforts of man are
1 5considered which conform to his own duty as the individual
14. R. Lingat, The Classical Law of India (trans. J.D.M. 
Derrett), (Berkeley, 1973), p. 8. It may be added here 
that the words of this quotation are to be taken strict­
ly literally.
15. Vide Maitrayana-Upanishad IV, 3 (supra), p. 300 (This 
important reference reads in the translation of F. Max 
Muller as follows: "This is indeed the remedy for the 
elemental Self: Acquirement of the knowledge of the Veda, 
performance of one's own duty, therefore conformity on 
the part of each man to the order to which he happens
to belong. This is indeed the rule for one's own duty, 
other performances are like the mere branch of a stem. 
Through it one obtains the Highest above, otherwise one 
falls downward. Thus is one's own duty declared, which 
is to be found in the Vedas. No one belongs truly to an 
order (asrama) who transgresses his own law."); cf.
Rgveda III, 21, 2 (trans. H. Oldenberg, Vedic Hymns, 
ubi cit., p. 283). Cf. the very similar version of R.E. 
Hume (op. cit., p. 421). The whole passage insists upon 
performance of dharma but lauds atma-jfiana (knowledge 
of the Soul) whereby moksa is obtained.
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1 6basis for a life of good actions* in practically innumer­
able situations. There are (idealiter) ' clearly fixed "privi­
leges, duties and obligations of a man, his standard of 
conduct as a member of the Aryan community, as a member of
one of the castes, as a person in a particular stage of 
1 7life" , but (realiter) there are so many manifestations 
of different usages, customs, and special precepts that a 
further guidance is necessary, a task that the smrtis have 
taken over.
16. This has been already taken into account by the Rgveda 
X, 85, 24 (vide the Rig Veda, trans. O'Flaherty, ubi 
cit., p. 269: "In the seat of the Law ["rtasya yonau"] 
in the world of good action, I place you unharmed with 
your husband."); cf. Taittirlyaka-Upanishad I, 11 
(trans. F.M. Muller, ubi cit., part II, p. 52).
17. Kane, HD, ubi cit., p. 3. Except for the Vedas 
(samhitas) as mentioned above there are indeed 'posi­
tive' precepts of a juridical character to be met with 
in the Brahmanas and Upanishads both of which are ap­
pended to the four Vedas.
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§ 7 Sruti and the 'Promotion' of dharma
I. By the time of the first appearance of smrti 
texts (about 550 B.C.) the topos of dharma was firmly es­
tablished to the extent of its first three aspects in the 
imagination of the early Indian mind. Dharma "appears to 
be eternally ordained and embedded in the constitution of 
the world" . The three aspects of dharma came to the sur­
face of sruti (as stated above) in form of (1) an extro­
verted presentation of natural phenomena, (2) a re-present­
ed extroversion of natural and (explicit) human phenomena, 
and (3) human affairs in coagulated relations and activ­
ities. Yet, it had not acquired practical functionality in 
all spheres of daily life which now seemed to call for 
reliable patterns of expected behaviour, in order to ensure 
an all-embracing capability of human beings to live in ac­
cordance with the regular course of the world.
We remember that already the Upanisads mark a shift of 
emphasis from the 'cosmic' pattern of dharma to the (ex­
plicit) human; to some degree the sacrificial relevance for 
the purpose of holding the universe in dharma (in the sense 
of rta) was minimized relative to a direction towards the 
whole of human affairs; everybody, all groups and parts of 
the society were expected to contribute to the realization 
of dharma. Since general intentions cannot sufficiently 
serve the needs of a whole and diverse community, distinct 
and easily comprehensible precepts had to be given without 
leaving the ground of the hallowed, irreversible and by now 
fossilized (closed) Vedic heritage. The origin of dharma 
inside sruti thus finds its continuation in smrti, a promo-
1. J.N.C. Ganguly, Philosophy of Dharma (Law), in: Indian 
Historical Quarterly, Calcutta, 2 (1926), pp. 575-586, 
809-825, p. 580.
-  41 -
2
tion in the indicated direction'rather than a development. 
Furthermore, the pre-motional state of dharma in sruti 
leads to dharmasastra (the study and teaching of dharma) 
within the scope of our smrti literature. This indicates 
once more that dharma was in full existence long before a 
corpus of literature was exclusively devoted to the promo­
tion of dharma.
II. To throw sufficient light on the promotion of
this complex topos of dharma we should like to recall some
distinct features of the Vedic heritage as visible in sruti.
'Knowledge' as it has been 'heard' and transmitted from
time immemorial comprises the four Rg-, Sama-, Yajur- and
Atharva-Veda, the Brahmanas, Aranyakas and Upanisads. The
Vedic sutra-literature does not belong to sruti but to 
3smrti. Hence, sruti forms the basis and primary source of 
knowledge on dharma; it spreads the first information on the 
state of the world right from the beginning of Indian im­
agination inaugurating the topos of dharma with all later
2. On the premises of our ordinary understanding of de­
velopment, namely a consecutive unfolding process from 
the negative to the positive state of existence, or from 
a latent to a fully visible or elaborate mature state,
I prefer to speak of promotion which in my opinion fits 
the Indian tradition adequately.
3. Vide H. Bechert/G. von Simson (Hg.), Einfiihrung in die 
Indologie, (Darmstadt, 1979), pp. 50-55; R. Lingat, The 
Classical Law of India, ubi cit., pp. 7-14, concerning 
smrti Lingat explains: "Smrti ... has two senses: in the
original, etymological sense it signifies remembered
tradition or the knowledge one may derive from memory of
the rules of dharma, in opposition to the sruti which is
knowledge directly acquired through Revelation. In a 
second sense it signifies the whole of the literature 
constituted by the dharma-sutras and dharma-sastras, a 
literature regarded as having been inspired by the smrti." 
(p. 13). Cf. also A.S. Altekar, Sources of Hindu Dharma, 
(Sholapur, 1952), pp. 11-12.
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consequences for the inception and formation of the in-
4
digenous Indian (Hindu) jurisprudence.
Only the Upanisads in the transitional period from 
sruti to smrti refer to dharma as personal duty of an indi­
vidual within the emerging and later framing constituents 
- - 5of varna and asrama. Up to this period (800-500 B.C.) rit­
ual activities by means of ya jna (sacrifice) predominated 
and formed a consciousness of the sacrificial act itself 
that benefited the actor and the state of the world.^ And 
this in itself (encircled in action and result) left no 
room for an independent and all-powerful deity (or deities) 
"Gods were only the functionaries in the affairs of the 
world. They never governed the world and men in the world. 
Men governed themselves according to the objective, real
4. Cf. P.V. Kane, Vedic Basis of Hindu Law, in: Journal of 
the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. 26, 
pp. 57-82, p. 57-8. Cf. also J.C. Heesterman, Veda and 
Dharma, in: W.D. 0 1Flaherty/J.D.M. Derrett (eds.), The 
Concept of Duty in South Asia, (New Delhi, 1978), pp. 
80-95; he points out that though the Vedas are tran­
scendence itself and thus divorced from human reality 
they "hold the key to ultimate legitimation". "Therefore 
even if the Vedas are in no way related to the ways of 
human life and society, one is still forced to come to 
terms with them." (p. 92-3).
5. Vide infra, § 10 I, II.
6. J.M. Koller holds a different (disputed) view according
to which not the yajna is the efficient cause whereby 
the devas give benefits. Cf. John M. Koller, Dharma: An 
expression of universal order, in: Philosophy East and 
West XXII, 1972, pp. 131-144 ("Though the yajna is di­
rected to a god, it is the activity of the yajna, not
the god, which effects the desired change. The power of
ordering the functions of this world is found in ya jna 
not in the gods." (p. 135).
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law of the world and in this government, gods were also 
7
given a part." What the Vedas emphasize is held to con­
stitute satyam (true order, truth) in the world of men and 
gods alike.
There exists a correspondence between order among
human beings as satyam and order in the relation of men
— 8to their religious (supernatural) activities as yajna,
both of which have their grounds (respectively) in the Veda,
the suprasensible basis of all conduct; "this leads to a
fusion of religion and morals, which is reflected in the
existence of only one word in Sanskrit, viz. Dharma for 
9
both" . This may explain why dharma is always considered 
to be linked with the supernatural world and the 'Supreme 
Reality' which is imaginatively real in the Vedas (sruti) 
wherein on the supposition of karma and samsara, all human 
activities are found to produce transcendent results (adrsta 
phala). Therefore, the individual seeks to participate 
through obedience to dharma in the Vedic transcendence 
opened on the way (marga) of jnana and karma, and this is 
to visualize dharma as the signpost to one's parama- 
sreyasa (^ u&'maLe. good).
7. C. Kunhan Raja, Law is not will of God, in: TRIVENI,
33, 3 sqg., pp. 3-7, p. 5. C f . J.D.M. Derrett, Religion, 
Law and the State in India, (London, 1968), where he 
mentions (pp. 165-6) the wishful thinking of Indian 
scholars in their occasional reference to 'God' to whom 
law was assumed to be subject but "unconsciously enter­
tained for the purpose of making unflattering comparisons 
with the legal systems of the West, which was the motive 
that sent this doctrine on its way."
8. Cf. G.-D. Sontheimer, Die Ethik im Hinduismus, in:
C.H. Ratschow (Hg.), Ethik der Religionen, (Stuttgart, 
1980), pp. 349-435, p. 406; A.A. Macdonell, Vedic Myth­
ology , (Strassburg, 1897, repr. 1963), p. 11; K.V.R. 
Aiyangar, Some Aspects of the Hindu View of Life accord­
ing to Dharmasastra, (Baroda, 1952), pp. 162-3.
9. K.V.R. Aiyangar, ibid., p. 62.
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III. It is about ten centuries after the first 
Rgvedic traces, when the commencing smrti texts provide 
ample signposts to guide man to this state which is con­
ducive to bliss (nihsreyasa). And the 'teachings of dharma' 
(dharmasastras) assert "that society ... exists not for its
own sake (there is none) but in order that this state may
10be achieved by each inhabitant" . One may add, that this 
state finally allows 'ultimate freedom' w ithout endangering 
the pre-established order according to the early imaginative 
Vedic world-outlook.
11The 'promotion' of dharma takes place or, at this
distance, gives the impression of having taken place in an
1 2unbroken consistency on the basis of sruti-dharma. Yet, 
this same topos appears in new circumstances of which the 
smrti texts are fully aware and which they clearly engender 
in their treatment of dharma-orientated teachings. These 
new circumstances enable all human beings to participate
10. J.D.M. Derrett, History of Indian Law (Dharmasastra), 
in: B. Spuler (ed.), Handbuch der Orientalisitk, II, 
Indien, Sektion Geschichte, ed. by J. Gonda, (Leiden, 
1973), p. 18. Cf. also K.M. Sharan, Court Procedure in 
Ancient India, (New Delhi, 1978), p. 1 ("... ultimate
objective is not merely general happiness but spiritual 
welfare.").
11. It may be worth notcc-i'w^ what J. Gonda, Het Begrip 
Dharma in Het Indische Denken, in: Tijdschrift voor 
Philosophie 20, 1958, pp. 213-268, has stated, namely 
(p. 267): "It is no correct method to suppose the term 
to have evolved semantically in the chronological order 
of the texts in which different aspects of the general 
idea attracted the attention of the authors."
12. On this basis "man is regarded as a manifestation and 
expression of a deeper reality, which is the measure 
of man, not vice versa ... (and) all reality is one in 
being and function". John M. Koller, ubi cit., p. 132.
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actively in dharma, and this means at the same time to be 
protected and maintained in the course of one's life.
"Dharma is so called because it upholds 
all creatures. In fact all creatures are 
upheld by dharma. Therefore that which is 
capable of upholding (dharana), is certain­
ly dharma."^
13. Mahabharata, Santi P. CIX, 10-12 (trans. P.C. Roy, 
vol. V I , p. 253).
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§ 8 The Nature and Relevance of.smrti in ’Promoting' dharma
I. The smrti texts give such information as enables
us to enquire into the whole complex topos of dharma as in
the course of 'promotion' between about 800 and 500/400 B.C.,
and still until about 200 A.D. when "additional works were
written to summarize dharma, including secular law, which
aimed at an educated and adult public, and consequently went
into some detail, though with a high degree of subtlety and
compression. These were called dharmasastra-s or smrti-s:
"  2they purported to be the remembered wisdom of the race 
Furthermore smrti (remembered wisdom) exposes an insight 
into the ingenuity of the ancient Indian (Hindu) mind spread 
over many centuries with only little loss in point of effect 
and admiration cmH;2side of the orthodox Hindu population. As 
an effective teaching of dharma smrti is only in thesi sec­
ond to sruti.
Smrti derives from smr (to remember). It indicates 
that its contents were remembered and thus orally handed 
down by Brahmin sastris (scholars) over many a generation. 
Ancient sages were believed to have remembered such wisdom 
as they thought worthy of preservation; otherwise, it is
1. This date agrees with the latest dating of the composi­
tion of the Manu-smrti or Manava-dharma-sastra; vide R. 
Lingat, op.cit., pp. 92-96 (95: "Indologists have been 
virtually forced into the position of adopting Buhler's 
opinion and agreeing to place the work between the sec­
ond century B.C. and the second century A.D.").
In case of the Indian situation I shall confine this 
enquiry chronologically to this date, including the Manu- 
smrti, although I am aware that later texts have to be 
occasionally recognized since all later 'jurisprudential' 
texts until 1800 A.D. at the latest can be treated as 
'ancient'; vide J.D.M. Derrett, Religion, Law and the 
State in India, ubi cit., pp. 1 5 0 ^
2. J.D.M. Derrett, ibid., p. 153.
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held, such wisdom might have been forgotten. The eminent 
Indian scholar P.V. Kane explains the fundamental differ­
ence between the Veda (sruti) and smrti as follows: "There 
are fundamental differences between the Veda and the smrtis. 
The Veda was deemed to be self-existent, eternal and of ab­
solute authority, while smrtis are pauruseya (works of hu­
man authors), have only a derived authority (as being pre­
sumed to be based on Vedic passages most of which are not
now available), their number is very large, they often dif-
3
fer so much from each other ..."
To the extent that the smrtis are concerned with propa­
gating and promoting the topos of dharma they are to be 
gathered as a product of Vedic dharma, a fact that does not 
allow us to qualify those texts as innovations developed on 
axioms which are derived from certain first rate dogmas.
They owe, to be sure, the insights into their task to once 
existent Vedic 'statements' which are indirectly and 
notionally present in what has been remembered.
It is this link with sruti that imparts (consequential) 
authority and utmost practical relevance to smrti. "The 
sages of our sastra merely 'remembered' their law; it never
3. P.V. Kane, History of Dharmsastra, ubi cit., vol. V, 2, 
sec. VII, ch. XXIX, p. 1272.
This 'interdependence' of sruti and smrti is clearly 
visible in a statement of Medhatithi. "As Medhatithi says 
(on Manu-smrti I, 1), 'Manu has said all that has been 
said in the Rgveda, the Yajurveda, the Saraaveda and the 
mantra-s of the Atharva, as also by the Seven Great 
Sages.'" (quoted J.D.M. Derrett, ibid., p. 85). Cf. also, 
K.V.R. Aiyangar, op.cit., pp. 81-2 ("Every dictum of a 
smrti has [scil. in orthodox theory] a Vedic source which 
can be discovered by sufficient knowledge and research."
p. 81) .
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4
emerged from a set of facts.” There was no tendency to 
deduce general principles from a multitude of groups of 
pragmatic precepts. One may add that they also never com­
prised anything like an organized body of co-ordinated
5
doctrines or a decalogue. And this seems not surprising 
because smrti composers appear to have been always alert
4. J.D.M. Derrett, Dharmasastraand Juridical Literature, 
(Wiesbaden, 1973), p. 42; "set of facts" is (likely) to 
be understood in Derrett's context as true and control­
lable data of experience,an exclusive reliance on which 
appears to be alien to the art of composition of ancient 
smrti texts, instead, it is much more likely (to go on 
with the same author) and this may interpret his above- 
quoted statement that "the variations between the pre­
scriptions laid down are supposed to reflect [in their 
Vedic link; my insertion] the changed habits of tribes 
or peoples in different areas, more or less influenced 
by indigenous usages or the peculiar exigencies of the 
political or economic situation". (Religion, Law and 
the State in India, ubi cit., p. 152).
5. Cf. K.V.R. Aiyangar, op.cit., p. 160; this holds equally 
true of Indian (philosophical) darsana-s (outlooks, 
views; from dris, to look at, to view) ; although they 
are often referred to as "philosophical systems" (Aiyan­
gar, ibid.), they cannot be qualified as such unless we 
speak of 'system' in a rather colloquial, non-technical 
and 'unphilosophical' sense.
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of the practical side of social.life,^ though Indians 
revel in classification and enumeration; but they were 
never urged nor felt the necessity to compress their 'ma­
terial' or opinion into an abstract and 'final' compendium 
aimed at an utmost systematic perfection. On the other hand 
the smrti composers, as G. Jha remarks , did not lack a 
"certain progressive spirit and desire" for adapting the 
topos of dharma to the naturally changing conditions and 
situations of life.
II. The earliest smrti specimens on dharma are so- 
called dharmasutras; they belong to the class of kalpa- 
(ritual)sutras, which form one part of the six Vedangas (the 
auxiliary 'sciences'), compositions required for the purpose
6. Cf. U.N. Goshal, The Relation of the Dharma Concept to 
the Social and Political Order in Brahmanical Canonical 
Thought, in: Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research 
Society, Patna, vol. XXXVIII, pt. 1, pp. 190-202; Gos­
hal observes (p. 192) concerning the dharma idea in the 
early smrtis that dharma "is conceived by these authors 
in the concrete form of the rules and principles [both 
expressions are to be grasped in an untechnical sense; 
insertion by myself] governing the lives of the social 
units"; consequentially Goshal speaks of ."this concrete 
conception of the dharma" (vide p. 192, infra). Nothing 
else do our smrti-s indicate, and a close inspection 
leaves us with the impression that flexibility instead 
of fixation ranked rather high although the social con­
stituents of varna and asrama may lead us in passing to 
a different impression. Cf. also Surama Dasgupta, Devel­
opment of Moral Philosophy in India, (Bombay, 1961), p. 
210 ("The smrtis, which have woven out a complex net­
work of social duties and values, have dealt with all 
the different levels of social life.").
7. Vide Ganganatha Jha, Hindu Law in its Sources, vol. I, 
(Allahabad, 1930), p. 2.
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8 —of interpreting the Vedas. The dharmasutras are, so to
say, manuals (or catalogues) comprising repertoires of
statements, precepts, maxims, etc. on the topos of dharma.
9They pass according to a usual enumeration under the names 
of Gautama (the oldest extant), Apastamba, Baudhayana, 
Vasistha, and so on, including the comparatively late sutra 
composition of Visnu. They are composed in succinct aphor­
isms intended to be learnt by heart.
-  10While the sutras are attached to a Vedic school, the
8. Vide Apastamba II, 4, 8, 13, pp. 121, in: The Sacred 
Laws of the Aryas, pt. I: Apastamba and Gautama, trans. 
by Georg Biihler, in: SBE, vol. II, (Oxford, 1879, repr. 
1975); R. Lingat, op.cit., pp. 10-14, 18 ff; Bechert/ 
v. Simson (Hg.), Einfiihrung in die Indologie, ubi cit., 
pp. 54-5; S.C. Banerji, Dharma-Sutras, a study in their 
origin and development, (Calcutta, 1962), pp. 1-6; N.C. 
Sen-Gupta, Evolution of Ancient Indian Law, (London, 
1953), p. 14.
9. Vide J.D.M. Derrett/T.K.K. Iyer, The Hindu Conception 
of Law, in: International Encyclopedia of Comparative 
Law, vol. II, ch. 1, V, (Paris-Tiibingen, 1975),
pp. 107-119, p. 115.
10. Derrett explains (Dharmasastra ..., op.cit., p. 25):
"The sutras, the crisp prose aphorisms, then typified 
cryptic teaching, arranged so as to recall to the stu­
dent, long after he had begun to earn as a scholar or 
ritual expert, what he had learnt in his teacher's 
school." An extremely remarkable point to mention is the 
fact of oral transmission for many generations (vide 
supra); to this Derrett observes (History of Indian Law, 
op.cit., pp. 20-21): "Jurists learnt the smrtis by heart 
and were able to trace back many customary practices 
directly or indirectly to the words of the sages who, 
supposedly, heard the truth about duty from the Self- 
existent One." An also important point is raised by 
K.V.R. Aiyangar, op.cit., pp. 83, 85, which may throw 
some additional light on the long-standing Indian habit 
of memorization and transmission: "In ancient India, 
there was a prejudice against books, i.e. knowledge re­
duced to writing. It was held to breed indolence, a 
grave weakness in a teacher or student. ... It corre­
sponded to a syllabus containing only topical headings 
that serve as guides to oral exposition and mental re­
capitulation by teacher and pupil." This memorization 
practice can be traced back to the Upanisads; vide P.V. 
Kane, History of Dharmasastra, ubi cit.,*vol. V, 2, 
sec. V I I f ctu XXVIII, p. 1180. On style and language of 
the dharmasutras, see also S.C. Banerji, Dharma-Sutras, 
op.cit., pp. 3-4.
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sastras (or smrtis) on dharma succeeding the sutras are
independent, and more detailed extensive compositions ar-
11ranged in a more easily memorable verse form. The most
important dharmasastra (or smrti composition on dharma) is
that one attributed to and passing under the name of Manu,
usually referred to as 'The Manu-smrti' or, when addressed
to an occidental public, 'The Laws of Manu' or 'The Code of 
1 2
Manu' , which unfortunately has the disadvantage that it 
may mislead, and thus lead an uninformed occidental observer 
to false conclusions. A consultation of J.D.M. Derrett's 
and T.K.K. Jyer's brief and intelligible passages under the 
heads of "The Role of the sastra" and "The Nature of the
, _ „ 13
sastra" in their expose "The Hindu conception of Law" can 
give helpful information in this matter; and the same is 
true of R. Lingat's chapter on "The Dharmasastras: The 
Manu-smrti"^ .
Apart from Manu-smrti there is a great number of smrti
compositions on dharma, the best-known of which are the
dharmasastras of Yajnavalkya and Narada as well as the frag-
15ments of Katyayana and Brhaspati. The smrti repertoire
11. Vide R. Lingat, op.cit., pp. 73-77 (on the difference 
between dharmasastra and dharmasutra).
12. In this way: G. Biihler, and R. Lingat (op. cit. , p. 77). 
Concerning the Manu-smrti I shall use and refer to G. 
Biihler's translation "The Laws of Manu", in: SBE, vol. 
XXV, ed. by F. Max Muller, (Oxford, 1886, repr. 1979).
13. Published in: International Encyclopedia of Comparative
Law, vol. II, 1, (Paris-Tiibingen, 1975), pp. 107-119,
111-15.
14. R. Lingat, op.cit., pp. 73-96.
15. Vide P.V. Kane, History of Dharmasastra, ubi cit., vol.
I, pp. XXIV ff (Synopsis of contents); Kane speaks of
a total number of about 100 smrtis (p. XXV) composed up 
to 800 A.D. about the period of the first appearances 
of commentators which are supposed to have existed by 
500 A.D. and authors of digests (p. XXXIV); cf. also 
A.S. Altekar, op.cit., p. 20.
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includes also (in fact though not in name) a composition
attributed to Kautilya (alias Kautalya), namely his Artha-
sastra (teaching of 'secular' ways of life, a manual on the
1 6
governmental art), which is produced in the sutra form.
In its intention.to stabilize the 'secular' ways of life it
supports the dharma orientation of the whole community in
17its different parts with different duties; altogether the 
Arthasastra is not unrelated to dharma, it covers ground 
covered to some extent in the dharmasastra, but its precon­
ceptions are entirely 'secular'. There are still the two 
famous epics, the Mahabharata including the Bhagavadgita, 
and the Ramayana, to be mentioned; these two smrtis are
equally relied on as a source of dharma, the Ramayana less
18 *frequently than the Mahabharata.
III. Although the subject-matters of the different 
teachings of dharma can be distinguished on the whole ac­
cording as they deal with two different kinds of affairs,
— 19with those called drstartha or adrstartha, their main—  • • •     • • • ■
question runs 'how to conform to such a way of life that 
can be accepted and qualified as being in accordance with
16. J.D.M. Derrett, Dharmasastra ..., ubi cit., p. 25;
P.V. Kane, ibid., p. XX-XXII.
17. Cf. F. Wilhelm, The Concept of Dharma in Artha and
Kama Literature, in: W.D. O'Flaherty/J.D.M. Derrett, eds., 
The Concept of Duty in South Asia, (New Delhi, 1978), 
pp. 66-79, pp. 70-1.
18. Vide P.V. Kane, ibid., p. XXVI (pp. 158-160); also 
J.D.M. Derrett, ibid., p. 46, where he observes that 
"the epics seem to borrow largely from the smrtis 
[the dharmasutras and dharmasastras, my insertion], 
and are occasionally themselves cited by the commen­
tators." (with further references, footnote 292).
19. Vide K.V.R. Aiyangar, op.cit., p. 78 (of course "There 
are again those which deal with both."); cf. M.M. Pat- 
kar, Treatment of Law in the Dharmasutras, in: The 
Poona Orientalist, vol. XXVI, 1 (1961), pp. 55-62,
pp. 61-2.
-  53 -
dharma*; and this question accounts for the 'practical*
rather than for the 'theoretical' in the intentions and
20treatment of our topos of dharma. Hence, even contradic­
tory answers only furnish the problem-orientation of this 
question whose solution depends on a (whole) situation with
variables which determine the problem and its subsequent
21
solution. "There is nothing static in the smrtis" , ex­
cept for the smrtis1 constant and indisputable reliance on 
two constituents existing in the four varnas as well as the 
four asramas; for these are to be taken as the constituting
pillars whereupon social and individual life entirely
22 -  rests. Moreover, they frame man's marga (way) furnished
with those many signposts of dharma directed towards the 
individual's nihsreyasa and, after all, if they are his con 
stant option, towards moksa. To follow dharma means first of 
all, according to sruti and smrti, to live one's life with­
in the limits of varna and asrama; in the words of Manu-
■ 0 —  -------------
smrti:
"For that man who obeys the law (dharma)
prescribed in the revealed texts (Veda)
and in the sacred tradition (smrti), gains
fame in this world and after death unsur-
23passable bliss."
20. Cf. J.D.M. Derrett, Religion, Law and the State in 
India, ubi cit., p. 153; N.C. Sen-Gupta, Evolution of 
Ancient Indian Law, (London, 1953), p. 1.
21. Shivaji Singh, Evolution of the Smrti Law, (Varanasi, 
1972) , p. 237.
22. Cf. the same, ibid., p. 237; Singh speaks of 'constants 
referring to the four varnas and asramas, and he adds 
(beyond the innumerable 'variables') a third 'constant' 
namely the four purusarthas, which are in my opinion 
not a constituting element comparable to the varna
and asrama 'scheme' (vide infra).
23. Manu-smrti II, 9 (trans. G. Biihler, SBE, vol. XXV, 
p. 31 (op.cit.)); cf. also the closing remark, Manu- 
smrti XII, 126 (ibid., p. 513).
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IV. There was a class of experts called acaryas, 
sastris, or gurus, generally members of the Brahmin varna , 
who occupied themselves with the task of studying, teach­
ing - the Brahmins' svadharma - and advocating dharma to 
all members of their community with respect to the dif­
ferent varnas and asramas. But they never regarded them­
selves as creators of dharma because there was nothing 
which had to be created, dharma existed and had only to 
be transmitted and promoted. Accordingly their first task 
required to study dharma, as it is stated in the Manu- 
smrti :
" (To study) this (work) is the best means 
of securing welfare, it increases under­
standing, it procures fame and long life,
24it (leads to) supreme bliss."
Their second important task comprised the teaching and 
advocating of dharma - that which made up the proper pro­
motion of dharma, including an educational process, the 
background against which a successful and lasting promo­
tion must be seen. All this calls for an evaluation of
smrti-texts under the practical needs of a dharma-orientated 
25community. Therefore to speak in terms of practical needs, 
means never to take the smrtis, especially the dharmasutras 
and dharmasastras, for what they are not and cannot be: 
a treatise (and by no means a specimen of book-law) 
evolving a theory of dharma in order specifically to govern
24. Manu-smrti I, 106 (ibid., p. 26).
25. Cf. J.D.M. Derrett, History of Indian Law (Dharma- 
sastra), ubi cit., pp. 20-21; the same, Dharmasastra 
and Juridical Literature, ubi cit., pp. 9, 11.
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practice. They are but the practical results of handling
practical problems for a wider benefit, namely to miss
2 6no' signpost (dharma) which, finally, leads to moksa .
26. "Characteristically", as Derrett writes (History of 
Indian Law (Dharmasastra), ubi cit., p. 19), "Indian 
'righteousness' does not lay down an exclusively 
valid way, but 'both this and that are true': this 
does not mean, however, that no order of preference 
exists in the abstract. ... (namely, to continue with 
Derrett) "ultimate bliss, relief from the pain of 
rebirth in the world."
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§ 9 Sources and Interpretation of dharma
I. Once the question is raised "what kind of human 
behaviour can be accepted as having the quality of dharma" 
one is referred to the sources of dharma. Generally three 
sources are relevant, although the Manu-smrti mentions 
four; they are, in the succession of their theoretical rel­
evance, the Veda (sruti), smrti, and acara (good custom),
—  * 1 -  -in addition atma-tusti (self-satisfaction). Acara needs 
—  - • • —  - ■ ■
2some explanation which I shall give later, sruti and smrti
3 —are not unknown to us, and atma-tusti is almost negligible
1. Manu-smrti II, 6: "The whole Veda is the (first) source 
of the sacred law [dharma], next the tradition [smrti] 
and the virtuous conduct of those who know the (Veda 
further), also the customs of holy men, and self-satis­
faction." (trans. G. Biihler, SBE, vol. XXV, ubi_cit. , 
p. 30); cf. Manu-smrti II, 12; Gautama I, 1-2; Apastam­
ba I, 1, 1, 1-3 (trans. G. Biihler, SBE, vol. II, ubi 
cit., p. 175, resp. p. 1; Vasistha I, 4; Baudhayana I,
1, 1, 1/3/4 (trans. G. Biihler, SBE, vol. XIV, ubi cit., 
p. 1, resp. p. 143. Aiyangar, op.cit., p. 73, observes 
that Yajnavalkya adds a fifth source, namely the desire 
to act springing from a pious resolve.
2. In short, Manu-smrti (henceforth only Manu, quoted after
G. Biihler, SBE, vol. XXV) II, 18: "The custom handed down 
in regular succession (since time immemorial) among the 
(four chief) castes (varna) and the mixed (races) of 
that country, is called the conduct of virtuous men 
[acara]." On the 'mixed castes' (the dif f erent
{-r-ctn different types of mixed marriages) and the elab­
orate theories to account for them and 'systematize' them 
see the recent publication by L. Rocher, Notes on Mixed 
Castes in Classical India, in: Adyar Library Bulletin 
XLIV-XLV, (1980-1), pp. 132-146.
✓
3. Cf. Manu II, 10 ("But by Sruti (revelation) is meant 
the Veda, and by Smrti (tradition) the Institutes of 
the sacred law [dharma]: those two must not be called 
into question in any matter, since from those two the 
sacred law [dharma] shone forth.").
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with regard to the authoritative-mbde of interpretation 
— — 4
(Mlmamsa); however it need not have been negligible in 
practice, since sila (good disposition, good conduct, eti­
quette) was itself a topic of instruction and provided some 
criteria, e.g. anrsamsya (humaneness), to assist a person 
experiencing doubt in a lacuna between traditional precepts 
(agama). Since the answer sought from dharma is the out­
growth of a practical problem the solution of which takes 
man to his 'desired' end, it deserves first of all a prac­
ticable answer, a direction to act. To this purpose sruti 
is only indirectly applicable because, as already mentioned, 
it lacks suitable direct precepts (especially the Rgveda).^ 
Nevertheless sruti remains the ultimate and 'constructive' 
as well as 'instructive' basis with respect to all other 
sources. Correspondingly smrti and acara may alter, not so 
sruti. Even invisible sruti overarches all 'later' sources 
of dharma. Hence, dharma remains always related to sruti. 
Compared to sruti all other 'systems', we should say 'non- 
Hindu' (e.g. Buddhist) 'systems', are founded on 'darkness'. 
This reads in the words of Manu:
"Those traditional texts outside the Vedas 
and whatever evil doctrines there may be, 
all they are without fruit after death -
4. Vide R. Lingat, op.cit., p. 7.
Appeal to one's own conscience or intuition can be made 
only by a person who is himself of unimpeachable morals, 
spirituality, and learning. Vide K.V.R. Aiyangar, o p . 
cit., pp. 74-5.
5. Vide Apastamba I, 4, 12, 10 (op.cit., p. 47): "... All 
precepts were (originally) taught in the Brahmanas,
(but) these texts have been lost ..." This indication, 
adding passage 11, comes into discussion when questions 
of textual interpretation are raised.
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they are traditionally feaid to be founded 
in tamas [darkness]."^
II. Since smrti is conceived of az. having been trans­
mitted in close correspondence and strict conformity with 
sruti one may rely on the dharmasastras as that whole auth­
oritative corpus that exists, so to say, as an extended ver-
7
sion of eternal Vedic words; though composed by men, it
g
shares in Vedic infallibility. Therefore, their precepts 
and statements on dharma are practically of foremost rel­
evance. The same holds true of acara as the third source of
9
dharma, for the smrtis themselves refer to it, recognizing 
that dharma in contact with human life can never be exhausted 
in 'isolated' precepts or in whatsoever manifestations of 
practical experience. The sastris had always to visualize the 
old in a new guise, or, in other words, new signposts (topoi) 
of dharma on the old basis to a never-changing destination.
6. Manu XII, 95 (trans. J.D.M. Derrett, Bharuci's Commentary 
on the Manusmrti, 2 vols., (Wiesbaden, 1975), p. 430; see 
also (ibid.) in translation Bharuci's commentary on this 
verse); vide also Biihler's trans. (SBE, op. cit., p. 505): 
"All those traditions (smrti) and all those despicable sys 
terns of philosophy, which are not based on the Veda, pro­
duce no reward after death; for they are declared to be 
founded on Darkness." Cf. also Medhatithi's commentary in: 
G. Jha, Manu-Smrti, (Calcutta, 1926), pp. 627-8; and Jai- 
mini I, 3, 3 ("Because dharma depends upon the Veda and the 
non-Veda is therefore not acceptable."), quoted after Jai- 
mini, The Mimamsa Sutras, trans. with an introduction by 
M.L. Sandal, (New York, 1979, repr.), p. 23, (The Sacred 
Books of the Hindus, vol. 28).
7. Vide P.V. Kane, History of Dharmasastra, ubi cit., vol.
V, 2, sec. VII, ch. XXVIII, p. 1182; cf. Roller, op.cit., 
p. 141.
8. Vide J.D.M. Derrett, Dharmasastra and Juridical Literature 
ubi cit., p. 18, with further references.
9* Vide Manu I, 107.
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And acara is one more topos to account for it.
III. The smrtis refer to acara as a source of dharma, 
and they do so in using several different expressions, name­
ly, apart from acara, sadacara or sistacara, and also sila
— — — — —    ■  • »  ■ - ’
and samaya signifying roughly 'conduct', or rather 'agree­
ment, convention or usage'; while the latter two words, some­
what distant from acara, sadacara or sistacara, are frequent­
ly employed in the smrtis to indicate a proper understanding
10 —of the third source of dharma. Acara ('ideal custom'), 
sadacara ('custom of the good'), and sistacara ('custom of 
the sistas', i.e. the 'disciplined') are for instance men- 
tioned in Manu, Vasistha, Baudhayana and Visnu. The praise 
of acara is especially exuberant in Vasistha who gives the 
following statement (VI, 1):
" (To live according to) the rule of conduct 
is doubtlessly the highest duty of all men.
He whose soul is defiled by vile conduct
1 2perishes in this world and in the next."
10. On acara or sadacara see for instance the explanations 
of P.V. Kane, History of Dharmasastra, ubi cit., vol.
Ill, ch. XXXII, pp. 825-855, also the subsequent chapter; 
R. Lingat, o p .cit., pp. 14-17, 176 ff; J.D.M. Derrett, 
G.-D. Sontheimer, G. Smith, Beitrage zu Indischem Rechts- 
denken, (Wiesbaden, 1979), pp. 21, 25 ff; J.D.M. Derrett, 
Religion, Law and the State in India, ubi cit., pp.
158 ff. It is my intention to give only the main charac­
teristic features of acara, and not to go into details 
which are sometimes open to controversy.
11. Vide Manu IV, 155-158; Vasistha VI, 1; 6-8; 43; Bau­
dhayana I, 1, 1, 4-6; Visnu LXXI, 90; (all ref. ubi cit.). 
Baudhayana for instance gives (ibid. I, 1, 1, 6 (trans.
G. Biihler) ) the following description of sistas (sishtas) : 
" (Those are called) Sishtas who, in accordance with the 
sacred law, have studied the Veda together with its ap­
pendages, know how to draw inferences from that, (and) 
are able to adduce proofs perceptible by the senses from 
the revealed texts." Vide also infra, my subseq. passage.
12. Trans. G. Biihler, SBE, vol. XIV, ubi cit. , p. 34.
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In contrast the Mahabharata, Vanaparva, is more explicit 
and affords a sufficient understanding; the passage runs 
as follows:
"And virtuous conduct is indicated by ac­
quisition of knowledge, pilgrimage to 
sacred places, truthfulness, forebearance, 
purity and straightforwardness. ... Those 
good men who know well the consequences of
the fruition of their good and evil deeds,
1 3are commended by virtuous men."
From all these indications and explanations we may 
gain the following viewpoints which are distinctive of acara 
as a source of dharma. Acara is given under the condition of 
a longstanding, at best an antique, practice which is wide­
spread, generally accepted, unambiguous and not principally 
in opposition to sruti and smrti wisdom, and being still ac­
knowledged as sistacara, the honoured practice of the 'vir­
tuous' or 'good'. Thus Vasistha says:
"A sista ... is one whose heart is free from  • « —
(wordly) desires and (only) such acts of 
sistas are (to be held as) dharma for which 
(wordly or secular) cause (or motive) cannot 
be assigned."^
It is important to observe that only such conduct can have
the qualification as sistacara that is purely adrstartha
" * 1 5(of an invisible purpose).
13. Mahabharata, Vanaparva CCVI, trans. P.C. Roy, vol. VI, 
(Calcutta, n.d.), pp. 457-8.
14. Vasistha I, 6-7 (trans. P.V. Kane, History of Dharma­
sastra, ibid., pp. 825-6, with further references); 
cf. the trans. of G. Biihler, op.cit. , p. 1.
15. Vide K.V.R. Aiyangar, op.cit., pp. 78-9; P.V. Kane, 
ibid. , pp. 827, 843; G. Biihler, SBE, vol. XIV, ubi cit., 
p. 1, note 7.
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Furthermore, sistas are only such persons who are very well 
versed in sruti and smrti and who are living according to 
their wisdom; a sista1s goodness, as Aiyangar observes,
"must have a background of intense belief in and [scil. in
16 _ _
thesi] a mastery of the Veda" . It follows that acara is
different from our understanding of 'custom'.
Briefly summarized we might say: Acara comprises ac­
cepted and honoured action in an adrsta spirit based on a 
firm belief in sruti and smrti, and entitled to be looked 
upon as a guide and pattern, thus to become, -for want of a 
sruti or smrt i 'dharma\ an additional source of dharma. Even wore.
R. Lingat has put it: "Thus acara, the way of life, 
is the supreme source of merit when it conforms to pre­
cepts . " ^
IV. The last passage of this paragraph is devoted to
some elucidating remarks on the interpretation of dharma in
1 8the context of the textual sources. Provided that the 
topos of dharma was not (and still is not) open to a satis­
factory definition by its 'nature' (as we know, it was not), 
it follows that the task of interpretation had to be mas­
tered by the ancient sastrTs. From Apastamba we learn:
"... Virtue [dharma] and Sin [adharma] do 
not go about and say, 'Here we are'; nor 
do gods, Gandharvas [lascivious (mythical)
16. K.V.R. Aiyangar, ibid., p. 74. Or, as R. Lingat, o p . 
cit., p. 14, says; "Sadacara is a religious life, ex­
clusively orientated towards the acquisition of spiri­
tual merit."
17. R. Lingat, ibid., p. 198.
18. The important reference is again P.V. Kane, History 
of Dharmasastra, ubi cit., vol. V, 2, sec. VII, ch. 
XXVIII-XXX, pp. 1152-1351. Further references are given 
in R. Lingat, op.cit., part two, ch. 1, esp. p. 150,
n . 12.
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beings], or Manes say (to men), 'This is
1 9virtue [dharma], that is sin [adharma]1"
-  20 Even Apastamba's subsequent statement cannot overcome the
difficulties in determining questions of dharma and adharma.
The aid of interpretation is always welcome with respect to
the difficulties, to continue with Apastamba, which arise
when one intends "to learn the sacred law [dharma] from (the
21letter of) the Vedas (only)" , and which are to be met with
in cases of unclear or doubtful indications to which Apa- 
22stamba refers.
Being unable to define dharma the sastris tried to de­
termine dharma as the respective situation called for. There 
are several possibilities. Laksmidhara states in his great 
digest of the first half of the 12th century that "dharma 
can be determined by [i.e. in respect of] its application 
in daily life, by consideration of the forms (svarupa) it 
takes, by its effects (phala) both seen and unseen, and by
the authority (pramana) behind it and the occasion (nimitta)
23for its use or application" . However, the ancient school 
of Mimamsa, dealing with and applying the exegetical method, 
give a definition of dharma, defining it, however, only for­
mally, namely, "the duty [dharma] is an object [artha]
19. Apastamba I, 7, 20, 6 (trans. G. Biihler, SBE, vol. II,
ubi cit., p. 72); c f . the translation given in R. Lin­
gat, op.cit., p. 197.
20. Ibid.I, 7, 20, 7 ("But that is virtue [dharma], the 
practice of which wise men of the three twice-born 
castes praise; what they blame, is sin [adharma].").
21. Ibid.II, 11, 29, 13 (p. 171).
22. Ibid.II, 11, 29, 14 (p. 171).
23. Ed. 1948, p. 5, quoted after K.V.R. Aiyangar, o p .cit., 
p. 63.
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- 24distinguished by a command [codjLna]" . In contrast, the
school of the Vaisesika also attempts at defining dharma,
saying that dharma is that from which prosperity (abhyu-
25daya) and beatitude (nih-sreyasa) result.
Both definitions, especially that of the Mimamsa (to 
which I shall confine myself), originated in close contact 
with Vedic texts in order to deal with and to arrive at a 
correct handling of sacrificial acts. To this extent they 
engaged in investigations of the Veda aiming at a correct 
knowledge of dharma. We owe to the commentary of Kumarila 
(7th. cent. A.D.) an explanation concerning the relation of 
dharma, Veda, and Mimamsa:
"When discussion about the correct knowledge
of Dharma is being carried on, Veda being
the means of such knowledge, mimamsa will
supply complete information about the sub-
2 6ject of the procedure or method."
24. The Mimamsa Sutras of JaiminT ,1,1,2, trans. with an intro­
duction by Mohan Lai Sandal, (New York, 1979, repr.), 
Sacred Books of the Hindus, vol. 28. The collection
of these sutras are regarded as the oldest extant, they 
may have originated between the third centuries B.C. 
and A.D. For more information see R. Lingat, o p .cit., 
p. 149.
25. Vide K.V.R. Aiyangar, ibid. Vaisesika is one of the 
six darsanas, the orthodox philosophical schools of 
the Hindus.
26. Quoted after P.V. Kane, HD, vol. V, 2, sec. VII, ch. 
XXVIII, p. 1185. Cf. the rather critical and most re­
cent article by N.S. Junankar, The Mimamsa Concept of 
Dharma, in: Journal of Indian Philosophy, vol. 10, 
no. 1, 1982, pp. 51-60 ("The Mimamsaka is concerned 
with the theory of meaning in so far as it enables him 
to instal the authority of the Veda on a pedestal where 
no foibles of human beings or their language can reach 
but which guarantees all the merits that human ingen­
uity can offer. (But) ... his arguments ... are not con­
vincing ." (p. 52)) .
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Mimamsa interpretation rules have been applied to 
smrti texts only after adaptation. On the other hand, not 
quite surprisingly, the smrti texts served as an object of
^ 27
Mimamsa investigation, so that we can speak of a mutual 
impact on each other with benefit for both. It is the domi­
nating intention of the sastrTs to teach their subject, 
namely dharma, with constant regard to the Mimamsa rules ,
once it is evident that a conflict of dharma dicta are out
2 8of the question.
The rules and maxims (of good sense) are chiefly to be 
understood as different types or tools to arrive at a deci­
sion (assuming the sastrl is forced to decide in a doubtful 
matter on dharma) with practical consequences. Therefore, 
several rules, not as an end in itself, have been invented; 
their main divisions, which need not be given here, are listed
in an easily comprehensible way within an encyclopedic ar-
29t i d e  by J.D.M. Derrett and T.K.K. Jyer. Apart from
27. Vide P.V. Kane, ibid., p. 1178.
28. In case of such a conflict the sastrTs were liable to
pay attention to the solution the smrtis themselves 
offered; e.g. Gautama I, 4: "If authorities of equal 
force are conflicting (either may be followed at) pleas­
ure." (trans. G. Biihler, SBE, vol. II, ubi cit., p. 175). 
Cf. Manu 11,14, with the same solution, but expressely
confined to a conflict of sruti texts. E.g. if sruti
and smrti texts are conflicting sruti prevails, for it 
holds the basic authority; whereas smrti prevails over 
acara. Vide J.D.M. Derrett et a l ., Beltrage zu Indischem 
Rechtsdenken, ubi cit., pp. 27-8. According to the prin­
ciple of unity of doctrine (ekavakyata), as K.V.R. 
Aiyangar, op.cit., p. 87, observes in explaining the dif­
ferent kinds of conflicting dharma dicta, there can be 
no real "'conflict of laws'" inside Dharmasastra. Con­
flict of opinions, of course, there will always be.
Cf. also P.V. Kane, ibid., pp. 1265 ff.
29. The Hindu Conception of Law, ubi cit., p. 116 (no. 185),
with a further reference. Vide also P.V. Kane, HD, vol.
V, 2, sec. VII,' ch. XXX, "On Mimamsa principles and the 
rules of interpretation in relation to Dharmasastra".
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other statements the Nyayakosa mentions that dharma is to 
be ascertained from an injunction when one has a (subjec­
tive) purpose (or desire),^0 thus taking up the above quoted 
definition of dharma by Jaimini. Summing up, we may say that 
what is ordered is dharma and what is strictly forbidden is 
adharma, and that a precept with an invisible purpose (a-
drstartha) is always superior to that with only a visible
- 31purpose (drstartha).
We may close here, but not without a remark on the 
persons, or group of persons forming an assembly, who were 
held to be authorized to state formally what could be ac­
cepted as dharma. Generally Brahmins were authorized and 
of course responsible to observe and propound dharma, whether
in cases that deserved their advice or conforming to their
32proper occupation to teach dharma to the other varnas.
Manu states:
"The Brahmin is said to be the creator, the 
punisher [i.e. discipliner], the teacher, 
the benefactor .
But whoever, to be sure, might administer 'law', Brahmins 
alone propounded dharma.
30. M.B. Jhalakikar, Nyayakosa or Dictionary of Technical 
Terms of Indian Philosophy, (Poona, 1928, revised ed.), 
p. 387 (I owe the translation of this passage to the 
kindness of J.D.M. Derrett). Cf. also on the Mlmamsa's 
primary object of study, the injunction, R. Lingat,
op.cit., pp. 153-156.
31. K.V.R. Aiyangar, ibid., gives the following example: 
"Rules which prescribe evening and morning prayers are 
Vedasiddha [established by the Veda] and adrstartha.
The political and other teachings of the kind in Darma- 
sastra ... come under the heads of drstartha or loka- 
siddha [established by the people, or the public, or 
popularly, or in daily life]."
32. Vide Manu XII, 108-114; Baudhayana I, 1, 1, 12-13; 16;
1/ 1/ 1/ 7-8 (concerning an assembly); Vasistha I, 16; 
III, 5; 20 (legal assembly); III, 7 (cf. Gautama V, 20).
33. Manu XI, 35 (trans. J.D.M. Derrett, Bharuci1s Commen­
tary, ubi cit., vol. II, p. 353).
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§ 10 Constituents of--dharma
1 2I. Varna and asrama , once being externally and in­
ternally established, form (at any rate from the smrti 
period onwards) the existential constituents of dharma in
the course of the world. Originated in sruti and promoted
4 5m  smrti under the condition of fostering dharma within
man's karmamarga, varna and asrama strengthened in their
own capacities the continuity of dharma and weakened all
contrapossibilities with only few exceptions .
1. Vide Diet, of Hinduism, ubi cit., p. 323; I give here a 
short note: its primary meaning is most general 'exter­
nal appearance', usually translated with colour or com­
plexion, and often referred to in the sense of 'caste' 
(from Latin 'castus' meaning pure) which is ultimately 
legitimized in Manu-smrti I, 31, although its first in­
dication may be traced back to the Rgveda X, 90, 11-12, 
the famous purusa-sukta (Hymn of Man, vide The Rig Veda 
(O'Flaherty, ubi cit.)).
2. Denoting the 'four stages of life' where man exerts him­
self. Vide Diet, of Hinduism, ibid., p. 22. It is still 
doubtful whether pre-Manu dharmasastrTs hinted at any­
thing like a system or systematic treatment of asrama(s) 
[the four stages of life]; vide also infra, footnote 10.
3. Vide Rgveda X, 90 (op.cit.) where the origin of all liv­
ing beings, especially the four 'components' of mankind 
are given according to their different functions.
4. Manu-smrti I, 31 (supra cit.). Vide B. Kuppuswami, Dharma 
and Society, (Madras, 1977), pp. 76-79 on "Divine Origin 
of Varna Vyavastha".
5. Since the purusa-sukta is of a relatively late date, we 
can presume that the topos of dharma was already present, 
at least in its foregoing rta imagination, and varna be­
came an additional, most effective constituent for the 
maintenance of order (dharma).
6. E.g. the rise of Buddhism (5th, or conceivably 4th cent. 
B.C.) in its strong opposition against the varna scheme 
and the Brahmins' spritual leadership on the basis of 
Veda.
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The following very few remarks and explanations are 
mainly designated to prepare a sufficient understanding 
(if possible) of what shall be treated subsequently in § 11, 
to which some central importance is attached. Of course, 
there would be much to say about varna and asrama in detail, 
especially about varna and jati, however, restrictions and 
confinement are inevitable considering the purpose of this 
enquiry in comparative jurisprudence. It can only set out 
the essential features in order to render possible a com­
parison between dharma, li, and nomos, such as is intended 
and outlined above. This must entail many shortcomings
which nevertheless may lead to a clear design though with
7
little strokes.
II. All smrti sources of dharma agree and take for 
granted in accordance with Manu-smrti I, 31 that
"but, for the sake of the prosperity of the 
worlds, he caused the Brahman a , the Kshat- 
riya, the Vaisya, and the Sudra to proceed 
from his mouth, his arms, his thighs, and 
his feet"^.
Accordingly man belongs to one of these varnas (classes,
'castes'); to the Brahmin varna with its priest and teacher 
function and obligation, to the ksatriya varna with its func­
tion and obligation to protect and to rule, to the vaisya 
varna obliged to the function of a tradesman or farmer, or
to the sudra varna with its sole function to serve the
9
three other classes. Furthermore, man has to spend his
7. Thus I shall be unable to enter into details or into the 
controversies on this subject which issuediwinnumerable 
debates for almost three millennia; on jati see Diet, of 
Hinduism, ubi cit., p. 128.
8. Trans. G. Biihler, op. cit. , pp. 13-14 (SBE, vol. XXV).
9. For more distinctions vide Baudhayana I, 10, 18, 2-6.
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life (at least theoretically) successively in the four as­
ramas . Gautama (III, 2) declares:
" (The four orders [asramas] are, that of) 
the student, (that of) the householder,
(that of) the ascetic (bhikshu), (and that 
of) the hermit in the woods (vaikhanasa) .1 0
Both, varna and asrama, are unanimously regarded as ir­
reversible elementary cornerstones of the interdependent 
individual and communal life; they are, as we should take
them, the basic existential constituents of dharma under
_ 11
the provision of karma and samsara. Imposed on man's des­
tiny in 'space and time1 varna and asrama contribute to 
order and stability at large; they preform the dharma course 
of the world. General security, unity of society, and fore­
seeable as well as reliable regularity could be guaranteed 
regardless of the many differences between human beings in
1 2
their respective situations and dispositions. Accordingly 
the smrtis (dharmasastra, and the two epics) go into detail
10. Trans. G. Biihler, op. cit. , p. 192 (SBE, vol. xII) ; ibid. 
explaining with Haradatta that "in all other Sastras 
(the order [asrama] of) hermits is the third, and (the 
order of) ascetics the fourth" - except for Apastamba 
(II, 9, 21, 1) who exactly agrees with Gautama. Cf. the 
explanation given by A.L. Herman, An Introduction (op. 
cit.), pp. 86-9; he renders: Brahmacarya, the Student 
Stage; Grhastha, the Householder Stage; Vanaprastha, 
the Forest-Hermit Stage; Sannyasa, the Ascetic Wanderer 
Stage. Vide also Manu I, 88-91. It is still uncertain 
whether Gautama really intended the asramas to be re­
sorted to successively.
11. Dharmasastra takes the propositions concerning karma 
and samsara for granted; vide J.D.M. Derrett, History 
of Indian Law, ubi cit., p. 36. For samsara vide Manu I, 
50 (op.cit.).
12. Cf. M.M. Patkar, Narada, Brhaspati, and Katyayana, (New 
Delhi, 1978), p. 5; Romila*Thapar, State formation in 
early India, in: Int. Soc. Sci. J . , vol. XXXII, 4, 
(1980), pp. 655-669, p. 660.
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stating and prescribing the many-duties (dharmas) of every­
body within the limitations of varna and asrama, and at­
taching sanctions of a social and/or a spiritual effect in 
order to ensure what the Mahabharata so clearly states:
"That which is capable of upholding
-  13
(dharana), is certainly dharma."
III. Some additional explanations on the constituents 
of dharma may be made before passing on. The fourfold varna 
division into which man enters by birth is of dharma-pra-
dhana (dharma‘auctoritas') in contrast to jati (birth) which
-  14
is of artha-pradhana (material or purposive 'auctoritas')
Hence varna membership serves a spiritual end; among the 
varnas only the Brahmin, the Ksatriya, and the Vaisya share 
the capability of being twice-born with their respective 
duties (svadharmas, vide § 11); the Brahmin varna is the 
most important, 'glorified' in Manu II, 87 with the words:
"But, undoubtedly, a Brahmana reaches the
1 5highest goal by muttering prayers only; ..."
Varna membership springs from a supernatural privilege owing 
to one's previous karma, a belief which has to govern also 
one's present life, in order to escape samsara ('bondage of 
life, death and rebirth') once for all and reach moksa 
(final release). Serving a spiritual end spiritual duties 
are in the highest esteem; but everyone is respected dis- 
charging his appointed varna duties wherefrom honour and 
esteem are gained, and not from sole membership of the
13. Mahabharata, Santi P., CIX, 10-12 (P.C. Roy, ubi cit.).
14. Pradhana denotes 'principal, important, having as one's 
authority'; cf. Monier-Williams, Diet., ubi cit., p. 
680. Vide also K.V.R. Aiyangar, op.cit., p. 123.
15. Trans. G. Biihler, op. cit. , p. 46 (SBE, vol. XXV).
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1 6varna. However, varna preserves a stable, unalterable 
spiritual superstructure encompassing the hundreds of jatis 
(subcastes) which arose varna-independently and do vanish 
thus; jati (after the 'joint family') provides social se­
curity under the varna 'roof' (resort) serving (as already 
mentioned) dharma-pradhana in contrast to artha-pradhana.
Similarly, asrama functions in man's individual life,
namely to prepare man most efficiently to make the best of
his present situation in fulfilling his respective duties
which are awaiting their reward. This division into four
1 7stages of life, sounding highly theoretically, is none­
theless, though often incomplete or brought to an end ir­
regularly, of good practical consequences. It is founded 
on the educational stage leading over to the householder's,
16. Vide K.V.R. Aiyangar, op.cit., p. 107; somewhere else 
he draws attention to the idea of 'superior' and 'in­
ferior', an idea which in his opinion "does not arise 
in the valuation of interdependent organs" (ibid., p. 
106); on page 123 he speaks of "the organic interde­
pendence of varnas as parts of a living social organism". 
With a different outlook B. KuppUswami (o p .cit.) points 
at the negative side of the varna and jati scheme which 
resulted that "Hindu society is, as it were, irreversibly 
fragmented" (p. 92) and thus, closed to ideas of equality 
and social mobility. On the interesting points on the 
"Impact of Ethno-Geographic Factors" concerning varnas 
and jatis see also Shivaji Singh, op.cit., pp. 164-176.
A.L. Basham, op.cit., pp. 147-151, holds an unbiased 
view avoiding dichotomous value-judgements when he pre­
sents his explanations, especially on varna and jati.
The same is true of R. Lingat, op.cit., pp. 29-45.
17. Vide Apastamba II, 9, 21, 2 (op.cit., p. 153 (SBE, vol. 
II)): "If he lives in all of these four according to 
the rules ... [of dharma], without allowing himself to 
be disturbed (by anything), he will obtain salvation."
Cf. Manu II, 88; Vasistha VII, 3, op.cit., p. 40, (SBE, 
vol. XIV). Cf. also Mahabharata, Santi P. CCLXXXVIII, 
op.cit., pp. 365-369. On the origin, development, and 
etymology of the idea/word of asrama see P.V. Kane, HD, 
ubi cit., vol. II, p. 1, ch. VIII, pp. 416-426.
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1 8the most important in the long run. Everybody according 
to his varna and jati dharma has the chance for self-exer­
tion through different modes of activities and prescribed 
requirements in each stage. Thus, asrama too evolves into 
a stabilizing constituent of dharma. We may be already 
aware of it, after having glanced over the tables of con­
tents in our numerous smrti texts; they pay extraordinary 
attention to these four asramas with fiisir respective ways
of life including the prescribed samskaras (initial, pre-
1 9paratory rites, purificatory ceremonies,sacraments).
The passing of man's life in four stages, idealiter
rounded up with a quarter of a century for each stage, is
also held to be governed by three debts which man has to
20discharge as sacred duties; the obligation to sages to 
whom man owes sruti and smrti, called rsi-rna, to be dis­
charged during the student's stage by studying the Vedas; 
the obligation to the ancestors, called pitr-rna, to be dis­
charged as a householder by marrying and having children, 
in order to continue the family line; and lastly the debt 
towards gods (and the whole creation), called deva-rna, to 
be discharged during the two final stages of a hermit (vana- 
prastha) and an ascetic (samnyasin) by performing sacrifices 
or sacred acts, expressed in the words of Manu:
"When he [the samnyasin] has paid the three 
debts, let him apply his mind to (the at­
tainment of) final liberation; he who seeks
18. "As all rivers, both great and small, find a resting- 
place in the ocean, even so men of all orders [asramas] 
find protection with householders." Manu VI, 90; trans. 
G. Biihler, op. cit. , p. 215.
19. E.g. Manu-smrti, chapters II-VI (roughly hso — fifths of 
the whole text). A.L. Basham, op.cit., p. 159, mentions 
that there are some forty samskaras from man's concep­
tion to his death.
20. Vide Vasistha XI, 48, ubi cit., p. 56, addressing a 
Brahmin.
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it without having paid '(his debts) sinks 
21downwards."
IV. Before closing this paragraph I should make two 
more remarks, a special and a general. I have mentioned al­
ready that the entry from one stage to the next depends on 
the previous performance of obligatory samskaras (supra), 
in order to enter 'in an improved, at best, perfect state
of being' the next stage which brings man closer to his 
22
final aim. This 'sacred procedure' may be understood as
the passing of a signpost (dharma) on man's karma-marga re­
lating worldly affairs with a supernatural goal. It is sum­
marized in Manu:
"With holy rites, prescribed by the Veda,
must the ceremony on conception and on
other sacraments be performed for twice-
born men, which sanctify the body and purify
23(from sin) in this (life) and after death."
Quite naturally the first stage creates and develops the 
educational foundation without which the tradition of the 
common Vedic heritage would be endangered, risking oblivion 
and at worst loss. Hence the strong emphasis of our smrtis 
laid upon education, namely in being taught (by Brahmins,
21. Manu VI, 35; see also the two following verses stressing 
the offer to direct one's mind to the aim of moksa, now 
when he shall live even without dharma, only devoted to 
attain moksa (final release from the bondage of samsara), 
vide Manu VI, 49, ubi cit., p. 207. Cf. R. Lingat, o p . 
cit., p. 51; K.V.R. Aiyangar, op.cit., p. 129.
22. Aiyangar, op.cit., p. 129, observes that samskaras are 
"fundamental in a conception of the Hindu way of life".
23. Manu II, 26, trans. G. Biihler, o p .cit. , p. 33.
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the transmitters of Vedic knowledge and wisdom) and study-
24ing this common heritage. Provided a successful enter­
prise, the necessary elements of human sensitivity and 
intellectual capabilities (or vice versa) have been stimu­
lated and fostered, in order to visualize the dharma rel­
evance for one's own and the community's benefit, yet to 
be sought and practised as one's own light or heavy burden, 
svadharma.
24. Vide Gautama VI, 21-23; and the whole chapter II;
Apastamba I, 1, 1, 14/16; I, 1, 1, 18 (indirect stress 
of producing Vedic learning, "the father and the mother 
produce the body only", trans. G. Biihler, op. cit. , 
p. 3); I, 2, 5, 7/9-11; Baudhayana I, 2, 3, 1; Manu II, 
112; (opera cit.). Vide also K.V.R. Aiyangar, op.cit., 
pp. 137, 142-4, 147-8.
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§ 11 Svadharma, sadharana-dharma, and ourusartha
I. Svadharma is a specific and distinct topos in re­
lation to varna and asrama. Dharma of varna and asrama is 
one's svadharma or varnasramadharma. It comes into focus
as the proper promotion of dharma in the early smrti period.
It is especially distinguished from sadharana-dharma (com­
mon dharma or residual dharma). All together there are vari­
ous special or relative dharmas (duties) complementing each 
other, even including sadharana-dharma which is not 'ab-so- 
lute' and not opposed to svadharma although the latter has 
indisputable priority. Moreover, dharma is present as puru- 
sartha (aim or good of man) usually being linked with artha, 
kama, and moksa.
Apart from varnasramadharma, which is interchangeable 
with svadharma, being the emphasized expression with reference 
to everyone's own and peculiar dharma relative to one's var- 
na and present stage of life (asrama), there are, as men­
tioned, usually four more (special) dharmas: varna-, asrama-, 
gunadharma (dharma of quality or function) and naimittika- 
dharma (dharma of occasion).
The following exposition centres on svadharma as the 
principal topos characteristically applied to individual 
duties within the existing constituents of dharma. Two more 
sections then follow dealing with sadharana-dharma and puru- 
sartha respectively. Of course, this is not the whole pic­
ture of the promotion of dharma in the early smrti period, 
but it is the essential part of it.
II. What is dharma according to the smrtis' teaching?
The answer is relatively easy. J.D.M. Derrett pointed it 
out: "Nominate the man, state his age, caste, and status,
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and one can be told what his dharma is." It is his sva- 
dharma, explicitly supported in the words of Manu:
"Rather one's own dharma [svadharma] badly
2
done than that of another well performed."
And the Arthasastra states:
"(The observance of) one's own special duty 
[svadharma] leads to heaven and to endless 
bliss.
To expound in detail these special or relative dharmas 
(duties) must be seen as a proper function of all smrtis 
which have taken over the task of promoting dharma on the 
basis of sruti. Hence, the Gautama-sutra remarks close to 
the end:
1. J.D.M. Derrett, Social and Political Thought and Insti­
tutions , in: A.L. Basham, ed., A Cultural History of 
India, (Oxford, 1975), pp. 124-140, p. 127; cf. also, 
the same, History of Indian Law, ubi cit. , p. 21. Or one 
might ask after kartavyata, "what ought to be done?" And 
one would get the answer: "Dharma requires to be done 
that which is enjoined, and requires that we abstain from 
what is forbidden", according to dharmasastra. (the same, 
The Hindu Conception of Law, ubi cit., p. 110.
2. Manu-smrti X, 97 (trans. J.D.M. Derrett, Bharuci's Com­
mentary on the Manusmpti, vol. II, (Wiesbaden, 1975), 
p. 328; cf. trans. by G. Biihler, op. cit. , p. 423 (SBE, 
vol, XXV). Vide also the almost equal wording of the 
Bhagavadgita III, 35; XVIII, 47 (A New Translation by K.
W. Bolle, (Berkeley, 1979)).
3. Arthasastra I, 3, 14 (trans. R.P. Kangle, The KautilXya 
Arthasastra, Parts I-III (Text, Translation, Study), 
(Bombay, 1969, 1972, 1975), part II, p. 8.
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"The law [dharma] of castes and of orders
4
[of varnas and asramas] has been declared."
The corresponding passage in the Manu-smrti runs:
"0 sinless one, the whole dharma has been
5
stated for the four castes by you."
Bharuci's comment on this passage is instructive, it may elu­
cidate our understanding of svadharma which obviously amounts 
to the 'heart of the matter' in determining man's duty with 
constant regard to his place and time in the universe; thus 
Bharuci expounds Manu-smrti XII, 1 as follows:
"One may object that by the word "of the 
four castes" the dharma of the asramas 
(stages of life) has been excluded. There 
is no exclusion, because, as the class 
[varna] cannot perish or be separated from 
the individuals, the dharmas of asramas 
are none other than the dharmas of the 
castes."^
4. Gautama XIX, 1 (trans. G. Biihler, op.cit., p. 274 (SBE, 
vol. II); cf. Manu II, 5, (SBE, vol. XXV, p. 29: "He who 
persists in discharging these (prescribed duties) in the 
right manner ['as they are prescribed in the Vedas and 
without expecting rewards'], reaches the deathless state 
and even in this (life) obtains (the fulfilment of) all 
the desires that he may have conceived." (trans. G. Biih- 
ler, op.cit.)); Apastamba II, 1, 2, 2, (SBE, vol. II, 
p. 102: "Men of all castes, if they fulfil their (as­
signed) duties, enjoy (in heaven) the highest, imperish­
able bliss." (trans. G. Biihler, op. cit.) .
5. Manu XII, 1 (trans. J.D.M. Derrett, Bharuci's Commentary
on the Manusmrti, ubi cit., p. 414); cf. trans. by G. 
Biihler, op. cit., p. 483 (SBE, vol. XXV).
6. Bharuci XII, 1 (trans. J.D.M. Derrett, ibid.).
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Thus man's varna is his irrevocable identity, any act against
which must destroy man and the overarching order (i.e. dhar-
ma -in the transmitted meaning of sruti, esp. of Rgvedic 
7
origin).
Varna-dharma is always implicitly asrama-dharma, for 
man naturally finds himself in one of the four asramas. For 
reasons of distinction and classification asrama-dharmas 
are expressly and separately listed. However, varnasrama- 
dharma determines one's svadharma on which the celebrated
g
Bhagavadgita gives four explicit instances. This very work, 
part of the widely known Mahabharata, culminates on empha- 
zising the importance of performing one's own duty (sva­
dharma) if one does not want to miss the desired end of 
moksa. To this end the performance of svadharma (including 
also a person's sex and position in the social scale) must 
also be seen in the interests of social stability for the 
present and, still more, for many generations to come; there­
fore a breach of svadharma, whose sruti origin makes it sac­
rosanct, is first of all a sin with appropriate conse- 
9
quences. That it is also a social offence is not surprising 
because svadharma has to serve the preordained order that 
is identical with sruti-dharma sustaining the universe once and
7. K.V.R. Aiyangar observes that 1 varna-dharma is social 
planning, in which the spiritual, educational, military, 
administrative and economic functions are attached per­
manently to certain hereditary groups, ensuring the 
transmission of professional ideals and standards and 
efficiency" (op.cit., p. 68).
8. Vide Bhagavadgita II, 31 ("Considering also the duty of 
your own class"); II, 33; III, 35; XVIII, 47 (the first 
two lines of the last two verses are identical), trans. 
after K.W. Bolle, op.cit., p. 27. Svadharma is an empha­
sis of what is really man's varnasrama; cf. Rajendra 
Prasad, The Theory of Purusarthas: Revaluation and Re- 
construction, in: J. of Indian Philosophy 9 (1981), pp. 
49-76, pp. 57-59.
9. Cf. K.V.R. Aiyangar, op.cit., pp. 68-9.
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for ever. ' '
Probably with regard to dharmasastra, so to say giving
  -JO
a survey, the Arthasastra (vide supra) lists in the be­
ginning, just after the 'enumeration of sections and books' 
and the 'enumeration of the sciences', and before 'estab­
lishing (the necessity of) economics, and the science of 
politics' the special duties (dharmas) of the four varnas 
and the four asramas, including sadharana-dharma (the duties 
common to all varnas and asramas); it concludes this chap­
ter with the remarkable words, summarizing the one idea and 
purpose of all teachings on dharma:
"For, people, among whom the bounds of the 
Aryan rule of life are fixed, among whom 
the varnas and the stages of life [asra­
mas ] are securely established and who are
guarded by the three Vedas, prosper, and
11do not perish."
Considering the two different preconceptions and intentions 
of teachings in arthasastra and dharmasastra we might apply 
the distinction between pravrtti-dharma and nivrtti-dharma, 
the one set of dharmas which directs man to ordinary life,
10. The Arthasastra, as stated above, is (despite precepts 
relating to religious institutions and performances) a 
work of entirely secular preconception and purpose; for 
a quick survey see there the essential duties (dharmas) 
as they are enumerated (trans. by R.P. Kangle,
op.cit.).
11. Arthasastra I, 3, 17 (trans. R.P. Kangle, ibid., p. 9). 
The other idea and purpose of dharmasastra are (as al­
ready mentioned) to lead man to moksa. J.D.M. Derrett 
explained this twofold intention of 'smrti dharma' (con­
cerning the two sorts of religious injunctions) as re­
garding social facts (covered only to some extent by 
dharmasastra, but entirely by arthasastra) and 'trans­
social' facts (I should like to say) involving the indi­
vidual "who seeks moksa, nivrtti, the cessation of •  * - « .
striving and suffering and experience altogether" (Re­
ligion, Law and the State in India, ubi cit., p. 69).
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to fit into the existing order of his life-world, and the
other set of dharmas which relates him to the (final) re-
1 2lease from this world.
Coming back to dharmasastra, we should be clear that 
the individual's dharma was constantly attempted to be 
predicated and ready for application in any situation.
There was an unceasing search to find the right way of liv­
ing, to give sufficient and practical advice so that every­
one could be sure about his svadharma upon which so much 
of one's 'destiny' depended. Not only the Mahabharata with 
the Bhagavadglta but also the Ramayana, the other great 
epic, abounds with instances, such as follows:
"Thus happiness accrues to one who dis­
charges his duty; through performance of
one's duty, the whole world is conquered,
1 3duty constituting its very marrow."
It is not difficult to observe that obviously the the­
ory of svadharma, assuming a corresponding practice, could 
easily be used to repel efforts directed and launched to 
upset the social and spiritual equilibrium. Correspondingly 
varna and asrama, the foremost constituents of dharma, were
widely held to counterbalance 'anti-dharmic' disturbances
1 4and thus to secure the balance of the social whole.
The permanent call for svadharma enacts the stabil­
izing factor within those constituents. And all further
12. Cf. J.D.M. Derrett, ibid., p. 70; K.V.R. Aiyangar, o p . 
cit., p. 66.
13. Ramayana III, 9 (trans. Hari Prasad Shastri, 3 vols. , 
(London, 1952, 1957, 1959), p. 20.
14. Cf. the critical remarks concerning varna-dharma by
B. Kuppuswami, op.cit., p. 52.
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15divisions of dharma provided by dharmasastra, as there
are additionally guna-dharma and naimittika-dharma, serve
the same intention. There is a clearly defined contrast to
be observed between such duties which are truly obligatory 
1 6(nitya ) and such qb are opteis2 (of pleasure), called 
kamya (directed to specific kama (pleasure)), in between are 
the naimittika-dharmas (duties), acts which should be done 
on specific occasions or for specific purposes; the impli­
cation of dharmasastra is that it defines dharma and adhar-
ma for a given situation referring to nitya, naimittika or
v- 17kamya.
We may remember the relationship between dharma and 
karma (supra, § 6), namely that karma without dharma would 
be void, and dharma without karma ineffective; the same 
holds true especially with respect to the smrtis1 conception 
and teaching of svadharma. The shift of emphasis from the 
period of the Upanisads to the dharmasastra1s task of teach­
ing the dharmas of all varnas and asramas considering the 
'force' of karma is quite obvious in all existing composi-
15. Vide supra, § 11; the different kinds of special or re­
lative dharma are usually given in five distinctions, 
cf. K.V.R. Aiyangar, op.cit., pp. 66-7; Bhavisya-pura- 
na cited by Laksmidhara, Krtya-kalpa-taru, brahmacari- 
kanda, p. 7, quoted after J.D.M. Derrett et al., Bei- 
trage . . . . , ubi cit., p. 12; cf. also J.D.M. Derrett,
The Concept of Duty ..., ubi cit., p. 30, who lists six 
kinds including sadharana-dharma, thus agreeing with the 
Nyayakosa, op.cit., p. 387. I shall explain sadharana- 
dharma separately for reasons given above. Anyway, there 
will be only a different method of explanation on this 
issue, for the treatment of the subject-matter as well 
as its interpretation remains the same irrespectively
of the enumeration.
16. Nitya confers the meanings of ordinary, usual; in our 
context esp. of invariable, fixed, obligatory, necess­
ary; vide M. Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit-English Dic­
tionary (1899), ubi cit., p. 547.
17. Most of the matters leading to Anglo-Hindu law come 
under nitya.
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tions. J.D.M. Derrett points outr "The way to achieve good
karma and to avoid evil must be taught by teachers. These
have to be trained. The sastra assimilated two roads to
achieving merit, avoiding the clash between the two paths
of karma (action, sacrificial endeavour) and yoga (devotion,
1 8asceticism) which reason could hardly avoid."
On the individual's part to achieve good karma compet­
ence (adhikara) is prerequisite, in other words, one's sva­
dharma is essentially required. For instance, to teach the 
Veda is the svadharma of the Brahmin householder, he alone 
has the (preordained) competence, so that from his karma 
(act) a good result is to be expected which attaches itself 
to the act and the performer. We should remember that "every 
act of Dharma is believed to create an invisible effect 
termed apurva or adrsta" and that, resting solely on Vedic
authority, "the existence of this influence cannot be 
1 9proved" . However, to practice one's svadharma but merely 
in expectancy of a good result is not wanted. Man, says 
Apastamba,
18. J.D.M. Derrett, History of Indian Law, ubi cit., p. 19/
20. Cf. P.V. Kane, HD, op.cit., vol. V, part 2, pp. 
1530-1612. Evidently, the successful promotion of dhar- 
ma rests on the doctrine of karma which itself is of 
sruti origin and thus a part of the foundation of smrti, 
esp. of dharmasastra. This may be illustrated with Gau­
tama, the (supposed) eldest smrti specimen on dharma:
" (Men of) the (several) castes and orders [varnas and 
asramas3 who always live according to their duty enjoy 
after death the rewards of their works, and by virtue 
of a remnant of their (merit) they are born again in 
excellent countries, castes, and families, (endowed) 
with beauty, long life, learning in the Vedas, (virtu­
ous) conduct, wealth, happiness, and wisdom." (XI, 29). 
"Those who act in a contrary manner perish, being born 
again in various (evil conditions)." (XI, 30). "The ad­
vice of the spiritual teacher and the punishment (in­
flicted by the king) guard them." (XI, 31). Trans. G. 
Biihler, op . cit. , p. 238 (SBE, vol. II).
19. K.V.R. Aiyangar, op.cit., p. 64.
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"shall not fulfil his sacred duties [i.e. 
svadharma] merely in order to acquire these 
worldly objects (as fame, gain, and honour).
For when they ought to bring rewards (duties 
thus fulfilled) become fruitless."
Not only kamyakarma (actions aimed at securing pleasant re­
sults) is relatively fruitless (nis-phala) but also good 
acts done indifferently without the necessary belief in
their proper value are ineffective for one's final release
—  21from samsara (the circle of birth, death, and rebirth).
Moreover, the Bhagavadgita reminds man to be aware of all 
his activities as being only an offer to Brahman.
"Whatever you do, or eat, or sacrifice, or 
offer, whatever you do in self-restraint, 
do as an offering to me. Thus you will be 
freed from the prison of deeds and their 
results, good and evil. Wholly trained in
22renunciation, released, you will come to me."
20. Apastamba I, 7, 20, 1-2 (trans. G. Biihler, op.cit. ,
SBE, vol. II, p. 71). Vide also Manu II, 2-3 (SBE, vol. 
XXV, p. 29); Bhagavadgita IV, 14; V, 12 ("The disci­
plined man gives up the results of his acts and attains 
perfect peace. The undisciplined man acts out of desire; 
he is attached to the results; his acts imprison him." 
Trans. K.W. Bolle, op.cit., p. 65).
21. We have seen (supra, § 6) that there exists in late sruti 
imagination an intrinsic relationship with dharma, kar­
ma and samsara that now completely surfaces in the to- 
pos of svadharma (varnasramadharma) in view of moksa.
22. Bhagavadgita IX, 27-28 (trans. K.W. Bolle, op.cit., pp. 
109-111); cf. also ibid., XVIII, 5-6 (p. 195). By the 
way,we may take notice of an instructive annotation by 
K.V.R. Aiyangar, op.cit., p. 91, namely that the "ex­
treme Vedantins permit the performance of enjoined karma 
like Agnihotra (daily fire-rite) as commanded by sruti. 
Other Vedantins take every enjoined act as designed as 
an offering to Brahman, to be done with the conscious­
ness that it is a form of adoration of the Supreme Being. 
In this sense Dharma is synonymous with worship. It 
links ethics with religion and philosophy, and fuses 
Dharmasastra with Vedanta." Theory and practice of re­
nunciation, or transfer of merit, important within Budd­
hism, cannot be discussed here.
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It may be superfluous to point out that care for one's 
own specific dharma does not amount to a kind of cherished 
egocentrism or the like, nor should it be mistaken for an 
artificial demarcation between individual and community.
For man's duties (except for the last stage, the ascetic's 
asrama) are related and permanently directed towards his 
'life-world', as there are his teacher, his parents, child­
ren, wife et cetera. The emphasis of svadharma inculcates 
the individual's responsibility for the whole. Provided that 
one's svadharma is being done (idealiter) perfectly, one has 
complied with community's expectations, and simultaneously
discharged one's duties towards moksa which is not counted 
_ 23
among kamya-karmas. All this is held to accrue to the per­
fect whole, comprising man and his community stabilized in 
dharma, here to be regarded as the overarching order.
To ensure this whole-scale state of dharma the smrtis 
(dharmasastras) were concerned about precepts, also for times 
and situations of distress (apad) when the regular (pre­
scribed) performance of svadharma would be difficult or
even impossible. Under such circumstances, called apad-
24 _dharma , exceptions from varnasrama-dharma (svadharma) are
permitted. Manu says:
"So the dharmas in time of distress have 
been set out for the four castes: those who
25
perform them properly reach the highest state."
23. Pleasant acts which are drstartha and distinct from ni­
tya- and naimittika-karma (vide supra, this §), whereas 
the practice of dharma for its own sake, called niska- 
myakarma, leads to moksa.
24. Apad, here: to get into trouble, fall into misfortune; 
vide Monier-Williams, Diet., ubi cit., p. 142.
25. Manu-smrti X, 130, trans. J.D.M. Derrett, Bharuci's Com­
mentary ..., ubi cit., p. 339; Manu has devoted a whole 
section (X) to apad-dharma, introduced with the words 
(IX, 336, last verse of this section): "Now learn in due 
order what it [the fine profession of dharma] is during 
distress." (ibid., p. 289). Vide also Bharuci's comment 
on the quoted Manu verse (X, 130), ibid., p. 339. Cf. in 
SBE, vol. XXV, pp. 401-430, G. Biihler's trans., op.cit.
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The effect of those explicitly prescribed restrictions, e.g.
to offer sacrifices for all members of all varnas or to make
* 26one's living according to that of the next inferior varna,
can be considered as regular (being provided as such) and
natural adjustment, bringing theory and practice into ac- 
27cord.
There is little doubt that svadharma, as has been ex­
plained, dominates in dharmasastra, even if it be admitted 
that the society was (broadly speaking) 'collective'. In 
contrast only marginal attention is devoted to those topoi 
to which occidental observers usually refer as cardinal vir­
tues for community life. Those 'virtues' pass under the ex-
 ^ 28 
pressions of slla and sadharana-dharma and figure various­
ly in smrti texts. They are the common duties (sadharana- 
dharmas) irrespective of varna and asrama. In Gautama we 
find the following passage:
"Now (follow) the eight good qualities of
the soul, (viz.) compassion on all creatures,
forbearance, freedom from anger, purity,
quietism, auspiciousness, freedom from avar-
29ice, and freedom from covetousness."
26. Vide Gautama VII, 4-5; cf. Vasistha III, 24-25 (both 
ubi cit., SBE, vols. II, XIV).
27. We may also visualize apad-dharma rules as the necessary 
legitimation of inevitable occurrences and practices.
Cf. A.L. Basham, o p .cit., p. 140.
28. G.-D. Sontheimer, The Joint Hindu Family, (New Delhi,
1977), explains "sadharana used as an adjective finds 
application if something*is 'common' or 'commonly ap­
plicable' to the whole of the society, i.e. ... the 
four varnas, but may also be used if something is 'com­
mon' or 'peculiar' to a closed group like a caste, guild, 
family, gotra, etc." (p. 35).
29. Gautama VIII, 22-23, trans. G. Biihler, op.cit. , p. 217 f 
(SBE, vol. II).
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Manu enumerates only five common' dharmas, as they are
"the sum of dharma in the four castes [var­
nas ]", namely, "abstention from injury, 
truth, absence of anger, purity, restraint 
of the senses"^.
III. It is maintained that sadharana-dharma conforms
31to a "comprehensive code of ethics" as K.V.R. Aiyangar 
has observed; yet this characteristic may not lead us to the 
assumption that the smrtis contained anything like an ethi­
cal theory or a theory of universal morality. It goes with­
out saying that no part of Hindu dharma relates to 'man1 
as man including mlecchas (non-Hindus). Moreover, neither 
there is a detailed analysis of any of the common duties 
nor an attempt at exhaustive or systematic treatment of 
sadharana-dharma as an isolated subject. Principal questions
on their fundamental truth, on validity or standardization 
32did not arise.
Smrti composers felt an obligation to teach the re­
spective dharma for every member of the community, and only 
to this extent sadharana-dharma could play its role in
30. Manu X, 63, trans. J.D.M. Derrett, Bharuci's commen- ■ 
tary ..., ubi cit., vol. II, p. 316 (orig. vol. I, p. 
216); Ibid. Bharuci1s remarkable comment: "... this 
dharma of the individual consisting in abstention from 
injury, and so on, is to be seen as applying even to 
those who spring from others than the four castes." Cf. 
the early dharmasutras of Apastamba I, 8, 23, 6 (p. 78)
and Vasistha IV, 4 (p. 26), both ubi cit., SBE, vols.
II, XIV; cf. also Arthasastra I, 3, 13 (p. 8), ubi cit.; 
Nyayakosa, ubi cit., p. 387. K.V.R. Aiyangar observes 
that the smrtis give catalogues of general virtues 
which amount when arranged to over thirty terms (ubi 
cit., p. 67).
31. K.V.R. Aiyangar, o p .cit., p. 67. Cf. S.K. Maitra, The 
Ethics of the Hindus, (Calcutta, 1963), p. 23.
32. Cf. P.V. Kane, HD, ubi cit., vol. II, ch. I, p. 11.
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guiding man in his behaviour for* the benefit of the whole 
community and yet, as part of the whole, for his own well­
being in this world and hereafter. Accordingly the cardinal 
virtues (dharmas) of ahimsa (abstention from injury) and
satyam (truth) shine forth most prominently in serving this 
33purpose; they are, no doubt, "basic to the very existence
33. The evaluation of ahimsa as well as the general distinc­
tion between sadharana-dharma and svadharma belongs 
mainly to the smrti period; while originating as doc­
trine with the Upanisads (the Vedic age knew little prac­
tice of ahimsa compared to Asoka, the emperor of the 
third century B.C., who propagated and practised it 
widely according to his desire for dharma-vijaya (con­
quest by means of dharma) ) , ahimsci entered not only in­
to the dharmasastras and the epics but in the first 
place into the teachings of the unorthodox Jains and 
Buddhists where it was held in great esteem and prac­
tice, and thus presumably influencing the later smrtis 
in their emphasis on ahimsa. Vide e.g. Manu IV, 148;
170; VI, 39-40; 52; 68-9; 75; in this book Manu is con­
cerned with the dharmas of the asrama of the samnyasin, 
and for him especially, who has turned his mind toward 
moksa but still being kept on his karmamarga and not 
merely pursuing his jnanamarga, ahimsa is a very prac­
tical precept of great significance not easily to be 
followed: "With a view to the preservation of living 
beings he should always, by day or by night, even dur­
ing bodily sickness, walk scanning the ground." (VI, 68; 
trans. Derrett, Bharuci's Commentary ..., ubi cit., p. 
19). K.V.R. Aiyangar, op.cit., p. 160, explains that 
"among the five yamas [rules of restraint] ahimsa comes 
first, because in social relations it is easiest to 
cause pain (in the extended sense)" and that "truth (sa­
tyam) comes only after a-himsa". Arising from passages 
which mention satyam in the first place, such as e.g. 
Mahabharata, Santi P. CLXII, saying that truth is the 
highest duty, we may have some doubts (as indicated for 
the pre-Buddhist period) whether there is in fact a 
clear priority of ahimsa over satyam, including also 
for the dharmasastra period with its emphasis on satyam 
in many places (e.g. Manu II, 179; IV, 138-9; 170, 175- 
6; Visnu LXX, 73-4) certainly bearing in mind that sa­
tyam is of Vedic origin where it played a prominent 
part with important consequences for the later legal 
procedures. Virtually this question of priority is sec­
ondary and only of theoretical interest, since both 
dharmas (duties) are to be practised with equal atten­
tion when the respective situation calls for it. Note 
the permitted deviations from satyam when limb, liveli­
hood and life are in jeopardy discussed by Derrett, 
Privileged Lies, in: Adyar Library Bulletin XLIV-XLV, 
(1980-1), pp. 285-292, 290-1, and compare Buddhist re­
fusal of concessions - "In no case is he [the Buddhist] 
allowed to tell a lie." (Tachibana, The Ethics of Budd­
hism, (London, 1926, 1975), p. 250 (243-256).
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34and survival of human society" • *, and their advocation for
all asramas bespeaks "the eternal [sanatana] verities about 
35conduct" . However, in a conflict of svadharma with sa­
dharana-dharma , especially exemplified in the conversation 
between Arjuna and Krsna in the celebrated Bhagavadgita 
(concerning the ksatriya1s duty to kill if the situation
calls for it, thus touching upon the problem of ahimsa),
* 3 6svadharma has been given an indisputable preference, prob­
ably with good reason, namely in order to ensure the pre­
ordained balance of the universe according to the Vedic im­
agination of dharma (here the irreversible order of human 
affairs in coagulated relations and activities).
IV. It is readily allowed that the promotion of dhar­
ma can also come under consideration with relation to what 
is commonly called purusartha either within the trivarga 
or, including moksa, within the caturvarga scheme. Although 
purusartha (literally 'purpose(s) of man (individual)')
"is not a technical term but a word of common usage in Sans-
37 _
krit" it appears to be scarcely used in the dharmasastra
of Manu. We find it in the section concerning the duties
(dharmas) of the ruler (raja) :
34. Rajendra Prasad, The Theory of Purusarthas: Revaluation 
and Reconstruction, in: J. of Indian Phil. 9 (1981), 
pp. 49-76, p. 58.
35. J.D.M. Derrett/T.K.K. Jyer, The Hindu Conception of Law, 
ubi cit., p. 113.
36. Though binding on every one,irrespective of varnasrama, 
sadharana-dharma is (situationally) overruled by sva­
dharma . And principally, as mentioned in the Bhagavad­
gita, in the case of the Ksatriya's duty to fight; vide 
e.g. Manu VII, 87-98 (ubi cit.). Cf. W.D. O'Flaherty,
The Clash between Relative and Absolute Duty ..., ubi 
cit., p. 97.
37. Rajendra Prasad, ibid., p. 50.
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"He should know these fOUr-fold means of
3 8attaining the ends of man [purusarthas]."
It conveys the meaning, most generally, of 'any object of 
39human pursuit' , thus, the end of man or the aim of human
existence. And there are conventionally altogether four aims,
— 40namely, dharma, artha, kama, and moksa. The controversy
existing to some degree whether purusartha represents the
trivarga or caturvarga scheme, i.e. the three- or four-fold
(including moksa) set of human aims, is here negligible; it
adds nothing to our further understanding of dharma.
With reference to the Manusmrti we can observe that the
trivarga as well as the caturvarga scheme is mentioned ac-
41cording to the context. Manu speaks for instance of the 
combination of the three purusarthas, of dharma, kama, and
38. Manu VII, 100 (trans. J.D.M. Derrett, Bharuci's Commen- 
tary ..., ubi cit., vol. II, p. 63, (cf. SBE, vol. XXV, 
p. 232)) .
39. Vide Monier-Williams, Diet., ubi cit., p. 637.
40. By now all of them may be well known except for kama 
which means 'pleasure' and is especially dealt with in 
the literature devoted to it, namely the Kamasutra where 
we find the following explanation (I, 2, 11): "Kama is 
the enjoyment of appropriate objects by the five senses
..., assisted by the mind (manas) together with the soul 
(atman)". (quoted after Unto Tahtinen, Indian Philosophy 
of Value, (Turku, 1968), p. 51)).
We may additionally note that Karl H. Potter, Presuppo­
sition ..., ubi cit., p. 9, contends that the trivarga, 
artha, kama, dharma," are best considered as attitudes 
and that this conception does justice to Indian ideas", 
whereas M. Hiriyanna, The Quest after Perfection, (My­
sore, 1952), pp. 22, 103, refers to purusartha as a hu­
man value consciously pursued, an object of desire.
41. Vide e.g. Manu II, 224; VII, 26; (concerning trivarga) 
and as already mentioned VII, 100 (on caturvarga); it 
seems that the trivarga set of purusarthas predominates 
because of the 'extraordinary' aim of moksa (vide infra). 
Cf. Arthasastra (ed. Kangle, o p .cit.)1, 7, 3.
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artha (wealth), with respect to. the king's wisdom and learn- 
4 2ing, and somewhere else he emphasizes that the "chief good
43 -consists of the aggregate of (those) three" . The Maha-
bharata makes no exception in stating that the course of
- 44the world rests upon dharma, artha, and kama.
Albeit unceasing in concentration on the promotion of 
dharma the sastra does not ignore, still less reject, occu­
pations which are inspired by visible objects (drstartha). 
Moreover, the dharmasastras leave no doubt that artha and 
kama are necessary for man's existence without which no pur­
suit of dharma could effectively take place; and this want 
would have the further consequence of a hopeless 'struggle' 
for moksa. Even a collapse of the all decisive constituents 
of varna and asrama could easily happen and endanger the 
otherwise balanced order of the world. Thus, neither artha 
nor kama are deemed as unworthy, although they are not 
properly taught within the scope of dharmasastra itself.
A special literature, the Arthasastra and the Kamasastra,
45
respectively, deals with those subjects.
Concerning the smrti tradition we are thus facing a 
composite picture with different accentuations and no res­
ervation. For instance in the case of Arthasastra we find 
the following determination:
42. Manu VII, 26 (SBE, vol. XXV, p. 220); vide also Bharu­
ci ' s comment at J.D.M. Derrett, o p .cit., p. 39.
43. Manu II, 224 (trans. G. Biihler, op. cit. SBE, vol.
XXV, pp. 70-1).
44. Mahabharata, Santi P. CLXI; cf. also ibid., CXXIII,
4-5, and VIII, 13-20.
45. Unto Tahtinen, Indian Philosophy of Value, (Turku, 1968), 
observes that "there has been continuous and extensive 
writing on the subject [dharma] right down to the pre­
sent, which is not the case with Arthasastra and Kama­
sastra11. Modern treatises on both of these subjects
are Western in character not representing indigenous 
tradition, (ibid., p. 27).The Sukraniti is not really an 
exception (vide L. Gopal, The Sukraniti - A Nineteenth- 
Century Text, in: BSOAS XXV (1962), pp. 524-556).
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"'Material well-being [artha] alone is su­
preme', says Kautilya. For, spiritual good 
[dharma] and sensual pleasures [kamas]
46depend on material well-being [artha]."
In contrast the dharmasastras are clear about the priority 
of dharma precepts over those of artha or kama quality.
There is a statement in Narada concerning the question of 
priority:
"When the rules of sacred law [dharma] and
the dictates of prudence [i.e. artha] are
at variance, he [the king] must discard
the dictates of prudence and follow the
47rules of sacred law [dharma]."
The darmasastra's determination solely rests on scrip­
tural sanction (i.e. on the authority of sruti). However, 
dharma only overrules artha and kama in case of a conflict, 
which can easily arise where (in a special situation) a 
dharma precept is in opposition to artha or kama precepts. 
Hence also the question of utility (and even problems of 
an utilitarian ethic from an occidental viewpoint) has been 
distinctly settled by the darmasastra on the basis of the
adrstartha foundation of dharma which makes for man's karma-♦ • ■»-— ........
marga towards moksa. But this destination takes for granted 
that man genuinely opts for the moksa goal and has properly 
fulfilled his trivarga duties, especially during the asra- 
ma of the householder, before he turns his mind to moksa 
which eventually implies freedom from karma and thus re-
46. The Kautiliya Arthasastra 1, 7, 6-7 (trans. R.P. Kang­
le, op.cit., p. 14; "it appears that Kautilya was the 
first to assign a high place to artha as against dhar­
ma and kama).
47. Narada, Introd. I, 39 (trans. J. Jolly, The Minor Law 
Books, Vol. XXXIII, p. 15); vide the same statement
in Yajnavalkya II, 21. Cf. R. Lingat, op.cit., p. 157.
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lease from samsara and the attainment (without residue) of 
all conceivable purusarthas. Thus Manu says in the section 
on the fourth asrama concerning the duties of the samnya- 
sin, implying that the devotion to the trivarga purusarthas 
has not been neglected:
"A twice-born man who seeks final liber­
ation [i.e. moksa], without having studied 
the Vedas, without having begotten sons, 
and without having offered sacrifices, sinks 
downwards."
V. All modes of existence, as long as they are pre­
served in dharma (i.e. here the preordained course of the 
world, established in order), are held to lead to moksa, 
the "summum bonum", to speak with Kane, which consists "in
non-return (anavrttih) to the world of pleasures and sor- 
49rows" . The emphasis is doubtlessly placed on dharma, on
the performance of svadharma as well as sadharana-dharma
and the abstention from adharma, as the essential requisite
50for the "attainment of purusarthaf moksa" . Then the with­
drawal from the world of karma might happen without damage
48. Manu VI, 37 (trans. G. Biihler, o p .cit. , SBE, vol. XXV, 
p. 205). This statement is very clear about the duties 
to be fulfilled in the previous three asramas which all 
are open to the pursuit of artha and kama. Vide also 
Manu X, 115, saying that "seven sources of wealth are 
consistent with dharma (trans. J.D.M. Derrett, Bharu­
ci 1s Commentary ..., ubi cit., p. 332). Even the vana- 
prastha (hermit) in the third asrama may enjoy kama 
which is not forbidden by dharma (Apastamba II, 8, 20, 
22 (ubi cit., p. 152)). This attitude can be traced 
back to a Rgvedic indication (RV I, 89, 8), where the 
enjoyment of life granted by the gods finds unambiguous 
expression.
49. P.V. Kane, HD, ubi cit., vol. II, pt. 1, ch. VIII, p. 
422.
50. V.A.R. Sastri, Dharma ..., ubi cit., p. 35.
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51to the established order (dharma)
No room is left for 1 hubris1, neither for a man still
seeking supreme happiness (nihsreyasa) nor for a man being
on his way (marga) in the world or remaining in the circle
of death and life (samsara) , iul mtfiJ'f'r contentment and disci- 
52pline , be it in the sphere of dharma or on the direct 
path of attaining moksa.
51. J.A.B. van Buitenen, Dharma and Moksa, in: Phil. East 
and West, vol. VII, 1957, pp. 33-40, observes (p. 37) 
that "moksa ... is the abandonment of the established 
order, not in favor of anarchy, but in favor of a self- 
realization which is precluded in the realm of dharma." 
Cf. D.H.H. Ingalls, Dharma and Moksa, in: ibid., pp. 
41-48; there is some (here negligible) difference be­
tween van Buitenen and Ingalls on this subject, which 
the latter explains on p. 48. Cf. also A.B. Creel, Dhar­
ma in Hindu Ethics, (Calcutta, 1977), pp. 48-52; and 
Ludo and Rosane Rocher, Moksa. Le concept hindou de la 
delivrance, in: Religions de Salut, (Brussels, 1963), 
pp. 169-202. With respect to this ultimate purusartha.
it appears that the dharmasastra1s advice to strive for 
it through constant practice of dharma (including kama 
and artha, so to say as permitted performances of a 
dharmic way of life) is only one accepted possibility 
within the many divergent, but tolerated ways and means 
visualized from the all-embracing religious and philo­
sophic point of view which is most characteristic of 
the (so-called) Hindu tradition. Cf. S. Radhakrishnan, 
Indian Philosophy, 2 vols., (London, 1940), vol. I, 
pp. 22-48, vol. II, pp. 26-7.
52. This is distinctly exposed by Manu (IV, 12): "He 
who desires happiness must strive after a perfectly 
contented disposition and control himself; for happi­
ness has contentment for its root, the root of unhappi­
ness is the contrary (disposition)." (trans. G. Biihler, 
op.cit., SBE, vol. XXV, p. 130). The whole picture be­
comes visible with the addition of Manu's saying (XII,
89): "Acts which secure (the fulfilment of) wishes in 
this world or in the next are called pravritta (such
as cause a continuation of mundane existence); but acts 
performed without any desire (for a reward), preceded 
by (the acquisition) of (true) knowledge, are declared 
to be nivritta (such as cause the cessation of mundane 
existence)." (trans. G. Biihler, ibid. , p. 503).
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To close this paragraph, I.should like to quote from 
the Mahabharata a statement which once more elucidates and 
sums up, in only a few lines, what one could explain more 
exhaustively than I have tried:
"When one has understood the declarations 
✓
of the Sruti that lead to correct infer­
ences (about Brahma) and has practised 
those auspicious virtues which the same 
and other scriptures inculcate, one may
lie down at ease, setting at nought the
' 53fears of decrepitude and death."
53. Mahabharata, Santi P. CCXIX, ubi cit., p. 131.
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§ 12 Rajadharma
I. Already the early smrtis envisaged that the 
promotion of dharma depended to a great extent on the effi­
cacy of certain provisions addressed to a raja (ruler, king) 
in order to exercise an all-pervading influence on his be­
haviour. Neither did the smrtis rely on an ideal promotion 
of dharma nor did they pretend 'abstract1 or superior wis­
dom and sufficiency, yet on the contrary, they attempted to 
be as realistic and practical as possible with regard to 
their task. Especially the dharmasastris were deeply con­
cerned about the ways and means of acquiring the desired 
state of affairs: dharma as an overarching order attaching 
to all spheres of life. Thus it is obvious that the sastrTs 
faced a task that called for permanent endeavours to pre­
sent the most suitable expedients to attain it with lasting 
results. In order to prevent confusion wherever it might 
arise or to restore it the ruler of a given community had 
to be admonished not merely to see to his svadharma within 
varnasramadharma but to the dharma of his community. For, 
according to the prevalent sastrTs1 conviction dharma could
only flourish if sufficient provision was made and avail-
1able for a raja as the most important community institution. 
The Mahabharata accordingly states:
"Unless there existed some authority that
regulated the people and their doings there
2
would have been chaos and no security."
1. Here to be grasped as ruler, king, sovereign, prince or 
chief of a given community. Vide Diet, of Hinduism, ubi 
cit., p. 243; P.V. Kane, HD, ubi cit., vol. Ill, ch. 
Ill, pp. 63-4, 70.
2. Mahabharata, Vana P. XXXV, 21 (trans. P.V. Kane, HD, 
vol. I, pt. 1, ch. XIV, p. 151).
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I shall content myself, in-this paragraph, with such
explanation as will further our understanding of the topos
3
of -dharma. Leaving aside the ruler’s svadharma I should
like to throw some light on the peculiar dharma of the ruler
(rajadharma) which he owes to his position itself. In order
to secure the dharmas of his community it was taken for
granted that a ruler was obliged to fulfil such actions as
could satisfy his subjects' desire for well-being, this being
congruous to his own desire. Naturally the whole community
takes interest (idealiter) in upholding dharma for both gen-
4
eral and individual -benefit.
II. Man's well-being was held to consist in the un­
hampered pursuit of (not less than) the three aims of man 
(trivarga purusartha) which could only persist under the 
necessary protection of a securely dharma-orientated ruler. 
Thus, the opening chapter on rajadharma reads in the words 
of Manu as follows:
"I shall expound the dharmas of the king, 
how the king should conduct himself, how he 
originated and how his highest attainment 
comes about." - "By a Ksatriya who has re­
ceived the Vedic samskara [the sacrament of
5
initiation] according to the rule all this
3. This svadharma (for general information on svadharma, 
vide above, § 11) springing from varna and asrama may be 
modified to some degree on the ruler's part in relation 
to his subjects though in theory it is not different 
(generally) from the ksatriya's svadharma.
4. Vide K.V.R. Aiyangar, op.cit., p. 176. Similarly P.V.
Kane, HD, ubi cit., vol. Ill, ch. Ill, p. 97,states: 
"Observance of dharma was the great social and political 
ideal from very ancient times for all including the king."
5. I leave aside the question of his coronation with its 
cosmic (magical) aspects.
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must be protected justly." - "For when the 
world was kingless and scattered entirely 
through fear the Lord created the king in 
order to protect all this."^
I should add that it is a given assumption that the raja was 
created; namely there was a time (just as, historically, 
such peoples survived) when no individual ruler was known.
Like the gods' dharma (devata-dharma) rajadharma re­
quires strict conformity to dharma (according to sruti and 
smrti) implying the protection of dharma without which the 
regular and preordained course of the world would definite­
ly collapse and disclose the worst possible and most ab-
7
horrent of states: matsya-nyaya (i.e. anarchy) ; however,
6. Manu VII, 1-3 (trans. J.D.M. Derrett, Bharuci1s Commen­
tary ..., ubi cit., vol. II, pp. 33-4); cf. SBE, ubi 
cit., vol. XXV, p. 216. In his commentary Bharuci ex­
plains that the "highest attainment" (in Derrett's trans­
lation, ibid.) "of the king is the abundant acquisition 
of prosperity founded on the triad, dharma, artha, and 
pleasure" - "all this" means "varnas (castes or classes) 
and the stages of life [asramas]" - "protection", Bha­
ruci continues, "is not merely a seen .matter [^startha]". 
With a view to the continuous promotion of dharma
J.D.M. Derrett observes in his "Religion, Law and the 
State in India" (ubi cit., p. 28): "This is what the 
classical jurisprudence says the king must do: he must 
secure the performance of their dharma-s by all classes 
of people ..., and must set a good example by his own 
regularity and sincerity." This latter calls for a 
strong-minded king having goo^, examples before himself, 
because, as the Mahabharata, Santi P. CXLII, says, "a 
weak-minded king can never display wisdom (in the dis­
charge of his duties) in consequence of- his not having 
drawn any wisdom from examples before him" (trans. P.C. 
Roy, ibid., vol. VI, p. 341).
7. Vide Mahabharata, Santi P. LXVII (ubi cit., p. 155) 
with the following illustration: "They who live in 
countries where anarchy prevails cannot enjoy their 
wealth and wives." For matsya-nyaya vide § 12 IV.
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8 fiwhile the gods cannot let dharma - down, the ruler can
it, so that constant indications on rajadharma are necessary
and thus inevitably met within our smrti compositions in a
great number. Almost unanimously they admonish the ruler,
to use the crisp formulation of Visnu:• •
"To protect his people" (III, 2), "And to 
keep the four castes [varnas] and the four 
orders [asramas] in the practice of their 
several duties [i.e. their respective (col-
9
lective) svadharmas]"(III, 3).
The effect of providing protection on the ruler's part 
and being protected on the subject's part is a welcome reci­
procity which is distinctly pointed out in Kautilya's Artha­
sastra, namely, that
8. K.V.R. Aiyangar, o p .cit., p. 177 observes: "In Indian 
belief even the great gods are only functionaries with 
duties [dharmas], which they cannot fail to discharge. 
They are governed by a devata-dharma." Neither the kings 
nor the gods "can act on whims, but must conform to 
Dharma" (ibid.). According to mimamsa gods are only the 
means of fulfilling man's desires prosecuted by correct­
ly performed sacrifices. Vide supra, § 7.
9. Trans, by J. Jolly, The Institutes of Vishnu, SBE, vol. 
VII, pp. 13-4, with a long list of crossreferences on 
dharmasastra works, so that there remain merely a few 
additions, such as e.g. to Vasistha XIX, 1 and 7, (op. 
cit., p. 96), and to Baudhayana * 1 , 10, 18, 1 (op.cit., 
p. 199) saying (with additional information): "Let the 
king protect (his) subjects, receiving as his pay [sic] 
a sixth part (of their incomes, or spiritual merit)."
In a footnote J. Jolly (ibid.) explains that "learned 
Brahmanas do not pay taxes, but the king obtains a sixth 
part of the spiritual merit which they acquire". Vide 
also Mahabharata, Santi P. XCI (ubi cit., vol. VI, p. 
212), and Ramayana, ubi cit., bk.I, ch. 25, pp. 56-7 
(stressing that even deeds that appear ruthless, are 
permitted to those appointed to protect their subjects" 
(trans. Hari Prasad Shastri)), cf. bk. Ill, ch. 9, p. 20.
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"in the happiness of the-subjects lies the 
happiness of the king and in what is ben­
eficial to the subjects is his own bene- 
fit
That the emphasis in connection with protection is put on 
material well-being (vide the following Arthasastra state­
ment, ibid.) completely fits a work of an entirely secular 
character, and this is by no means surprising; however, 
what is worth mentioning once more, is that it does impart
to us, in stressing activity as "the root of material well- 
11being"(ibid.) , the basic significance of karmamarga (vide
above, § 6) which is not - contrary to what is still commonly
12believed by Western philosophers - inferior to jnanamarga 
Accordingly the Arthasastra draws heavily on that convic­
tion when it refers to the negative effects of the want of 
activity; this passage reads in full:
"In the absence of activity [ anutthane: 'in
absence of positive striving'], there is 
certain destruction of what is obtained 
and of what is not yet received. By activity
10. Arthasastra, 1, 19, 34; trans. R.P. Kangle, op.cit., 
p. 47.
11. In the Mahabharata, Santi P. CXV (ubi cit., pp. 271-2) 
we find a more prolix observation, in short, as follows 
that "a king ... engaged in protecting his subjects ... 
should be conversant in all matters connected with vir­
tue and wealth" (trans. P.C. Roy, ibid.).
12. Of course the Upanisads and the Bhagavadgita give the 
impression that jnana is superior.
- 99 -
reward is obtained, and'One also secures
1 3abundance of riches."
III. Protection does not come about 'eo ipso1, it
requires due attention to internal and external affairs.
-  14
Appropriate activities are to be executed as rajadharma 
by means of danda (literally: stick, punishment), in a 
wider sense to be comprehended (and so used in our sources) 
as imposing 'acknowledged' secular disadvantage on some­
body in situations resulting from 'contra-dharmic' activ­
ities .
Danda is necessary and, at least in theory, inescapable, 
even for the ruler himself. Thus, says Manu:
"For his sake the Lord at first created 
Punishment [danda], protector of all crea­
tures, dharma, born of himself, having the
13. Arthasastra, 1, 19, 36 (ibid., p. 48). We may gather 
from this passage that "activity" conforms (quite gen­
erally) to man's destiny on his karmamarga, not just 
touching upon the ruler's duty (rajadharma) to protect 
his subjects through appropriate activities (e.g. by 
means of danda) but expressly including it with all 
aspects as regards the relation of dharma and karma 
(vide supra, esp. § 6); thus "activity" leads within 
karmamarga to sukha (happiness, pleasure; vide as 
quoted, ibid. 1, 19, 34), which is threatened with "de­
struction" by inactivity, and continues to nihsreyasa 
(highest (spiritual) good), unless prevented by in­
activity, obtaining just that as "reward" and here ad­
ditionally 'royal' riches.
14. We may not forget the king's duty to secure the per­
formance of penance and to supervise readmission to 
caste.
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1 5form of the brilliance of Brahma."
_ Protection by means of danda, however, includes the • • —
ruler's care for man's secular and religious prosperity,
demanding the expiation of a sin and the punishment of an
unwanted or forbidden behaviour, since an adharmic behaviour
having the quality of a 'crime' simultaneously pertains to
1 6a sin and a punishable 'crime'. Hence to escape the ruler's 
danda may be not dif f icult, cwc! is of ten successfully achieved,
* * ~ 17"but not that of the eternal law of karma"
15. Manu VII, 14 (trans. J.D.M. Derrett, Bharuci's Commen­
tary , ubi cit., p. 36); the great importance of danda 
could not be more strongly emphasized. Bharuci's com­
ment (ibid.) reads: "This has been said: "Without pun­
ishment [danda] there is no passionate quality, there­
fore, if punishment is to be eschewed no king will wish 
to protect his people (?)"." (vide footnote, ibid.).
Vide Manu VII, 28 (ibid., p. 40: "... it strikes even 
the king who swerves from dharma, together with his rela­
tives."). K.V.R. Aiyangar, Rajadharma, (Adyar, 1941), 
on Manu VII, 28.
It is revealing to observe that Brahmins, who taught a 
limitation on physical punishment of themselves, really 
admire danda and therefore not less vyavahara (vide §
13) which is also given in a particular relation to 
danda. Vide J.D.M. Derrett, Vyavahara: Light on a Vanished 
Controversy from an Unpublished Fragment, in: the same,
E C M H L , vol. I, ubi cit., pp. 80-85, pp. 81, 84.
16. Cf. Hans Losch, Rajadharma. Einsetzung und Aufgabenkreis 
des Konigs im Lichte des Purana's, (Bonn, 1959), stating 
(p. 116): "Jedenfalls ist im Begriff des Panda die 
Staatsgewalt versinnbildlicht, die sich in den verschie- 
denen Bezirken staatlichen Lebens als Gerichts- und Ver- 
waltungshoheit manifestiert, wahrend sie auBerhalb der 
Staatsgrenzen im zwischenstaatlichen Verkehr ihren Aus- 
druck in kriegerischen Auseinandersetzungen findet."
Vide K.V.R. Aiyangar, op.cit., p. 94; ibid. explaining 
that "the extraordinary severity shown in dealing with 
pratiloma unions ['unnatural' unions with a husband of
a lower varna] reflects the intensity of the belief in 
the maintenance of both the social and the cosmic order 
by the prevention of saykara [inter-varna unions]"; danda 
implies (in its dharmic foundation) deterrence and cor-# 
rection as well as expiation, repentance and penance 
• (prayascitta). Aiyangar opines on good grounds (ibid., 
p. 109) that "punishment is looked at not as retaliation".
17. Aiyangar, ibid., p. 109.
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To perform rajadharma as regards internal protection
the ruler, whose effective authority is "entirely secu- 
1 8lar" , depends for his success on inflicting danda cor­
rectly while telling the truth, acting after due investi­
gation, being wise and learned in the trivarga purusarthas,
19dharma, kama, and artha. This then results, to continue 
with Manu, in prosperity
"with respect to the three aims; he who is
voluptuous, partial, or mean will be struck
20down by Punishment [danda] itself"
And the community of his subjects does also prosper in
18. R. Lingat, op.cit., p. 215; I should add with Lingat 
(ibid.) in the interest of a proper understanding that 
"the king appears to owe his authority neither to the 
divine will, nor to his birth, nor to any social com­
pact, but solely to the force at his disposal" (with a 
reference to a somewhat isolated deviating proposition 
of Narada XVIII, 25, which "simply restates the law of 
karma").
19. Vide Manu VII, 26 (ubi cit., SBE, vol. XXV, p. 220, and 
Derrett, Bharuci1s Commentary ..., ubi cit., vol. I, p. 
53, vol. II, p. 3 9 (trans.); Manu's statement has a good 
dharma-sutra backing in Gautama XI, 2-6 (ubi cit., SBE, 
vol. II, pp. 234-5.
20. Manu VII, 27 (ibid.). The worst aspect of a ruler is 
his tendency to vyasanas (vices, weakness); vide Manu
VII, 45-53 with Bharuci's commentary (ubi cit., pp. 44- 
49) and compare Arthasastra (ubi cit.) 8,3,1-66; cf. 
J.D.M. Derrett, A Newly-discovered Contact between Artha­
sastra and Dharmasastra: the Role of Bharuci, in: the 
same, E C M H L , vol. I, pp. 120-130, pp. 127-9.
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21dharma, i.e. in their (subjects') svadharmas conforming 
to the maintenance of the preordained universal dharma.
The ruler's concern about external affairs which also 
confronts smrti composers in dealing with raj adharma may 
be treated as an extension or subdivision of protection, 
applying the force of danda to "thieves" from within and to 
danger (in a very wide sense) from without. The authority 
for such conduct could be traced, for instance, in Manu's 
statement (which may amount to a definite precept) that
"the world is conquered by Punishment, a
pure man is hard to find; through fear of
Punishment the entire universe submits to
22being enjoyed".
Conquering the whole world (i.e. within a ruler's reach) 
purports to keepinq the world in order, so that rajadharma
23shares the responsibility for sustaining universal dharma.
21. This reads in the words of the Arthasastra at the end 
of chapter four, 1, 4, 16, succinctly summarizing the 
secular aspect of rajadharma: "The people, of the four 
varnas and in the four stages of life [asramas], pro­
tected by the king with the Rod [danda], (and) deeply 
attached to occupations prescribed as their special 
duties [svadharmas], keep to their respective paths." 
(trans. R.P. Kangle, op.cit., pt. II, p. 10). Cf. an 
explanation by Sen-Gupta, op.cit., p. 38. P.V. Kane,
HD, ubi cit., vol. Ill, ch. Ill, p. 96, remarks what
I should not miss to quote in full: "The importance of 
dharma as an all-embracing institution was impressed 
upon the king by our writers so frequently that it must 
have had its psychological effect on every king. The 
idea that danda personified as Deity might strike down 
the bad king himself [with references] would tend to 
keep even a whimsical king within bounds."
22. Manu VII, 22 (trans. J.D.M. Derrett, Bharuci's Com. ..., 
ubi cit., vol. II, p. 38, orig. vol. I, p. 52).
23. Cf. hereto G. Biihler' s translation of Manu VII, 22 (SBE,
vol. XXV, p. 219) and Bharuci's comment (trans. Der­
rett, ibid.).
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24
A justification for conquest is.thus provided. The rela­
tion of rajadharma (viz, the king uses force (danda) to con­
quer foreign countries) to universal dharma which must be 
maintained (therefore protection of what is already ob­
tained) surfaces in a further statement of Manu, expressly 
stressing the ruler's duty to protect this whole, 'enlarged 
world':
"Thus the lord of the earth, having proper­
ly attended to all business, may seek to
acquire countries that have not been acquired
25and protect those which he has acquired."
We should add, continuing with Manu,
"... kings who are concerned exclusively 
with the protection of their subjects go 
to heaven"^;
24. Vide J.D.M. Derrett, The Maintenance of Peace in the 
Hindu World: Practice and Theory, in: Recueils de la 
Societe Jean Bodin, XIV (1962), pp. 143-177, 144-5, 
166-69.
25. Manu IX, 251 (trans. Derrett, ibid., p. 273). Cf. Manu
VII, 87-9; Visnu III, 42; 47-48 (saying, neither to 
"abolish (or disregard) the laws of that country", nor 
to "extirpate the royal race", but to "invest there a 
prince of the royal race of that country with the royal 
dignity" (trans. J. Jolly, ubi cit., SBE, vol. VII, p. 
18)); cf. Manu VII, 201-203. According to dharmasastra 
as well as to the Arthasastra condemnation of annex­
ations after conquest is based on loyalty to dharma and 
not to any human person; vide K.V.R. Aiyangar, o p .cit., 
p. 179.
26. Manu IX, 253 (trans. Derrett, ibid., p. 274); cf. Manu 
VII, 144. For more and explicit details vide "The Kau- 
tiliya Arthasastra" (ubi cit.), esp. books 7-14 con­
cerning the conduct of external affairs.
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27and still they may also 'enjoy' .their subjects, who give 
willing obedience to the precepts of dharma, presented as 
well as represented by Brahmins; and they obey the commands 
of the king who himself is seen to perform his rajadharma. 
Thus, says Gautama:
"The king is master of all, with the excep­
tion of Brahmanas" and "... these two, up-
28hold the moral order in the world."
IV. In passing we should not miss some observations 
on the ruler's handling the task of administering 'justice' 
within his community,* capacity that partakes of his rajadhar­
m a . What follows anticipates to some degree the issue of 
'dharma and litigation' (vyavahara), subsequently in § 13.
Commencing with the treatment of litigation or lawsuits 
Manu reads:
"Desirous of trying lawsuits he, the king, 
should enter the court in a modest [ ! ] man­
ner, accompanied by Brahmins and by council-
27. From an instructive article by J.D.M. Derrett, Bhu-Bha- 
rana, Bhu-Palana, Bhu-Bhojana: An Indian Conundrum, in: 
the same,E C M H L , vol. I: Dharmasastra and Related 
Ideas, (Leiden, 1976), pp. 33-49, we learn the three­
fold occupations of ancient Indian kings (including the 
curious concept of the Kings' enjoying their subjects) 
in terms of their English equivalents as maintenance, 
protection, and enjoyment of the Earth (pp. 35, 36, 37), 
which may be interpreted (if one can go so far) as con­
forming to the trivarga purusarthas (dharma, artha, ka- 
ma) with respect to the kings' svadharma.
28. Gautama XI, 1 and VIII, 1 (trans. G. Biihler, op.cit. , 
SBE, vol. II, pp. 234, 214 (vide footnote, ibid.); cf. 
Apastamba II, 5, 11, 5-6 (ibid., p. 125); Vasistha. I, 
40-41 (ubi cit., SBE, vol. XIV, p. 8).
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29lors experienced in policy."
It is rajadharma to try and to decide cases, and in doing 
so to listen to the advice of "well-instructed Brahmanas" 
(Visnu III, 72) and, as just quoted, to their advice in pol 
icy. Thus we learn that it is not the Brahmin himself who 
is principally entrusted with vyavahara though he should be 
appointed for it "whenever the king himself shall not carry 
on the trial of suits'1^ 0 .
The Brahmin's svadharma is, as I have pointed out, to
teach and to protect dharma, only in the second place to
help to administer it in vyavahara. The royal administra- 
- 31tion of vyavahara equals the Brahmins' performance of
sacrifices, with the same effect, the maintenance of dhar-
32m a , and with an equal reward. However, to be sure, it is
not rajadharma to create or establish dharma, and therefore
in principle there is no royal legislation; but it is the
king's duty to enforce dharma whenever the situation calls
for it; and also, if necessary, to discover and to imple- 
33ment it. A raja-sasana (royal decree, expression of the
29. Manu VIII, 1 (trans. J.D.M. Derrett, Bharuci's Com. ... 
ubi cit., p. 90); cf. Gautama XI, 19; Vasistha XVI, 2; 
(both ubi cit.) . Manu's insistence on "councillors ex­
perienced in policy" refers once more to the king's task 
which "is essentially political" (R. Lingat, op.cit., 
p. 221).^ C f . Yajnavalkya II, 1 f f f in: M.N. Dutt, The 
Dharma Sastras, (Calcutta, 1906-8, repr. New Delhi, 
1978), vol. I, pp. 61-68.
30. Manu VIII, 9 (trans. Derrett, ibid., p. 93); cf. Visnu
III, 73.
31. Wilhelm Rau, Staat und Gesellschaft im alten Indien, 
nach Brahmana-Texten dargestellt, (Wiesbaden, 1957), 
p. 95, observes that the ruler as representing 'legal' 
authority is mentioned as early as in the Satapatha 
Brahmana 5, 3, 3 , 9 .
32. Vide M.M. Patkar, Narada ..., ubi cit., p. 8.
33. Cf. A .L. Basham, op.cit., p. 87; K.V.R. Aiyangar, op. 
cit., p. 178; R. Lingat, op.cit., p. 231.
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ruler's will) could be an appropriate expedient to effec-
34tuate this duty (rajadharma).
V. As regards the dominant feature of rajadharma we 
have seen that smrti compositions despite their functional 
differences foster protection by means of danda in order to 
stabilize community life, both under a secular as well as 
a religious aspect. Rulership included unbiased attention 
to religious aspects, since for obvious reasons the perform­
ance of 'royal' duties was inseparable from religious af­
fairs partaking in man's destiny towards nihsreyasa and
moksa . Thus we find the statement of Manu:
—  • —
"The king who protects all creatures in ac­
cordance with dharma and strikes those who 
are worthy of death, sacrifices day by day 
with sacrifices having thousands of hundreds 
as the fees. "
No doubt rajadharma which was taught by brahmin teachers 
centred, to speak in topoi of purusarthas, on dharma. Hence, 
by all means the ruler had to be on guard to prevent such 
disturbances from without and from within that might endan­
ger dharma and tend to the state of anarchy (arajakam:
'kinglessness') and chaos (matsya-nyaya), and this meant in 
particular, as J.D.M. Derrett has observed, that the ruler 
under the special presupposition of rajadharma (in contrast
34. R. Lingat, ibid., observes that "the commentators and 
digest-writers know by the name raj a-sasana only indi­
vidual measures or occasional orders (with ref.). These 
precepts had no other foundation or sanction than the 
will of the king, nor other object than to secure the 
government of the realm".
35. Manu VIII, 306 (trans. J.D.M. Derrett, Bharuci's Com­
mentary, ubi cit., p. 182). Vide also Manu VIII, 305,
308, 311 (ibid.). Cf. John W. Spellman, Political The-
ry of Ancient India, (Oxford, 1 964), p. 22 3. U.ToWiwen, Nlot?-
\Ao6ert4- Theories (y iJiz f o i &OGj )  i pp-H-Z, SSj exp&ws taw peak.chon ofUne. 
people. #y-(orte d id  wJ* oliwiwish, gul rtrlfi&r ewWicecf Jta. r u t fe s 's  cowp&cwce 
vam  4 l i e  d u t y  o(- a I i i 'm s g T .
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to rajanTti) had to care for th£'maintenance of "the deli­
cate balance of competing, jealous groups, castes, (and)
3 6regions within his kingdom"
The special presuppositions of rajadharma made no way 
and certainly did not give rise to, a concept of law, nei­
ther to a Rule of Law nor to fundamental rights, as Derrett 
in his article (mentioned above) has distinctly pointed out,
a fact which is of considerable importance for a proper
37understanding of dharma.
This being said, I should emphasize once more that in 
order to comply with rajadharma the individual ruler oc­
cupied and deserved his pivotal communal position for the 
sake of dharma. This position was not unlimited, for con­
cerning the "administration of justice the king was to be 
checked by the judge and sabhyas [assemblies of elders], who
were fearlessly to render advice to the [scil. possibly]
3 8erring king" . All this includes under the rule of dharma 
(i.e. the preeminence of dharma) that the ruler could not 
himself make dharma; nor could he make law in default of a 
concept of law! Dharma had to be discovered or ascertained 
according to dharmasastra; in given situations the ruler
36. J.D.M. Derrett, Rajadharma, in: Journal of Asian Studies, 
XXXV, 4, (1975-6), pp. 597-609, p. 606; cf. the same, 
Social and Political Thought and Institutions, in: A.
L. Basham (ed.), A Cultural History of India, (Oxford, 
1975), pp. 124-140, pp. 125, 140 "The ideals of the In­
dian peoples presupposed insecurity, from which politi­
cal power rescued them. Against this background one 
sought one's soul's comfort by practising personal and 
social virtues; apart from this background, virtues 
were hardly to be aspired to." Ibid., p. 140.
37. The same, ibid., with a useful brief explanation of ra- 
janTti as "the way a king should comport himself to be 
successful" in contrast to rajadharma as "the way a 
king should comport himself in order to be righteous", 
i.e. in a dharmic sense.
38. P.V. Kane, HD, ubi cit., vol. Ill, ch. Ill, p. 97.
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could propound directions (rajasasanas) which were capable
of being held (by sastrls) to be valid un^er the proposi-
39tion that they were not opposed to dharma. Finally it may 
be worth noting that neither rajas nor brahmanas were the 
masters of dharma , but both indeed ils servants; thus 
"the superiority of dharma was a matter of the Hindu world
39. Cf. K.V.R. Aiyangar, op.cit., pp. 176, 178; R.P. Kangle, 
The Kautiliya Arthasastra, pt. Ill, A Study, (Bombay, 
1965), pp. 223-4; N.C. Sen-Gupta, op.cit., p. 39; J.D.
M. Derrett, Rulers and Ruled in India, in: the same,
E C M H L , vol. I, ubi cit., pp. 50-79, p. 71. In the 
Arthasastra (3,1,38) we find the following somewhat 
paradoxical but revealing statement which may summarize 
an essential viewpoint of the ruler's role (at least 
in theory): "When all laws [dharmas] are perishing, the 
king here is the promulgator [promoter, effectuator] of 
laws [dharmas3, by virtue of his guarding the right con­
duct [acara] of the world consisting of the four varnas 
and four asramas." (trans. R.P. Kangle, op.cit., pt. II, 
p. 194; vide also his explanation, ibid.).
40. J.D.M. Derrett, Rajadharma, ubi cit., p. 607; cf. the 
same, Rulers ..., ibid., p. 59.
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§ 13 Dharma and vyavahara
I. The purpose of this paragraph is to focus briefly 
on the role of dharma when a dispute has to be settled be­
fore an authorized tribunal, or, to use Manu1s words (VIII, 
1) when lawsuits were about to be investigated. It is then 
that vyavahara calls for dharma, which in having been fully 
stated (Manu I, 107) does not exclude or neglect to handle 
vyavahara. This now has to be explained, since the modern 
jurist will by no means presuppose, with respect to our con­
text, that (to speak in his terms)
righteousness and law necessarily overlap, still less that 
the latter can be comprehended by the former.
Vyavahara, following P.V. Kane's observations, "is so 
called because of its removing various doubts" . Apart from 
this definition it has acquired several meanings which are 
stated ^  Kane;^ for our purpose we can follow and work 
with the extremely crisp meaning given by Bharuci in his 
comment on Manu VIII, 1:
3
"vyavaharanam vyavaharah ."
This conforms to Kane's just mentioned, very ancient expli­
cation in the sense of vyavahara as "law-suit or dispute in
4
a court and legal procedure" .
Generally dharma appears within vyavahara as that which 
must be protected in order to preserve the protection of
1. P.V. Kane, HD, ubi cit., vol. Ill, ch. XI, pp. 246-7.
2. Ibid., pp. 245-6. It appears to have been a technical 
term far anterior to the attempts, etymological and 
otherwise, to explain it.
3. J.D.M. Derrett (ed.), Bharuci1s Commentary ..., ubi cit., 
vol. I, p. 85, translated in vol. II, p. 91: "A 'lawsuit' 
is a litigation ... ."
4. P.V. Kane, ibid., p. 246.
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dharma; this reads in the words*of Manu:
"Dharma indeed, if damaged, damages; dhar­
ma when protected protects; hence dharma
should not be damaged lest damaged dharma 
5
destroys us."
According to Gautama, the earliest dharmasutra, the ruler's 
administration of dharma (vide § 12) should be regulated by 
sruti , smrti, the angas and the pur ana ^
Both statements given in their respective contexts re­
call the paramount significance of dharma; even within vya­
vahara dharma retains its close connection with sruti (the 
Vedas) and smrti, without which a promotion of dharma would 
lose its basis; moreover, the progressive deterioration of 
the present time-cycle that (to follow Brhaspati I, 1) al­
ready necessitated the administration of 'judicial' proceed­
ings would be exacerbated. Therefore, to prevent or to re­
move disorder that troubles the involved parties with drsta 
and adrsta (seen or unseen) effects, carefully organised 
and successfully practised vyavahara is needed, especially 
impartiality in order to yield the same reward "as solemn
7
Vedic sacrifices do" . However, we may be aware that dhar- 
masastra compositions came into existence to care especially 
for man's education according to standards of dharma, thus 
only incorporating (still in the case of Manu) a compara­
tively small portion on vyavahara, and only to the extent
5. Manu VIII, 15 (trans. J.D.M. Derrett, Bharuci's Com. ..., 
ibid., p. 95); cf. G. Biihler' s translation in SBE, vol. 
XXV, p. 255, where "dharma" is rendered by "justice", 
thus easily perverting the original understanding into 
the direction of the occidental conception of justice.
6. Gautama XI, 19 (trans. G. Biihler, op.cit. , SBE, vol. II, 
p. 237.
7. Yajnavalkya I, 359-60, quoted after P.V. Kane, ibid., 
p. 242; it is in this way, as Kane (ibid.) continues 
that "administration of justice was held to be a very 
sacred duty". Vide supra, § 12 IV.
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necessary to solve inevitable disputes for the sake of dhar- 
ma as the indispensable condition of the maintenance of the 
world as well as man's signpost towards moksa.
II. Having thus considered most briefly and generally 
the role of dharma within vyavahara some attention to the 
special position of dharma therein may be due. Regarding 
this issue a bundle of problems requires adequate consider­
ation; there are e.g. the relation between dharma and vya­
vahara rules, the relevance and consistency of vyavaharapa- 
das (the subject matters of a possible litigation), the re­
lation of dharma and caritra (custom, usage), and that of 
dharma and raja-sasana (already touched upon in § 12 on ra­
jadharma) , and last but not least the interdependence of 
dharma and satya (truth), and of dharma and 'law'. Some of 
those problems are of great antiquity, others occur with 
the steady promotion of dharma in all spheres of life, an
impressive picture of which may be obtained from the Maha- 
— 8bharata. Fortunately, there are some valuable investiga­
tions which handle those problems to a good extent including
instructive details, so that I can easily refer to these 
9
works here and concentrate in this passage on the 'four
8. Cf. T. Chakravarti, Dharma in the Mahabharata, in: Bull­
etin of the Rama Krishna Mission Institute of Culture, 
Calcutta, IV, 11 (1953), pp. 269-70; A. Chandra, The
doctrine of dharma in the Mahabharata, in: [ 1963] I S.C.J.
(Journal sect.), pp. 11-16.
9. The most recent investigation is: J.D.M. Derrett,
G.-D. Sontheimer, G. Smith, Beitrage zu Indischem 
Rechtsdenken, h g . v. Theodor Viehweg u. Reinhard May, 
(Wiesbaden, 1979), esp. parts II and III on "Gewohnheits- 
recht/Sitte und Recht in der traditionellen indischen 
Jurisprudenz" (pp. 17-58) and "Gerichtsverfahren und 
Richter im traditionellen indischen Recht" (pp. 59-85); 
vide also M.M. Patkar, Narada, Bphaspati, and Katyayana, 
a comparative study in judicial procedure, (New Delhi,
1978); J.D.M. Derrett, The Concept of Law according to 
Medhatithi, a pre-Islamic Jurist, in: the same, E C M
H L, vol. I, (Leiden, 1976), pp. 174-197; R. Lingat, o p . 
cit., part II: "From Dharma to Law", esp. pp. 176-256; 
and, of course, P.V. Kane, HD, ubi cit., vol. Ill, ch.
XI on "Vyavahara (Law and Administration of Justice)", 
pp. 242-316.
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feet decision-basis' of vyavahara, and therein on the rel­
evance of caritra - both to further our understanding of 
dharma.
Vyavahara can be of two kinds, namely concerning 1ar- 
tha1 (wealth in a wide sense) and 1himsa' (injury) or, to 
follow our well-known distinction, of a civil or criminal 
kind, respectively divided according to Manu (VIII, 3-7) 
into fourteen kinds of disputes on 1artha1 and four on 1him­
sa 1. These are the usually enumerated eighteen vayvaharapa- 
das which were held to be a convenient arrangement, not em­
bracing all possible disputes, and hardly aimed at repre­
senting any regularity or, as Kane observes, "scientific
10principle of classification" . Surveying the actual con­
texts of the Manu- and Yajnavalkya-smrtis we find it more 
than likely that the so-called eighteen vayvaharapadas are 
intended primarily as models rather than manuals of prac­
tice; indications rather than codes. Dharma, however, is 
well served by this.
A decision concerning those vyavaharapadas must be 
reached on the 'four feet decision-basis' according to an 
ancient text of unknown age and origin, to be met with (for 
instance) in Narada-smrti and KautilTya Arthasastra, saying 
that a decision is to be based on dharma, vyavahara, carit­
ra, or raja-sasana, the later of which always supersedes
11 —the earlier one. From Narada and the Arthasastra we are
10. P.V. Kane, HD, ibid., pp. 258; vide also ibid., pp. 
248-9, 258; Bharuci's comment on Manu VIII, 8 reads 
that, most plausibly, "an absolutely complete enumer­
ation cannot be made because their subdivisions are 
limitless" (trans. J.D.M. Derrett, Bharuci's Com. ..., 
ubi cit., vol. II, p. 93).
11. Vide Narada, Introd. 10 (ubi cit., SBE, vol. XXXIII, 
p. 7); KautilTya Arthasastra 3, 1, 39 (R.P. Kangle,
o p .cit., part II, p. 195 with further information; cf. 
Brhaspati II, 18 (ubi cit., SBE, vol. XXXIII, p. 285). 
For an instructive discussion vide J.D.M. Derrett et 
a l ., Beitrage ..., ubi cit., pp. 42-7; cf. P.V. Kane, 
ibid., pp. 259-60.
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given to understand in their respective subsequent state­
ments that dharma is based on satya (truth), vyavahara on 
witnesses, caritra on general usages or common acceptance 
among members of a community, and raja-sasana is based on 
the authority of a ruler's individual order.
There is some old dispute concerning the intricate
question of how to understand and to apply (according to
different post-Manu smrti compositions) the 'four feet de-
cision-basis' in a vyavahara (lawsuit) as I have preferred
to denote this maxim which admits of being grasped as a
1 2source for a decision (better than source of law ) or a 
means whereby a decision-basis may be proved, and this es­
pecially with respect to caritra (in short to be rendered 
with custom or usage). Leaving aside details that are eas-
12. This preference is induced by the phenomenon that nei­
ther a word "law" (Skt. naya) is used in the early 
dharmasastras nor a concept of law (in an occidental 
sense) being observed, instead there is a body of more 
or less complex rules or precepts (such as having the 
quality of dharma, vyavahara, caritra or raja-sasana) 
to be met with whereupon a court decision can be based 
and accordingly enforced under public acknowledgement 
of the authority in charge of settling disputes. Vide 
J.D.M. Derrett, The Concept of Law ..., ubi cit., pp. 
174-5, where he asks for attention concerning the dan­
ger of using the word "law", "... since ... naya may 
not occur in Medhatithi [a famous commentator of the 
Manu-smrti] at all, and since the words which certainly 
occur do not correspond to any commonly accepted word 
for "law" in modern languages, ..." (p. 174).
As to the maxim mentioned, some additional explanation 
may be wanted. In the present context a precept having 
the quality of vyavahara (and thus overruling dharma) 
means a precept concerning transaction or dealing (vide 
P.V. Kane, HD, vol. Ill, p. 245), in other words (Artha­
sastra 3, 1, 1, with Kangle's annotation, ubi cit., p. 
190): "vyavahara is primarily a transaction between two 
or more parties, which may form the basis of a suit in 
a court of law." And as such vyavahara shares by incor­
poration and references the authority of dharmasastra, 
because "a decision should not be given by merely 
relying on the text of the sastra" (Brhaspati, quoted 
after Kane, ibid., p. 259). Cf. also R.C. Hazra, Dharma 
- Its Early Meaning and Scope, Part II, in: Our Heritage 
(Calcutta), vol. VIII, 1960, pp. 7-34, pp. 32-3.
- 114- -
1 3ily obtainable from Derrett I.should take this instruc­
tive maxim as a proper precept to be applied in court in 
order to arrive at a decision being acceptable to those con­
cerned , and simultaneously satisfying the needs of dharma- 
sastra as well as the interests of a wider public seeing
their customs (caritras) readily applied when the situation
4r -4. 14calls for it.
III. This being mentioned, I should like to further 
this enquiry with a few remarks on the relevance of caritra 
in its relation to dharma, thus touching upon a delicate 
but significant problem in attempting to understand the 
ancient topos of dharma. Any theory of dharma as distinct 
from a legal theory deserves utmost clarity in the mutual 
relations of dharma, custom, and "law". This especially 
would be indispensable for a comparative theory of ancient 
jurisprudence surpassing occidental conceptions as well as 
such preconceptions as derive from an occidental jurist's 
outlook.
Once more, in vyavahara (a lawsuit) caritra (custom,
usage) supersedes dharma; dharma means here the sastra1s
dharma as being taught and composed by sastris, which is,
however, not the whole dharma in consideration of its ori- 
1 5
gin in sruti, although it is an essential and accordingly
13. Vide "Beitrage zu Indischem Rechtsdenken", ubi cit., 
pp. 45-7; and "Religion, Law and the State in India", 
ubi cit., pp. 154-6.
14. The old dispute whettcrthe four 'feet' are means of proof 
or sources of law is perhaps misconceived. Professor 
Nobuyuki Watase (private communication) derived recently 
from this ancient maxim (in an article published in Ja­
panese) a solution according to which two of the 'feet' 
are means of proof and two are means whereby the deci­
sion is to be arrived at. It appears that his view and 
mine have much in common.
15. This is quite obvious from dharmasastra itself; vide 
e.g. Gautama XI, 25-7; Manu XII, 108-13.
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highly promoted aspect. Quite apart from the above mentioned 
maxim this is firmly established, and already fixed in Manu 
with ample dharmasutra authority. It is said in Gautama that
"the laws [i.e. the usages in accordance 
with dharma] of countries, castes, and fami­
lies, which are not opposed to the (sacred)
1 6records [i.e. sruti], (have) also authority" ;
and Manu reads, much more elaborated, and to be grasped in 
its context with regard to our maxim:
"... he [the ruler] shall decide ... ac­
cording to reasons derived both from the 
location of the litigants and from the 
sastra. " ^
Implicitly caritra takes a share in dharma; it is an ac­
cepted expression of dharma in its entirety which is held 
to be present even if invisible. For his own welfare man's 
actions had to be governed by his dharma (svadharma) and 
that of his near-range community, the practices of which 
created caritra in order to maintain lasting order (in the 
sense of dharma) for the benefit of this whole community 
that exists as an 'entity' of his own, supporting the indi­
vidual aiming at nihsreyasa and moksa. Even adharma prac­
tices (as being opposed to the sastra's dharma) might find 
acceptance as dharma under specific conditions because, fol­
lowing a statement in the Mahabharata, dharma and adharma
1 8arise as such due to time and place. Such is the influence
16. Gautama XI, 20 (trans. G. Biihler, op. cit., SBE, vol.
II, p. 237).
17. Manu VIII, 3 (trans. J.D.M. Derrett, Bharuci's Com. ..., 
ubi cit., p. 92); cf. Manu VII, 203; VIII, 41 and 46; 
Apastamba II, 6 , 15, 1; Vasistha I, 17; XIX, 7.
18. Vide Mahabharata, Santi P. LXXVIII, ubi cit., p. 182.
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1 9of caritray and of course vyavahara as propounded in dhar­
masastra had to recognize its near-range aspect of dharma. 
However, as regards the dharmasastra's conception of itself, 
it is limited to non-opposition to the sastra1s dharma, 
which is quite obvious in the just-quoted statements by 
Gautama and Manu. It should not be surprising at all that 
the sastra, to the unceasing efforts of which the promotion 
of dharma could take place and spread its influence lasting
over so many centuries, endeavoured to be the only authority
20to say what is dharma and what adharma.
IV. Caritra as a decision-basis within vyavahara par­
ticipated in those aspects expounded by dharmasastra, and 
moreover it could guarantee more specifically with respect 
to the situation and the dispute concerned that dharma, as 
overarching order and the factor of tradition and stability, 
did not collapse or become itself a subject of aversion and 
rejection.
19. Vide J.D.M. Derrett et al., Beitrage ..., ubi cit., pp. 
18, 23-4, 38-9.
20. J.D.M. Derrett, ibid., p. 36, observes in his instruc­
tive explanations considering especially the difference 
between acara (as a source of dharma) and caritra;
"Acara bildete eine erganzende Quelle des dharma [after 
sruti and smrti], wenn die schriftlichen Quellen schwie- 
gen, ... Bei*Streitfalien [in a vyavahara], besonders 
bei solchen sakularer Natur, mogen Regeln (dharmani, 
Neutrum) Quellen des Rechts [according to the above ex­
plained maxim] (nicht von dharma) sein, wenn sie sich 
als echte lokale oder gruppenbestimmte Sitten ausweisen. 
Diese beiden Wege, die sich auf die Sitten beziehen, 
diirfen nicht verwechselt werden. Das wertvolle Werk von 
P.V. Kane [History of Dharmasastra] leidet darunter,
daB es dies nicht zur Kenntnis nimmt." Cf. also, the 
same, Dharmasastra ..., op. cit., p. 11; and, the same, 
Religion, Law and the State in India, ubi cit., pp. 158- 
170, chapters on "AcSra and the SasTra" (pp. 158-61), 
"Custom versus the Sastra" (pp. 161-64), respectively 
dealing with the intricate problems of "Custom and Law 
in Ancient India" (p. 148, the headline of chapter 6 ).
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Concrete social order surfaced in caritra and that had 
to be brought into a good balance with dharma, not too dif­
ficult a task considering that the early smrtis (dharmasut- 
ras) conceived dharma already in concrete precepts governing 
human affairs in their communal units, especially in (vide
§ 8 ) coagulated relations and activities. However, admitting
21the impossibility of providing useful generalizations and 
abstractions of the many different caritras in vyavahara 
(customs and usages in especially long-range business affairs 
and transactions), a matter of fact concern, the dharma-sa- 
strTs never attempted to present a systematic treatise, on 
the basis of their specific outlook, on 'law' (or methodi­
cally treated 'legal' precepts in a completed presentation). 
Instead they aimed at a practical arrangement of prominent 
and widely accepted 'legal' topoi that could enable decisions 
to be fitted into (or possibly matched against) their pre­
valent conception of dharma.
To obviate some possible uncertainties on the essen­
tial components of caritra I should explain that caritra is 
fit to be assumed and treated as regular conduct within a 
community as soon as it has acquired the status of a long­
standing, still prevailing practice, founded on the common 
acceptance of those concerned who, according to definition,
already possess a good reputation irrespective of the custom 
22in question. Under this proposition caritra can become 'in 
casu' the appropriate basis for a court decision, and thus 
can overrule dharma, without however the slightest tendency 
to replace it generally in the long run of human existence 
from generation to generation.
21. This is implicit in Manu VIII, 3; 41 and 46.
22. Cf. J.D.M. Derrett et al., Beitrage ..., ibid., p. 21-3.
P A R T  T W O
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§ 14 Origin, Extension, 'and Consolidation of ti
I.O. The origin of Li  ^ can be traced as early
as the beginning of the Western Chou dynasty (1122 B.C.).
2The originating phase comes into consideration within a
period of roughly 350 years until the end of the Western
3Chou dynasty in 771 B.C. The chronologically first movement of 
the topos of LL, which I shall terminate with the supposed 
date of Confucius' birth (551 B.C.), overlaps with the 72 
years of his life-time, inasmuch that the available sources 
include the "Spring and Autumn" period (770-464 B.C.) during 
the rule of the Eastern Chou dynasty (770-256 B.C.). There­
fore, the sources of the so-called first movement of exten­
sion of the topos of LL are probably not free from later 
interpolations under the influence of Confucius' teachings.
1. The romanization of Chinese characters which is used 
here and in § 16 is the Wade-Giles system since it
is still the one commonly used in English writing deal­
ing with China and Chinese. Reference to Chinese charac­
ters is given separately at the end of the enquiry by 
using small Roman letters as indicators. Li without 
indication is always the above given character.
2. It is not more than about 350 years from before the beginn­
ing of the Chou dynasty that history in China can be 
reliably assumed and dated; this gives us also the pre­
sumed date of the (traceable) beginning use of the 
Chinese script, however, during these 350 years of the 
Pre-Chou period, when the Shang dynasty ruled over parts 
of China, there are no indications of Li as having been 
written down and preserved. Vide H.G. Creel, The Origins 
of Statecraft. Vol. One: The Western Chou Empire, (Chi­
cago - London, 1970), p. 336. On problems of the Chinese 
historicity including the script, vide Joseph Needham, 
Science and Civilisation in China (in short SCC). Vol. 1: 
Introductory Orientations, (Cambridge, 1954), pp. 98,
86 f, 32; Fung Y.u-lan (transl. by Derk Bodde) , A History 
of Chinese Philosophy, Vol. I, (Princeton, 1952, 71973), 
p. 7; Wolfram Eberhard, Geschichte Chinas, (Stuttgart, 
1971), p. 16.
3. In making use of the word 'movement' I attempt to de--
scribe appropriately the Chinese 'phenomenon' of a dis­
tinctive series of mental impulses creating, extending,
and consolidating the indigenous expression LL.
- 120 -
One may take into account .that a desirable clear-cut
periodic classification is impossible. Problems of this kind
are due to the general difficulty of chronology and authen-
4
ticity of Chinese sources. Though there are inevitable 
chronological incongruities, in particular as to the early 
phases of Chinese history, they do not affect our understand­
ing of ZZ as it surfaces in the sources coVsmiJ a period 
of nearly one millennium.
The early documents for this enquiry consist in the Shu 
Ching (Book of History, or better, of Historical Documents), 
the Shih Ching (Book of Songs or Poetry), and the Tso Chuan
5
(supposedly a commentary on the "Spring and Autumn Annals").
4. "Problems of chronology hamper the study of almost every 
aspect of ancient China." H.G. Creel, op.cit., p. 487.
The above given dates follow Creel's chronology (ibid., 
pp. XIV, 47). On problems of authenticity, authorship and 
biographical material, vide Raymond Dawson, Confucius, 
(Oxford, 1981), pp. 3-8.
5. On the Shu Ching ("Document Classic") as the oldest source 
of ZZ, and generally the oldest historical documentary 
work in China, vide Creel, op.cit., pp. 447-463; A.F.P. 
Hulsewe, China im Altertum, in: Golo Mann u. Alfred HeuB 
(Hg.), Weltgeschichte, Zweiter Band, (Frankfurt a.M./ 
Berlin, 1962, Giitersloh, 1 979), pp. 477-571 , 483; Bodo 
Wiethoff, Grundziige der alteren chinesischen Geschichte, 
(Darmstadt, 1971), p. 22; C.P. Fitzgerald, China. A short 
cultural history (1 935), (London, 1950), in German, (Miin- 
chen, 1967, 1977), pp. 60, 89.
A valuable and easily attainable survey on translated 
original sources gives Fung Yu-lan, op.cit., pp. 410-416.
As to the sources concerning the origin of Li, and on ZZ 
in the Confucian Analects, and in the Mencius I shall use 
and refer to James Legge, The Chinese Classics (in the 
original with a translation, critical and exegetical notes, 
etc.), 5 vols., (Hong Kong, repr. 1970), in short: Legge,
CC . Other sources are given below. Vide the discussion on 
the sources in Creel, op.cit., pp. 444-486.
According to my intention of giving a brief treatment of 
the origin, extension and consolidation of ZZ, for compara­
tive purposes, I shall only use and refer to the most sig­
nificant (and easily available) sources for authentic in­
formation on ZZ. Thus I exclude, for instance, the Chou 
Li (Ritual of Chou) and the I Li (Book of Etiquette and 
Ceremonial), here also for reasons given by Creel, ibid., 
pp. 478-80, 485-6.
- 121 -
Subsequent to its origination, the topos of LZ can be 
traced in two movements, one of extension (before Confucius), 
and a second of consolidation being inaugurated with Confu­
cius ' teachings. According to the significant sources, the 
consolidation movement takes place in three phases: the first 
comprises the most influential teachings of Confucius as found 
in the Lun Yii (Analects) , the second, the works under the 
names of his renowned successors and opponents during the 
Warring States period (463-222 B.C.), and the third the Li 
Chi (Book of LZ) being compiled and edited during the early 
years of the Former Han dynasty (206 B.C. - 8 A.D.). Both 
movements represent a long process of continuity until ZZ 
appears as a strongly Confucian consolidated and complex 
topos which has pervasively moulded the Chinese culture up 
to the present day. My characteristic of two movements, of 
extension and consolidation, seeks, at the very outset of 
this enquiry, an appropriate descriptive framework which 
strives to escape from a narrow and unfit presentation of 
'things' Chinese by avoiding, if at all possible, the use 
of an Occidental framework and terminology that would mis­
lead our comparative endeavours.
6 . This includes, of course, further descriptive caution, 
inasmuch Qh Jr!iz Chinese world-view differs substantially 
from our own which we convey inevitably in employing the 
English language and terminology. These bear no relation 
to the very different Chinese language of our original 
sources nxn q close relation to the influential heritage 
of the Greek and Latin languages with remarkable effects 
on our thinking, speaking, and writing. Vide Reinhard 
May, Frieden und die Aufgabe des Rechts, (Wiesbaden, 1979), 
pp. 17-23, 94-106, esp. 108-112, 151-64. In his Science 
and Civilisation of China, vol. 2, (Cambridge, 1956, repr. 
1975), Joseph Needham states in section 18 on "Human Law 
and the Laws of Nature": "Granet was correct in his con­
clusion that the Chinese world-outlook was running along 
quite different lines, and that the Chinese notion of 
Order positively excluded the notion of Law." (p. 572).
And he concludes (p. 574): "The time has come for a 
rigorous effort to follow Chinese modes of thought."
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The strong and lasting ChLn-ese attitude of thinking 
and acting in the context of ZZ inspired a very rich 
literature dealing with the manifold aspects of Z Z , visible 
throughout the whole corpus of the classical sources. Due 
to the limited scope of this paragraph I shall only primar­
ily and briefly deal with source works and not indulge in
references to other works except for a few important contri- 
7
butions in Western languages in order to aid further and 
more detailed investigations for comparative purposes.
7. Vide for instance N.E. Fehl, Li. Rites and Propriety in 
Literature and Life, (Hong Kong, 1971), pp. 81 ff, 213-22; 
further informative and basic works, including transla­
tions of sources, are (general): Wm. Theodore de Bary 
(ed.), Sources of Chinese Tradition, vol. I, (New York - 
London, 1960), esp. pp. 1-149; Wing-tsit Chan, A Source 
Book in Chinese Philosophy, (Princeton, 1963, *1973), 
esp. pp. 3-270; E.R. Hughes, Chinese Philosophy in Clas­
sical Times, (London, 1942, repr. 1971), esp. pp. 1-286; 
Fung Yu-lan, op.cit., esp. pp. 22-378; Alfred Forke, 
Geschichte der alten chinesischen Philosophie, (Hamburg,
21964), esp. pp. 5-482 with references in Chinese; Marcel 
Granet, La civilisation chinoise, (Paris, 1929, 1968), 
esp. pp. 19-160, 175-207, 339-451; the same, La pensee 
chinoise, (Paris, 1934, 1968), esp. pp. 33-76, 249-480.
Special works are: Jean Escarra, Le Droit Chinois, (Pekin 
et Paris, 1936), esp. pp. 3-84 (La conception chinoise du 
droit); Derk Bodde, Basic Concepts of Chinese Law: The 
Genesis and Evolution of Legal Thought in Traditional 
China, in: Proceedings of the American Philosophical So­
ciety, Philadelphia, vol. 107, 1963, pp. 375-398; Derk 
Bodde/Clarence Morris, Law in Imperial China, (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1967), esp. pp. 3-51 (partly identical with Bodde1s 
Basic Concepts (above)); Karl Bunger, Die Rechtsidee in 
der chinesischen Geschichte, in: Saeculum 1952, pp. 192— 
217; Tsien Tche-hao, Le droit chinois, (Paris, 1982), 
esp. pp. 5-15; Yosiyuki Noda, The Far Eastern Conception 
of Law, in: International Encyclopedia of Comparative 
Law, vol. II, 1, (Paris - Tubingen, 1975), pp. 120-36;
H.G. Creel/ Legal Institutions and Procedures During the 
Chou Dynasty, in: J.A. Cohen et al. (eds.), Essays on 
China's Legal Tradition, (Princeton, 1980), pp. 26-55; 
Oskar Weggel, Chinesische Rechtsgeschichte, (Leiden - 
Koln, 1980), esp. pp. 3-27, 277-280 (Quellen und Litera- 
tur zum chinesischen Recht); Reinhard May, o p .cit., esp. 
pp. 107-235 (zum "Diallaktischen Charakter chinesischen 
Rechtsverstandnisses").
The following two dictionaries will be used: F.S. Couv- 
reur, Dictionnaire classique de la langue chinoise,
(Paris 1890, 21911, repr. 1966/67), short: Couvreur,
Diet.; Herbert A. Giles, Chinese - English Dictionary, 
(London, 1912, repr. 1967), short: Giles, Diet.
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1.1. In the Shu Ching, there are four instances of ZZ 
which belong to the genuine documents of the Western Chou
g
period. Two of the earliest phrases read:
"Let the king at first employ the ceremonies 
[ZZ] of Yin, and sacrifice in the new city, 
doing everything in an orderly way, but with­
out display."
"Order has been initiated throughout the four
quarters of the empire; but the ceremonies
[ZZ] to be honoured (by general observances)
have not yet been settled, and I [the king]
cannot look on your [the duke's] merit as 
9
completed."
The translation of both phrases is offered with an explana­
tory comment saying that (in the first instance) the ZZ of 
the present Chou dynasty cannot be employed for various rea­
sons, so that in the meantime the "ceremonies" [ZZ] of the 
previous Yin (also known as the Shang dynasty) should be 
practised, and (in the second instance) that the "ceremonies" 
in general are to be distinguished from those of the pre­
ceding dynasties.**^
In translating ZZ_ with 'Ceremony' in the first instances 
to be met with, we are introduced to a rather general under­
standing which requires an additional explanation with re­
gard to the graphic etymology of the character and its wider 
context. The character is composed of two parts. The right
8 . Vide H.G. Creel, The Origins of Statecraft in China, 
ubi cit., p. 336.
9. Shu Ching, transl. Legge, CC III, pt. V, bk. XIII, 5,
p. 438; pt. V, bk. XIII, 19, p. 445; the other two ZZ
are to be met with in pt. V, bk. XIII, 15, p. 443;
pt. V, bk. XIV, 8 , p. 478.
10. Ibid., pp. 438-9, 445.
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hand part ZZ^a  ^ discloses, especially in its ancient form,
1 1a vessel used in sacrificing, more specifically, a ritual
1 2vessel containing two pieces of jade. The left hand part
6 h Z k shows the radical of the composite character (the
combination of both parts is later than the bone or bronze
inscriptions) the meaning of the 6 hZh ^  part is given
with "sign, signify, show, inform, deity, divinity, relig- 
1 4ious" ; an etymologically more detailed explanation says 
that it is a derivative of the three horizontal strokes,
/r \
meaning, in its straightened form as a part of 6 hZh , 
’’influx coming from heaven, auspicious or inauspicious signs, 
by which the will of heaven is known to mankind"^.
The whole character retains the original denotation,
signifying ritual actions as offering valuable sacrifices.
With reference to the ancient dictionary, the Shuo Wen Chieh
Tzu of Hsu Shen, completed in 121 AD, Wei-ming Tu observes
that ZZ "specifically points to the step or act whereby
spiritual beings are properly served and human happiness 
1 6
obtained" • Initially, the expression ZZ denotes, most
11. Vide L. Wieger, Chinese Characters, (transl. from the 
French ed. 1915, New York, 1965), no. 744, p. 547;
Giles, Diet., no. 6947, p. 873.
12. J. Needham, SCC II, table 11, no. 77, p. 230.
13. Ibid. Cf. N.E. Fehl, o p .cit., pp. 4-5.
14. Ibid.
15. Wieger, o p .cit., Lesson 3D, p. 29.
16. Wei-ming Tu, LZ as process of humanization, in: PEW XXII 
(1972), pp. 187-201, p. 190; cf. The Sacred Books of 
China, transl. by J. Legge, The Li K i , pp. 9-10 (SBE, 
vol. XXVII, Oxford, 1885, repr. New Delhi 1976); J. Es- 
carra, op.cit., p. 16, says: c a le sens primitif de 
sacrifices offerts aux esprits pour obtenir la prospe- 
rite." In a slightly different accentuation A. Waley,
The Analects of Confucius, (London 1 938, 61 971 ), p. 64, 
refers to the original meaning of ZZ as 'arranging 
ritual vessels'.
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generally, a human activity in connection with the intention 
and practice of sacrificing, namely, as mentioned, for some 
specified purpose, very often in connection with ancestor 
worship directed to show deep concern and due respect for 
one's departed, thus keeping up the important continuity of 
many generations.
As to the above quoted phrases from the Shu Ching, the 
application of Li. has been slightly extended, so that the 
expression marks the meaning (as probably in similar con­
texts) 'ceremonious' or 'religious ritual'. While Legge 
(supra) has chosen the translation "ceremony", Couvreur
translated in French "rite, ceremonie religieuse, rendre un
n -  » 1 7  culte
The original JLL_ actions grew (as I might suppose) in 
importance to the extent that their proper performances could 
bring about the desired positive effects in the visible as 
well as in the invisible world. Therefore, it seemed quite 
natural to equate more generally ceremonies or festive pro­
ceedings (religious activities, festive celebrations, rit­
uals) of some social relevance with LL and to ascribe magical
1 8power to those performances.
17. Couvreur, Diet., p. 652.
18. Cf. Donald J. Munro, The Concept of Man in Early China,
(Stanford, 1969), p. 35; H.G. Creel, The Origins of
Statecraft in China, ubi cit., p. 335; Karl Biinger,
Die Rechtsidee in der chinesischen Geschichte, in: Sae- 
culum III, 1952, pp. 192-217, p. 201; the same, Reli­
giose Bindungen im chinesischen Recht, in: K. Biinger/
H. Trimborn (Hg.), Religiose Bindungen in friihen und
in orientalischen Rechten, (Wiesbaden, 1952), pp. 58- 
69, p. 63; the same, Entstehen und Wandel des Rechts 
in China, in: Entstehung und Wandel rechtlicher Tradi- 
tionen, hg. v. W. Fikentscher et al., (Freiburg/Miinchen, 
1980), pp. 439-472, p. 449-50. Marcel Granet, La civili­
sation chinoise, ubi cit., gives a valuable impression 
of the early Chinese ways of life from a sociological 
point of view, esp. his descriptions of "La vie aux 
champs", "Les coutumes paysannes", "Lieux-saints et 
cites", "Pouvoirs diffus et autorite individuelle", et 
"Dieux et chefs masculins", pp. 161-217.
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In the Shih Ching (The Book of Poetry, between 1122-
600 B.C.) XX occurs primarily with this connotation ten times 
19in six poems; in two poems the application of XX is once
20more extended. The first of it presents X-t as being used 
in the sense of 'rules of proper and correct behaviour1. In 
the second poem XX occurs twice in the third and last stanza 
consisting of four lines with four characters per line. It 
reads:
Look at the rat! It has its teeth.
And a man! But without IX?
A man, and yet without XX
21Why does he not quickly die?
LX means in this context 'correct and proper behaviour', 
man's behaviour that would fit a special situation, for in­
stance a sacrifice in a devotional manner at the right time.
22Thus, Xx. has acquired the meaning of 'propriety'. Despite
enormous difficulties of translating XX into a language of
the non-Chinese language family we can assume without much 
hesitation that XX in whatsoever sense is essential to man 
himself and his direct or indirect relation to others. Here, 
already, XX surfaces as man's way of life, whether in appro­
priate activities, such as ceremonies and the original sacri-
19. Vide Legge, CC IV, pp. 85, 323, 371-2, 397, 586, 603; 
cf. H.G. Creel, o p .cit., pp. 336-7 (he speaks of ten 
times in seven poems, and N.E. Fehl, op.cit., p. 81, 
speaks of nine times in six poems, whereas I have 
counted ten in six).
20. Vide Legge, CC IV, pt. II, bk. IV, IX, 5, line 8 , p. 323. 
Cf. the discussion of an adequate translation and under­
standing by H.G. Creel, op.cit., pp. 336-7 with reference 
to Karlgren and Waley; I do not follow Karlgren's and 
Legge's translation of XX by 'law'.
21. Vide Legge, CC IV, pt. I, bk. IV, VIII, 3, p. 85 (in the 
original Chinese version); my translation follows Legge's 
comment (ibid.) but slightly deviates from his wording
in lines 2 and 3; cf. H.G. Creel, op.cit., p. 337, where 
he gives Karlgren's translation of the whole poem (XX is 
rendered with 'decorum'.
22. Vide Legge, ibid.
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ficial acts, or in the manner o'f' man's cherished behaviour.
H.G. Creel points out that in the Western Chou period XX 
hardly refers to a special code of conduct peculiar to aris­
tocrats and that "in sharpest contrast to the situation in
Spring and Autumn times there is no single case in which XX
..23
is unmistakably used as the name of an aristocratic code"
1.2. To further the understanding of the original
topos of XX four highly significant framework topoi should.
be mentioned, X 1 Xen ^  , X rXen-mXng ^  , Xe.^ , and fo^ Xfl-O ^  .
{c )T'Xen (heaven) represents the image of the totality of
24
cosmic events beyond man's direct control. But according 
to the early Chinese belief in a reality of imagination, 
there is an interrelation between man's way of life and 
heavenly actions and reactions.
(c)
Problems of a harmonious interrelation between X'Xen
25and man centre man's interest in his own contribution.
/ j \
To accord with the X ' Xen-wiXng (the appointment of heaven) 
ought to be the king's utmost concern in order to ensure har­
mony between heaven and earth by means of an unceasing culti-
(e) 25avation of Xe (virtue, human excellence) . Thus it is
said in the Shu Ching (Book of Historical Documents):
23. H.G. Creel, op.cit., pp. 337-8. Horace H.Y. Too, The 
Origin and Formation of the Traditional Chinese Syn­
thetic Jurisprudence, in: Chinese Culture IX, 1962, 
pp. 73-107, p. 85.
24. Cf. T'ang Chiin-i, The T'ien Ming in Pre-Ch'in China, 
in: PEW XI (1962), pp. 195-218, p. 203; Otto Franke, 
Chinesisches Recht, in: Handworterbuch der Rechtswis- 
senschaft, I (Berlin, 1926), pp. 867-871, p. 867;
Fung Yu-lan, o p .cit., p. 31 (distinguishing five dif­
ferent meanings of XVXew).
25. Cf. A.F.P. Hulsewe, China im Altertum, ubi cit., 
pp. 497-507.
25a. An even more adequate translation (interpretation), also
in this early phase of Chinese history and language, might 
be, because of the non-existing pair of vice and virtue 
as opposed to each other, 'moral impetus, excellent in 
character'; vide infra, 111.3.(3). Cf. A. Waley, The 
Analects of Confucius, (London, 1 938, 61 971 ), p. 33.
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"Heaven [ X ' X e n ]  was not -with him because he
2 fi
did not seek to illustrate his virtue [Xe]."
And a famous poem in the Shih Ching (Book of Poetry) says/ 
elucidating those interrelations:
"The appointment of Heaven [X'X 2.n-mXng ] is
not constant (i.e. 'not once for all'). ...
Ever think of your ancestor, cultivating
your virtue [Xe], always striving to accord
with the will (of Heaven) [ (X'Xe.n.) m^ ing ] ,
so shall you be seeking for much happiness.
... The great appointment [mXng] is not
easily [preserved]. ... Do not cause your
27own extinction."
Despite an observable but uncharacteristic belief in
spirits, and in some kind of a supreme deity in very early
2 8phases of history, man considered himself little exposed to
26. Shu Ching, transl. Legge, CC III, pt. V, bk. XIV, 11,
p. 457. T'ang Chiin-i, op.cit. , p. 201, clearly empha­
sizes that "the Heavenly mandate comes after man's 
cultivation of virtue [Xe^e ^], and the future of men 
is thus not determined by God. Moreover, after a man 
receives the Heavenly mandate, there is still something 
(i.e. cultivation of virtue) for him to do which can be 
done only by himself". This is plainly voiced in the 
following quotation from the Book of Poetry (vide infra, 
text). Concerning the early topos of Xe.(e) vide also
A. Waley, The Way and its Power, (Boston/New York 1934, 
cit. after the Mandala ed., London, 1977), pp. 21, 31-2; 
D.J. Munro, op.cit., pp. 191-3.
27. Shih Ching, transl. Legge, CC IV, pt. Ill, bk. I, 1, 5-7,
pp. 4 30-1.
28. Cf. Homer H. Dubs, Theism and Naturalism in Ancient 
Chinese Philosophy, in: PEW IX (1959/60), pp. 163-172, 
p. 166; Werner Speiser, China. Geist und Gesellschaft, 
(Baden-Baden, 1959, 1974), p. 62; H.G. Creel, op.cit., 
pp. 493-506 (The Origin of the Deity T'ien); J. Needham, 
SCC II, ubi cit., pp. 580-1.
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29the supernatural. Instead he ,firmly believed in the close 
interdependence of nature and his behaviour. Therefore, it 
is^ up to him to regulate his conduct in the realms of his 
own control, such as in the family, the nucleus of human 
interdependences, in order to create an all-embracing har­
mony between nature and man. Apart from ££, k&'LCLO ^  (filial 
piety) is a dominant family virtue, without which disharmony 
would prevail throughout the family, and thus profoundly 
affect the balance between the human and non-human events.^
1.3. ; Devoid of a conception of transcendence a will) &(i&L
tendency to an occupation with the supernatural, the topos
(d) , (a)
of t 4.e.n-rr\'LYiQ (or any other, e.g. ■&hang ^ [ruler
above]) never took on the form of a divine celestial creator,
nor, vice versa, could such topoi create an inclination to
31extend the effective 'reality of conception' into the 
spheres of the supernatural, from which viable effects were 
to be expected in the realms of human life and events.
T '-len-m^ng implied the idea of heaven as issuing 'direc­
tives' or commands of various kinds (and we could find many 
32examples) , but it did not give way to the 'superstructure'
of an all-powerful personal lawgiver on whom exclusively
3 3depended man's destiny with necessity.
29. Cf. Derk Bodde, Dominant Ideas in the Formation of 
Chinese Culture, in: the same, Essays on Chinese Civi­
lization, (Princeton, 1981), pp. 132-8, pp. 132-3;
T'ang Chun-i, Cosmologies in Ancient Chinese Philosophy, 
in: Chinese Studies in Philosophy, V (1973), pp. 4-47,
p. 1 1 .
30. Vide Shu Ching, Legge, CC III, pt. V, bk. IX, 16, pp. 
392-3. Cf. infra, 111.3.(2), footnote 93, and the brief 
discussion at II.3. (3).
31. Vide Reinhard May, Frieden und die Aufgabe des Rechts, 
ubi cit., pp. 22, 104-111.
32. Vide J. Needham, SCC II, pp. 547-8.
33. Cf. T'ang Chiin-i, op. cit. , pp. 11-12; J. Needham, ibid., 
p. 581, where he gives the exposition that "there was
no conviction that rational personal beings would be 
able to spell out in their lesser earthly languages the 
divine code of laws which he had decreed aforetime".
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In direct contact with all kinds of natural phenomena 
which maintained a strong feeling for mutual dependence 9 con­
stant influence was thought to be exerted upon human behaviour 
in order not to upset the balance between heaven and earth.
In this sense man had to respond to heaven with a compliant 
mode of existence on earth; was held to be such a response, 
thus, a factor, which, at best, could regulate human affairs
everywhere X,<Ln k^yia , under heaven (i.e. on the earth or
3 4in the world). And it is from this concern, namely that 
the order of human society must correspond to the order of 
nature, that the topos of LL gained fundamental value and 
thus was gradually transferred to new fields of application. 
This took place in a first movement, namely, as we shall 
see, in a movement of extension of the topos of Li before 
the teachings of Confucius made their decisive contribution, 
which inaugurated a second movement, one of consolidation.
II.1. With the consecutive 'Spring and Autumn' period 
during the reign of the Eastern Chou kings, an increasing 
significance of the topos of LL, gradually intruding into 
almost all spheres of man's existence, is easily to be 
gathered from numerous references, in particular from the 
later documents of the Shu Ching and the Tso Chuan (a com­
mentary on the very brief year-by-year chronicle history of 
the state of Lu, the Ch'un Ch'iu (Spring and Autumn Annals), 
from 722-481 B .C .,compiled c. 300 B.C. on the basis of 
earlier records)
34. Cf. Louis von Kohl, Die Bedeutung der Riten im alien 
China, in: Ostasiatische Rundschau 13 (1932), pp. 5 9 - 
61, 81-84, pp. 82-3; Cheng Chung-ying, Chinese Philos­
ophy: a characterization, in: Invitation to Chinese 
Philosophy, ed. by A. Naess/A. Hannay, (Oslo, 1972), 
pp. 141-165, pp. 144-6, 162-3.
35. Vide Fung Yu-lan, op.cit., p. 415; H.G. Creel, Legal 
Institutions ..., ubi cit., p. 47.
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( C ) (C )The conceptions of £ ' £<lyi , . as well as £ f £e.n and 
£ £ ^ ^  (heaven and earth) still determine man's desire to 
conform to the pattern of nature by means of an adequate 
conduct of life which was deemed to be available most ad­
equately in a ££ expressing behaviour. As man owes his exi­
stence to £ ' £ q,yl and the three ways of £ 1 £o,n ,
£ £ ^ ^  , and m a n ^  have to be brought into a balanced corre­
spondence through the practices of Z£, so that the natural 
harmony between £ ’ £ <lyi and £ £ ^ ^  will not be spoiled. The 
Tso Chuan gives an explicit account of it:
"Ceremonies [Z£] (are founded in) the reg- 
lar procedure of Heaven, the right phenomena 
of earth, and the actions of men. Heaven and 
earth have their regular ways, and men take 
these for their pattern, imitating the bril­
liant bodies of Heaven, and according with 
the natural diversities of the earth. ...
The rules of ceremony [££] were therefore
3 8framed to support (that nature)."
As it is advisable for everybody to comply with the ac­
cepted rules of ££, so the ruler in particular takes the 
foremost responsibility in governing his people according 
to the demands of Z£, because it was ££
"what the ancient kings received from [in the
sense of 'have been made to pay attention to']
Heaven and Earth for the government of their
people, and therefore they ranked it in the 
39highest place"
36. Vide Shu Ching, transl. Legge, CC III, pt. V, bk. I, I,
3, pp. 283-4 (with comment).
37. I Ching ("The Book of Changes"), transl. Z.D. Sung, 
appendix II, ch. X, p. 333.
38. Tso Chuan, transl. Legge, CC V, bk. X, year XXV, 
pp. 704/708.
39. Ibid., bk. X, year XXVI, pp. 715/719.
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This means that £' xen and £jJ"^ , comprehended as 
interrelated factors of natural phenomena, cause man to 
respond by creating out of his own experience and imagin­
ation, modes of an appropriate conduct, lasting models of 
refined behaviour, to settle his own affairs; by acting towards 
one another on the principle of reciprocity, the relations 
of men are balanced to accord with the goal of an overarching
balance between nature and man. Such conduct conforms to the
(e) - 40pattern of -te. and shapes the standards of £x.
"It is by propriety [£x] that righteous- 
(k) 41ness [£ 3 is carried out; it is by good
faith (sincerity)] that propriety
42[£x] is maintained."
Thus, we find Z£ in close relation to the most prominent 
guidelines according to which man's affairs should be con­
ducted.
II.2. Considering the interdependence of heaven, ruler,
43 44and people, it is the ruler, called the Son of Heaven,
40. Vide ibid., bk. V, year XXVIII, pp. 204/209; bk. I, 
year XI, pp. 31/33.
41. Instead of translating 'x' with 'righteousness', namely, 
'that which is right to do' (vide Giles, Diet.., no. 5454),
I prefer to render 'x' with 'that which is appropriate
to do', or 'a suitable and proper way of behaving towards 
one another'.
42. Tso Chuan, ubi cit., bk. V, year XXVIII, pp. 206/213.
43. Shu Ching, ubi cit., pt. IV, bk. VIII, II, 3, p. 255.
44. "Emperors indeed were not themselves considered to be 
divine, despite the title Son of Heaven. This was merely 
a manner of speaking, natural enough to the family-con­
scious Chinese, to convey how the ruler acted as inter­
mediary between Heaven and the people, serving as son
to the former and parent to the latter, neither rela­
tionship being meant literally." R. Dawson, The Chinese
Experience, (London, 1978), p. 11.
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on whom rests the task of perfecting government with ££, 
and who is addressed:
"Exert yourself, 0 king, to make your great 
( 0 )
virtue [to, ] illustrious, and set up the
pattern of the Mean before the people. Order
(k)your affairs by righteousness [£ ]; order
your heart by propriety [Z£]: - so shall you
46transmit a grand example to posterity."
Given such prominence to the position of the ruler and
his actions, which are required to be "in reverent accordance
with the ways of Heaven [£f£e,n £ a o , failure in due
attention to ££ on the part of the ruler leads to imbalance 
48and confusion. But if t£ takes over and governs states and 
49families (clans, people) order is secured and provision
50made for the good of one's future heirs.
II.3. A lasting impact on the self-creative movement
of making Z£ into a distinctive way of life must be as-
(n )cribed to the ordering of society in u)a Zun (five rela­
tionships) . According to the Chinese 'reality of conception'
* (c)their origin may be seen in the context of £'£zn (heaven) 
as a complex of natural phenomena working as a source of
45. Tso Chuan, ubi cit., bk. VIII, year XII, pp. 377/378.
46. Shu Ching, ubi cit., pt. IV, bk. II, IV, 8 , p. 182.
47. Ibid., pt. IV, bk. VIII, II, 2, p. 254.
48. Ibid., pt. IV, bk. VIII, II, 11, pp. 257-8.
49. Family means the joint or extended family.
50. Vide Tso Chuan, ubi cit., bk. I, year XI, pp. 31/33.
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51inspiration. In the Shu Ching, .we find the following sig­
nificant passage concerning the varieties of ZZ_ linked with 
the five constituent sections (u)u £Ze.n^ °^  ) or relationships
( T1)(u)u Zan ) of society considered as a whole organism:
* (c)"From Heaven [ V  tun. ] are the (social) 
arrangements with their several duties 
[£Zzn^°^ ] (i.e. with their five sections
and their respective duties); to us it is 
given to enforce those five duties 
and then we have the five courses of gener­
ous conduct I From Heaven are the (social) 
distinctions with their several ceremonies 
[ZZ]; from us proceed the observances of 
those five ceremonies [ZZ], and then do they 
appear in regular practice! When (sovereign 
and ministers) show a common reverence and
respect for these, do they not harmonize the
52
moral nature (of the people) ? 11
51. Thus, there are the five elements (or activities be­
tween heaven and earth, that which moves about without 
ever ceasing), namely, water, fire, wood, metal, earth; 
vide Shu Ching, ubi cit., pt. V, bk. IV (The Great Plan), 
pp. 320 ff, 325. Cf. R. Dawson, The Chinese Experience, 
ubi cit., p. 90. On the relation of natural phenomena 
and social organization Jean Escarra, o p .cit., points 
out considering M. Granet's expositions: "On con^oit 
qu'un groupe humain, ayant acquis, par des observations 
repetees, une certaine connaissance des phenomenes na- 
turels, etablisse ensuite a 1 'imitation de ceux-ci, des 
regies d 1 organisation sociale." (p. 8 ).
52. Shu Ching, ubi cit., pt. II, bk. Ill, III, 6 , pp. 73-4.
On Zuvi(n ) and £Z q,yi (°) see the entries in Giles, Diet. , 
nos. 7464, 11177, and Legqe, CC III (Shu Ching), pp.
580, 654 (index) , on ZZ q,yl^ °) in the sense of tun (n ) as 
in the mi Zun which appears in Confucius' Analects and 
in Mencius, etc. cf. F.S. Couvreur, Dictionnaire clas- 
sique ..., ubi cit., p. 72; A. Forke, Geschichte der 
alten chinesischen Philosophie, ubi cit., pp. 18, 42.
This passage is not at allt easy to render adequately into 
English. However, we are able to grasp the central issue,
in particular if we take some other passages into consider-
5 3 / \
ation. Thus, it is obvious that there are the five tto,n
(n ) ----or tun , namely the distinguished relationships between
father and son, ruler and subject, husband and wife, elder 
and younger (brother), and between friends. Taken together, 
they shape the whole society in a natural and characteristic 
manner so as to secure a plain and reliable order under the 
proposition that they are interlocking with their respect­
ive circle of duties and their corresponding performances 
which demand due attention to tt expressing an expected cor­
rect and proper behaviour. In fulfilling one's duty tt is
the manner of how to do it, and so "the outward expression
54 ,of inward feeling" or, perhaps more likely, the inner 
constraint to act or react expectedly, in accordance with 
usage.
The observance and performance of tt becomes the fruit
(p) 55of the respective five (moral) lessons, the u>u chtao * 
or the five instructions of how to behave. This in turn 
created, quite naturally, the manifold particular tt, the 
polite and decent ways of conduct (usages) due to the rela­
tionship and the situation therein. The Shu Ching refers, 
so to say representatively, to the three and five tt. The 
three tt are "all the observances in the worship of the
spirits of heaven, the spirits of earth, and the spirits 
5 6of men" . And the five tt mentioned in the Shu Ching are
53. For instance, Shu Ching, ubi cit., pp. 31, 58, 316, 580.
54. Quoted after Giles, Diet., no. 6949, p. 873.
55. Vide Shu Ching, ubi cit., pt. V, bk. Ill, 10, p. 316; 
see also Legge1s comment, ibid., p. 31.
56. Shu Ching, ibid., pt. II, bk. I, V, 23 with Legge's 
comment, p. 47.
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those appropriate to worship, tp. calamity and mourning, to
State guests, to war, and to festivities such as marriages
57and other occasions of joy.
II.4. Offences in disregard of one's duty called for 
appropriate treatment in order to restore the lost equilib­
rium of nature, the harmonious interaction between the hu-
( r )man and non-human spheres. The iou h&£ng (the five pun­
ishments) are regarded as such treatment; they are to be 
considered in correspondence to the too. ck£ao (the five 
educational lessons of conduct (duty)) within the five re­
lationships and their implicit order to conform to the re-
5 8spective rules of ££. It was admitted that the severe and 
formidable five punishments, and to a lesser degree the 
five banishments, were primarily intended to prevent of­
fences that caused, as has been believed, the dreaded dis­
turbances of natural harmony. Accordingly,the maxim prevailed
59that compassion and virtue should rule in punishments,
and likewise that "through punishment there may come to be
no punishments, but the people accord with the (path of the)
60Mean [i.e. the harmonious middle path]" . In paying atten­
tion to this maxim, we find it repeated in the context of 
an important instruction concerning a perfect and wise gov-
57. Ibid., pt. II, bk. I, III, 8 , pp. 35-7 with Legge's 
explanation and reference to a different viewpoint on 
the contents of the u)u (p. 37) . Vide also, J. Es- 
carra, op.cit., p. 1 0 , pointing out once more the su­
preme importance of £ ’ £e.n in relation to everything 
£' £e,n h6£a (h) (under heaven) .
58. Vide Shu Ching, ubi cit., pt. II, bk. I, V, 19-20,
pp. 44-5; cf. ibid., pp. 38, 74, 542. Among the offences 
for which punishment is provided failure in familial 
duty ranks high. Creel, The Origins of Statecraft, 
ubi cit., p. 168.
59. Vide Shu Ching, ubi cit., pt. II, bk. I, III, 11,
p. 39, and (on -£e(e ) , of pre-' Spring and Autumn' origin)
pt. V, bk. IX, TT, p. 396.
60. Shu Ching, ubi cit., pt. II, bk. II, II, 11, p. 59.
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ernment that can do without rel*i*ance on fixed regulations.
The central part of this passage reads:
"Do not rely on your power to exercise op­
pression; do not rely on the laws 
to practise extortion. Be gentle, but with
( S )strictness of rule [c.ki.k , in the sense
of restraint]. Promote harmony by the dis-
61play of an easy forbearance."
The topos of , which we shall come to see in con­
trast to signifies in its present form of writing (re­
taining the meaning of the differently composed original
graph) 'a rule or fixed regulation (of punishment), a model
6 2as well as pattern and means'. Both conceptions represented
by k64,ng and jja^^are correlated in that denotes
the strict procedure or method (which came to be fixed in
writing) pertinent to the enforcement of punishment, es-
0 ( j
pecially concerning the uJu h^-lng (the five punishments) 
which were in use long before became known as referring
to written penal l a w . ^  Significantly, the origin of keying 
and was attributed to foreign, non-Chinese influence,
and may additionally explain the strong antipathy, primarily 
concerning f the promulgation of which met with deep
concern, and likewise the application of it had to be, none­
theless, amazingly considerate, and always carefully pre­
meditated. This can be instructively demonstrated by
61. Ibid., pt. V, bk. XXI, 7, p. 541.
62. Cf. Escarra, op.cit., p. 16; L. Wieger, op.cit., p. 288; 
F.S. Couvreur, Dictionnaire classique, ubi citf, p. 508; 
D. Bodde, Basic Concepts of Chinese L aw, ubi cit., re­
marks that "_£a. is the usual generic term for positive
or written law as an abstraction ... The word was al­
ready in common use before its appearance in legal con­
texts" (p. 379).
63. Vide D. Bodde, ibid., pp. 379-80.
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reference to Lii Hsing section (,".The Prince of Leu upon 
64punishments" ) in the Shu Ching; it concerns an announce­
ment about the handling of punishments, probably the oldest 
notice of such a compilation in China though its exact date 
still remains a question of conjecture.^  Once more we find
( G )a manifestation of to, (moral impetus, excellent in char-
6 6
acter), repeatedly emphasized, and, moreover, a condemna­
tion of inappropriate application of the aJu. fiA^ng, which is 
attributed to an uncultivated practice, in fact to that of
the non-Chinese Miao people, who "made the five punishments
/ \ 67
engines of oppression, calling them the laws [jja " ] 11
Furthermore, there is a second example demonstrating 
the negative effects of a code of punishments in contrast 
to the traditional, long-established way of life, namely the 
practice of in a spirit of benevolence and harmony. The 
Tso Chuan which, as mentioned above, was compiled from 
earlier records during the third century B.C., mentions the 
Hsing Shu (Books of Punishments), probably the first in­
scriptions (536/5 B.C.) to be treated as a ruler's code of 
defined penal regulations of totally secular origin and 
without any reference to the supernatural sphere. Though the
text itself is not available, we are reliably informed by
6 8the Tso Chuan that the Hsing Shu met with a strong oppo-
64. Shu Ching, ubi cit., pt. V, bk. XXVII, 1-22, pp. 588- 
611, with Legge's translation of the book-title.
65. Vide the discussion of the problem (also in view of the 
general question of the earliest "bodies of [written] 
law") by H.G. Creel, The Origins of Statecraft..., ubi 
cit., pp. 161-66 (with further references).
6 6 . Shu Ching, ibid., pp. 593, 595-6, 609, 611.
67. Ibid., p . 591.
6 8 . In Legge, CC V, ubi cit., pp. 607-611 (Duke Chao, 6th 
year). Cf. The discussion by J. Needham, SCC II,
pp. 521-2; D. Bodde, Basic Concepts ..., ubi cit., 
pp. 381-2; 0. Weggel, Chinesische Rechtsgeschichte, 
ubi cit., pp. 3-4.
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sition culminating in the sayings "When a State is about to
9 (s)perish, there will be many new enactments [c.kZh ] in 
69it." One of several good reasons to reject a government 
on the basis of written and defined regulations (generally 
referred to as especially in later centuries) is
that they make people reject ZZ and appeal to £a, thus in­
creasing their contentious spirit and provoking danger to 
the maintenance of natural harmony which by all means had 
to be prevented for the sake of man's existence under heaven
/u \
{£ 1Zdn k-6Za ). Therefore, as Joseph Needham pointed out, 
"from the beginning the supple and personal relations of ZZ 
were felt to be preferable to the rigidity of ^ ^  ^ .
II.5. We have considered now the first, socially im­
portant movement of extension of the topos of ZZ. Therein,
ZZ was found to evolve (broadly speaking) from a special to
72a general way of life. This process took place (including 
the originating phase) over a period of about 600 years. 
However, I am unable to give a definition of ZZ. It appears 
that by the 6 th century B.C. ZZ was only available as a com­
plex topos, the comprehension of which entirely depended on 
the contexts that reflected the situation in which ZZ played 
its peculiar part. In fact, the actual topos of ZZ cannot 
be exhausted in any (abstract) definition. Inasmuch as ZZ 
occurs variously in the early literature, it is amenable
69. Ibid., pp. 607/610 (transl. Legge).
70. So especially the Fa Ching by Li K'uei (only the head­
ings of its contents are available) which, as one can 
assume, served as model for all later so-called codes
of regulations ('law'). Vide J. Needham, ibid., pp. 523-
4. Vide also Timoteus Pokora, The Canon of Laws [Fa 
Ching] by Li K'uei - A Double Falsification?, in: Ar- 
chiv Orientalni 27 (1 959), p p . 96-121, who expresses 
doubts whether it can be used "as a base for the far- 
reaching conclusions concerning the origin o'f the Chin­
ese codes" (p. 117).
71. J. Needham, ibid., p. 522.
72. Cf. H.G. Creel, The Origins of Statecraft ..., ubi cit. 
p. 197; N.E. Fehl, op.cit., pp. 216-7, 220-1.
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only to a rather general characteristic such as a socially 
created and accepted way of life, which obviously comprises 
a wide range of possible and accepted modes of human activ­
ities, being in the course of time represented as distinct 
habits or usages, in particular within the five relation­
ships .
In contrast to the above mentioned regulations called
, ZZ was not codified and remained unwritten during
73most of the Chou dynasty, being orally preserved and trans­
mitted by means of example and education. Thus, ZZ was
modelled from within and not imposed from above, devoid of
74any individual author, whether human or divine. Lc owes 
its invention to man's endeavour to fit into the natural 
harmony of things; to give active support to it, appropriate
. (k)
conduct is sought with due attention to the practice of x. 
and .
While the early phase saw little disposition to the 
supernatural sphere, disclosing ZZ as an attentive and ap­
propriate expression in form of sacrificial ceremonies, the 
following phase exhibited a movement of ZZ into the natural 
human spheres of life, where ZZ was regarded as a suitable 
action or reaction in correspondence with the visible and 
invisible natural forces. LZ behaviour became an essential 
part in human relations with almost no propensity to the
supernatural; it was socially legitimated and under constant
(n )survey by the whole community in its wu. Zun organi-
75zation with an accent on hierarchical modifications.
73. Vide D. Bodde, Basic Concepts ..., ubi cit., p. 383.
74. Cf. E.J.M. Kroker, Positives Recht und Naturrecht in 
China, in: Kroker/Veiter (eds.), Rechtspositivismus ..., 
(Wien/Stuttgart, 1976), pp. 130-157, pp. 138-9; D. Bod­
de, ibid. , p. 378 (even in the case of no divine
origin was ever suggested).
75. Cf. K. Biinger, Die normativen Ordnungen in China und ihr 
Verhaltnis untereinander (1951), in: Ostasienwissenschaft- 
liche Beitrage, (Wiesbaden, 1971), pp. 169-180, p. 170;
D. Bodde, ibid., p. 383.
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As to the operation of ■Li,, .we may assume that the prac­
tice of it was internally enforced, working upon man's con­
sciousness in form of an inner-constraint or compulsion to 
comply with its rules and models, so as to demonstrate one's 
personal ability to support universal harmony as well as to 
contribute to the cultivation of society and oneself. Every­
body had to have, and to do, his duty, namely conforming to 
the way of conduct in accordance with ZZr or he was likely 
to bring about disorder in his relationships and personal 
misfortune. In the case of a ruler, this is amply illustrated 
with a passage from the Shu Ching:
"By my desires I was setting at nought all 
rules (of conduct), and by my self-indul­
gence I was violating all rules of propriety 
[ZZ]: - the result must have been speedy ruin 
to my person. Calamities sent by Heaven may 
be avoided, but from calamities brought on 
by one's-self there is no escape."
Whereas this pre-Confucian passage, drawing attention to 
the consequences of violating the rules of ZZ, in the sense 
of appropriate demeanour to others, already indicates a 
shift of emphasis to man's way of life (here with respect 
to the ruler's part in relation to his subjects and the due 
consequences of his failure), which we shall see at the 
centre of Confucius' teaching, the main emphasis nonethe­
less remains in the perspective of t1 Ze.n dao , the way of 
heaven, or, in other words, in the "world of nature", where
man can "find in all things an underlying harmony and unity,
77rather than struggle and chaos". However, it is the task
76. Shu Ching, ubi cit., pt. IV, bk. V, II, 3, p. 207.
77. D. Bodde, Dominant Ideas in the Formation of Chinese 
Culture, ubi cit., pp. 133, 135; cf. the same, Harmony 
and Conflict in Chinese Philosophy, in: A.F. Wright, 
(ed.), Studies in Chinese Thought, (Chicago - London, 
1953, **1 967) , pp. 19-80, p. 46.
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of man to make his way to accord-with it by means of con­
stant regard for ZZ, since "there is establishment for the
observers of propriety [ZZ], and overthrow for the blinded
7 8
and wantonly indifferent11
III.1. In what follows, I shall describe in a rather 
cursory manner the second movement of ZZ. On the basis of 
the proceeding one, this movement can be conceived as the 
central and final one that took place in three phases, all 
of which contributed to the consolidation of the topos of 
ZZ over a period of two thousand years. There is the initial 
phase of Confucius' teaching transmitted in the so-called 
Analects (Lun Yii)^, and the subsequent ous. cf tii£ famous suc­
cessors and opponents, which roughly coincides with the War-
fto
ring States' period (463-222 B.C.) , and finally the third
phase, beginning with the Former Han dynasty (206 B.C. - 
81
8 A.D.), when the great compilation Li Chi (the so-called 
Book of Rites) was ready to appear concluding the consoli­
dation of ZZ. All this covers a period of c. 500 years from 
the birth of Confucius (551-479 B.C.) to the appearance of 
the Li Chi.
78. Shu Ching, ubi cit., pt. IV, bk. II, IV, 9, p. 183.
79. Though the date and the actual authorship of the Lun Yli 
('Selected Saying', or Analects in Legge's well-known 
translation) are uncertain, there is little doubt, ac­
cording to A. Waley, o p .cit., pp. 21-26, that the com­
pilation took place after Confucius' death and was in 
existence (possibly not in its present state) when Men­
cius and Hsiin Tzu referred to the master's teachings, 
i.e. by the middle of the fourth century B.C. As usual, 
when referring to Confucius' authorship of the Lun Yu,
I do so in a conventional sense disregarding the problems 
of authenticity involved; this applies likewise to all 
subsequent works of the pre-Han period. Concerning the 
Li Chi some similar problems are involved (vide the 
introductions in Li Chi, ed. New York 1967).
80. As to the dates, vide H.G. Creel, The Origins of State­
craft , ubi cit., pp. XIV, 47.
81. Previous to the Former Han dynasty is the first Chinese 
imperial dynasty of the Ch'in (221-207/6 B.C.) whose 
impact on the formation of the Chinese culture may also 
be seen in the controversy over £a or ZZ as a suitable 
means of regulating administration and- social life.
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In characterizing the sum of these phases as a consoli­
dation movement, I want to make it clear that there was no prope 
development, rather, a steady process of manifestation of 
all principal aspects of ZZ already exhibited; in other 
words, a constant review takes place combining the early 
aspects into one complex whole. Basically no new aspect has 
been added, but many refinements and elaborations of con­
crete behaviour referring to what exists already in tradi­
tional practices of ZZ, at least in a common understanding 
of what might be an appropriate practice. Thus, naturally 
a great number of delicate shades of meaning can be at­
tached to the topos of ZZ as it occurs in our sources. Con­
sequently, it is again impossible to offer a definition of 
Z Z , either in Chinese or in any other language. Likewise 
all the difficulties of translation remain; in a strict
sense ZZ is untranslateable, its complexity defies all suc-
8 2cessful efforts. Thus, we can be content with a broad de­
scription which already resulted (supra) in an equally com­
plex English version: ZZ as a socially created and accepted 
way of life, being firmly consolidated by the end of this 
second movement.
III.2. Even most expositions, comments and references 
concerning ZZ as it appears in the sources,are subtle or 
complex, interwoven with quite different subjects or special 
indications so that an almost entire presentation would 
go far beyond the scope of this enquiry. But there are 
five significant propositions suitable for us to 
focus on the consolidation movement of the topos
82. Cf. Noah Edward Fehl, op.cit., pp. 3-4; and cf. further­
more for instance, Yungback Kwun, Exkurs: "Li" als der 
monistische Rechtsbegriff in der chinesischen Philoso- 
phie, in: Entwicklung und Bedeutung der Lehre von der 
"Natur der Sache" ..., Diss. (Universitat des Saarlandes, 
1963), p. 49; Herbert H.P. Ma, Law and Morality. Some 
reflections on the Chinese experience past and present, 
in: PEW 21 (1971), pp. 443-60, p. 444; Jung-Pyung Lim,
Das gegenwartige Familienrecht Siidkoreas zwischen deut- 
scher Rechtsdogmatik und fernostlicher Sozialdoktrin, 
Diss. (Mainz, 1972), p. 90; Antonio S. Cua, Dimensions 
of ZZ ..., in: PEW 29 (1979), pp. 373-94, p. 374.
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of ZZ . These can be elicited as .a descriptive framework for our
summary to be illustrated with characteristic passages from
8 3the original works.
The propositions are now to be given with their respective 
subsequent explanations, and no special importance should be at­
tached to the order in which I have set them out: (1) No innovation 
or creation, but rather recurrence and insistence on ancient experi­
ence and conduct to be invoked by constant learning (hsueh^u ^).
(2) Maintenance and special emphasis of ZZ as practice(s) 
against individual misconduct and social disorder, and for 
self-cultivation and social harmony. (3) Unceasing attention 
to the topos of ZZ in connection with the topoi of social and 
moral esteem. (4) Preference of ZZ over and ii6^ ing ^  .
(5) Auspicious conservation cf ZZ, in general, as a socially 
created and accepted (and binding) way of life, and in par­
ticular, as a vast body of concrete rules of conduct.
111.3.(1): Confucius refers to himself as a transmitter 
84of antiquity. Assuming that a model or an ideal way of con­
duct existed then, upon which man could rely and follow in 
the present days of decay, transmission rather than creativ­
ity is needed, innovation is unnecessary. The topos of ZZ 
need not be given from without to the world, there is no 
connection to a supramundane sphere. Great antiquity is
83. In quoting from the works concerned, I shall make use
of well-known and easily available English translations, 
if necessary, sometimes giving more than one transla­
tion or cross-references, in order to draw attention to 
differences in the English versions, which are, quite 
naturally, the result of general and, as regards the 
Chinese language and literature, of special translation 
problems.
84. Vide Lun Yii ('Analects'), VII, I; cf. II, XI [referring 
to, or, in case, quoted after the English versions of 
(1) J. Legge, The Chinese Classics (in Chinese and Eng­
lish with copious comments), vol. I: Confucian Analects, 
etc., (1861), (repr. Hong Kong, 1970); (2) A. Waley,
The Analects of Confucius, (London, 1938, 61971 ) ;
(3) Confucius, The Analects (Lun Yii), by D.C. Lau, 
(Harmondsworth (Penguin Classics), 1979) .
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attributed to ZZ, its origin is- -ascribed to a social enter­
prise of sages, who sought to harmonize human behaviour with 
the way and order of the natural world. Thus, the Shang
(Yin) dynasty followed the ZZ of the Hsia, and the Chou the
8 5:ZZ of the Shang (Yin). From a Confucian viewpoint the fol­
lowing passage is of central importance.
"Of the things brought about by the rites 
[ZZ], harmony is the most valuable. Of the 
ways of the Former Kings, this is the most 
beautiful, and is followed alike in matters 
great and small, yet this will not always 
work: to aim always at harmony without regu­
lating it by the rites [ZZ] simply because 
one knows only about harmony will not, in 
fact, w o r k . " ^
Therefore, to obtain the necessary information about the 
'old ways', Confucius strongly advocates to study (fi£ue.k ^  ) 
the past which includes the beneficial imitation of the 
'old ways'. in the Confucian sense of the word,
comprises the four activities, namely, learning, studying,
85. Vide Lun Yii, II, XXIII; III, IX. Hsiln Tzu's discourse 
on ZZ, beginning with a brief passage on the origin 
of ZZ (cf. the Li Yun chapter of the Li Chi (the Book 
of Rites), vide infra), is most suitable to give a com­
prehensive account of ZZ in the perspective of the 
'younger generation' of Confucian 'scholars', in his 
case, of the second prominent successor of Confucius.
H.H. Dubs, who translated his works (1928), calls Hsiin 
Tzu "The Moulder of Ancient Confucianism" (so the title 
of his book, a study on Hsiin Tzu) . Vide the translation 
by Burton Watson, Hsiin Tzu, Basic Writings, (New York - 
London, 1963), pp. 89-111.
8 6 . Lun Yii, I, XII (quoted after Lau, ubi cit. , p. 61; cf. 
the Chinese original and Legge's translation p. 143).
Cf. Mencius IV, A, 1 (quotations and references after 
(1) J. Legge, The Chinese Classics (in Chinese and Eng­
lish with copious comments), vol. II: The Works of Men­
cius (1861), (repr. Hong Kong, 1970); (2) Mencius,
transl. by D.C. Lau, (Harmondsworth (Penguin Classics), 
1970).
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imitating, teaching. Numerous 'passages in the Lun Yii give 
ample evidence that k6ue.h is regarded as a precondition for 
practice, especially to guiding man's moral conduct in cor­
respondence with the rules of or, in general, with the
8 8spirit of these rules. Whereas Confucius is said not to
have talked on the four subjects, viz, extraordinary things
8 9(prodigies), force, disorder, and spiritual beings, he was
known to teach (ckXao , to give instruction, to educate)
"under four heads: culture, moral conduct, doing one's best,
90and being trustworthy in what one says" . Confucius' cul­
tural and moral-educational programme was free from super­
natural beliefs; he was uninterested in the supernatural
87. Vide Giles, Diet., no. 4839.
8 8 . Vide Lun Yii (on k6ue.h^ ) : II, IV, pp. 146-7; V, XXVII, 
p. 183; VII, II, p. 195; XVII, VIII, 3, p. 322 (pp. re­
fer to text and translation by Legge, ubi cit.); also 
Mencius (quoting Confucius on fiAue.k) , II, II, II, 19, 
p. 192 (Legge); furthermore Hsiin Tzu, section 1 (en­
couraging h6ue.li) , 19, pp. 15-23, 95, 102 (B. Watson, 
ubi cit.).
89. Vide Lun Yii, VII, XXI, p. 88 (D.C. Lau, ubi cit.); cf. 
ibid. , VI, XXII, p. 84; XI, XII, p. 107. Hsiin Tzu, in 
speaking of the three bases of ZX, does not mention the 
religious or supernatural world either; he speaks of 
the world (heaven above and earth below), of honouring 
the ancestors, and exalting rulers and teachers; these 
are the three bases of ZX. Vide Hsiin Tzu, sect. 19 (B. 
Watson, ubi cit., p. 91JT Whereas R. Dawson, The Chin­
ese Experience, ubi cit., p. 93, remarks that "the in­
creasing application of the concept of tX_ to all human 
activities could make men forget its religious origins 
and see it mainly as an ornament to man's social life", 
McAleavy, Chinese Law, in: J.D.M. Derrett (ed.), An 
Introduction to Legal Systems, (London, 1968), pp. 105- 
30, emphasizes even more the fact (p. 107) that Confu­
cius "eliminated theology altogether" [if there ever has 
been theology at all]. A conflict of moral teachings 
with religious duties is, therefore, impossible. Cf. 
Wei-ming Tu, Centrality and Commonality. An Essay on 
Chung-yung [The Doctrine of the Mean], (Hawaii, 1976), 
p. XIII.
90. Lun Yii, VII, XXV (Lau, p. 89); cf. the Chinese original 
with Legge's transl., ubi cit., p. 202 (VII, XXIV).
- 14-7 -
world, because, as we read in th-e Tso Chuan:
"The way of Heaven is distant, while the 
way of man is near. We cannot reach to the
91former; what means have we of knowing it?"
111.3.(2): It is obvious that being occupied with the 
world of man, instruction under the above-mentioned four 
heads is not just desirable but necessary. Especially suit­
able means and measures must be available to prevent or to 
obviate individual misconduct that causes harm to the well- 
regulated five relationships (wu t u n ^ ) bound by ties, 
either of nature or social interest. Moderate individual 
conduct, the control of one's passions, keeps man away from 
antagonistic or extreme behaviour to each other, and thus 
keeps the core of the wo. tun intact, and consequently the 
balance of natural, as well as social order. Evidently, 
Confucius and his successors derived from past experience 
the conviction that the practice of tt provided the basis
upon which man's moral conduct could be established, so
92that man himself could take his stand. Strong commitment 
to Li enables, whatever may be the situation, an appropriate 
way of conduct (practical morality), illustrated, 
for instance, by Confucius' explanation of 'Filial Piety' 
(hAtao ^ V ^), a topos of central significance:
"When your parents are alive, comply with
the rites [tt] in serving them; when they
die, comply with the rites [tt] in burying
them; comply with the rites [tt] in sacri-
93ficing to them."
91. Tso Chuan, bk. X, year XVIII (quoted after Legge, 
ubi cit., p p . 669, 671).
92. Vide Lun Y u , VIII, 8 ; XVI, 13; XX, III (ubi cit.).
93. Lun Yii, II, V (Lau, ubi cit. , p. 63): cf* ibid., IV, 
XIX-XXI. For a discussion of h ^ t u o (filial piety) 
vide A. Waley, The Analects of Confucius, ubi cit., 
pp. 38-9; R. Dawson, Confucius, ubi cit., pp. 46-9. 
Furthermore, infra, 111.3.(3).
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Confirmed by many instances from past generations, especial­
ly on ceremonial occasions in the early days, and a growing 
conviction of the positive effects of commitment to AX in
the declining days of the Chou dynasty, inspired an enormous
94diffusion of AX practices, mainly (and usually) orally
transmitted as the socially accepted way of life. As
R. Dawson states, "it coloured all social occasions and
all human relationships, in such everyday contexts meaning
95
'propriety', 'politeness', or 'good form'"
As we learn from the Lun Yii, Confucius was not so much 
interested in giving an account of the details of AX prac­
tices; he was afraid of the harm the absence of the spirit 
of AX could do. Thus, he gave the following illustration:
"Respectfulness, without the rules of pro­
priety [AX], becomes laborious bustle; care­
fulness, without the rules of propriety 
[AX], becomes timidity; boldness, without 
the rules of propriety [AX], becomes insub-
94. A written version may well have existed before Confucius, 
and in fact still during the Chou period, as far as the 
so-called Li Ching is concerned which was more or less 
lost after the "Ch'in fire" in 213 B.C. The three pre­
served 'Li Books', the Chou Li, the I Li, and the 
Li Chi, all go back to the Confucian tradition. The 
written version of the Chou Li may have been produced 
around the Warring States period recalling the long be­
fore existing AX practices. The I Li giving-a detailed 
account of AX to be practised by the individual (writ­
ten down in the Warring States period) has probably 
partly inspired the production of the Li Chi (The 'Book 
of Rites') which inaugurated the final consolidation of 
AX as a socially accepted (and binding) way of life 
(vide infra, ad 5). Vide H.G. Creel, The Origins of 
Statecraft, ubi cit., pp. 478-80, 485-6; Ch'u Chai and 
Winberg Chai, Introduction, in: Li Chi., ubi cit., 
pp. XXIX-XXXI; Fung Yu-lan, op.cit., p. 412.
95. R. Dawson, Confucius, ubi cit., p. 26.
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ordination; straightforwardness, without the
96
rules of propriety it*,], becomes rudeness."
Self-cultivation ranked high in Confucius' programme of 
practical morality. The c.kun-tzu. (the gentleman or per­
fect man) is the model of it in the true spirit of tt, and
he gives due attention to its performance whenever the situ-
97ation demands his example. On him, first of all, rests 
success or failure of the social order to be brought about by 
ti_ and not by law ( ^  ) .
"When those above are given to the observ­
ance of the rites [ti], the common people
98will be easy to command."
Social order becomes a natural consequence, and the ckiin-tzu' s
model of self-cultivation adds a state of peace and tran-
99 (x)quillity to all people. Thus, harmony [Aio '] is still kept
as the supreme goal of orientation.^0 0  Harmony denotes a
96. Lun Y u , VIII, II, 1 (transl. Legge, ubi cit., p. 208; 
cf. the translation provided by D.C. Lau, ubi cit.,
p. 92). Cf. Shu Ching, pt. IV, bk. V, pt. II, 3 (Legge, 
ubi cit;, p. 207), quoted above (II.5.); both instances 
draw attention to the ill consequences of disregard of 
Li.
97. Vide Lun Yii, XII, V; XII, XV (repetition of VI, XXVII 
(XXV)); VIII, II, 2; IX, XXIV (XXV); XV, XVII (XVIII); 
IV, XVI. Vide also Hsiin Tzu, sect. 2 (B. Watson, ubi 
cit. , pp. 24-32). Ckiin-tzu. refers to "a man of true 
(rather than merely hereditary) nobility", hence the 
practice of translating Ckiin-tzu as "gentleman" (H.G. 
Creel, Confucius, (New York, 1949, 1975), pp. 77-8).
Cf. R. Dawson, ibid., pp. 53-6.
98. Ibid., XIV, XLI (transl. Lau, ubi cit., p. 131); cf. 
XIII, IV ("When those above love the rites [ti], none 
of the common people will dare to be irreverent."
(Lau, ibid., p. 119)).
99. Ibid., XIV, XLII (XLV).
100. Vide supra, ad 1. However, the ways and means of
achieving this goal are different from those advocated 
in the Tao Te Ching; vide e.g. chapter 45. Reinhard 
May, Frieden und die Aufgabe des Rechts, ubi cit., 
pp. 121-2 (3.3.).
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viable 'state of affairs' such as with man himself, between
his nature and emotions, perfect with the self-cultivated
c.kiin-tzuL, furthermore between members of the urn Zun ^  , and
particularly between members of the family, between man and
nature, and between all forces of the universe. LL especial- 
101ly contributes in all its spheres of influence to such a 
'state of affairs', and, in turn, depends as a socially ac­
cepted way of life on its achievement, without which the 
viability of ZZ would have been greatly reduced or com­
pletely destroyed.
111.3.(3) Obviously, the topos of ZZ, particularly due 
to its social viability, cannot remain isolated from other 
topoi of social and moral esteem. Therefore, ZZ often oc­
curs in connection with those topoi of human behaviour which
are of long standing, deeply rooted in ancient experience
(6 ) (k )and evaluation. Two of those topoi are -te and Z . Both
. 102
played their part in the first movement of Z*,.
The outstanding Confucian emphasis of the topos of ZZ, 
not so much its general maintenance as a legacy from past 
dynasties (including the legendary), caused opposition to a
101. Vide supra, ad 1, footnote 8 6 .Hsiin Tzu, discussing ZZ
(sect.19) says, beautifully summarizing: "Through rites 
[Z Z ] Heaven and earth join in harmony [are in accord­
ance with each other], the sun and moon shine, the four 
seasons proceed in order, the stars and constellations 
march, the rivers flow, and all things flourish; men's 
likes and dislikes are regulated and their joys and 
hates made appropriate. Those below are obedient, those 
above are enlightened; all things change but do not be­
come disordered; only he who turns his back upon rites 
[ZZ] will be destroyed." (transl. B. Watson, ubi cit., 
p. 94). In interstate practice, for instance, the 
parties involved had to accept that even conciliation 
and pacification must be based on ZZ; vide Keishiro 
Iriye, The Principles of International Law in the Light 
of Confucian Doctrine, in: Recueil des Cours, 1967-1 
(120), pp. 1-59, p. 10 (with references); cf. Erich 
Haenisch, Politische Systeme und Kampfe im alten China, 
(Berlin, 1951), pp. 12-19.
102. Vide supra, II. 1. ff.
considerable degree. Being aware .of it, Confucius himself 
(anticipating strong criticism) is said to have advocated 
principally the spirit of tZ in contrast to the mere for­
mality, in performing the obligatory rules of behaviour. He 
himself has opposed the mere execution of LL practices, 
often appearing as a drilled and artificial demeanour.
"The rites, the rites [t^ i] , it is not enough
103merely to mean presents of jade and silk."
In correlation with > an<3 unfolds its
true social and moral nature. Thus, Confucius clearly states
"What can a man do with the rites [£/c] who
(vl 104 
is not benevolent [jen ] ?"
In contrast to je n (benevolence, etc.), which is
first to be met with as a topos of special moral signifi-
105 (e)cance in the Lun Yii of Confucius, the topoi of ttL
■ (k)and X have a comparatively long history; they have al­
ready 'framed' our understanding of the of the initial 
( 6 )movement. Te. denotes in general, as I have briefly ex-
106plained, a 'moral impetus, excellent in character'. The 
Lun Yii gives an illustration:
"The rule of virtue [to.] can be compared 
to the Pole Star which commands the homage
of the multitude of stars without leaving
i ,,107its place.
103. Lun Yii, XVII, XI, transl. Lau, ubi cit. , p. 145; 
cf. Legge, CC I, p. 324.
104. Ibid., Ill, III, (Lau, p. 67; Legge, p. 155).
105. Cf. A. Waley, The Analects of Confucius, ubi cit., 
pp. 27-9; R. Dawson, Confucius, ubi cit., p. 37.
106. Vide supra, 1.2., footnote 25a. Cf. Giles, Diet., 
no. 10845.
107. Lun Yii, II, I, transl. Lau, ubi cit. , p. 63; cf. Legge, 
CC I, p. 145. Vide furthermore, Lun Yii, II, III;
VIII, XX.
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generally designates 'appropriateness'^0^; it is es­
sential to the nature of the chun-tzu^  (the 'perfect man')
and his activities, especially in connection with his ti
„ (k)
practices, that he 'illustrates' i in a sense of morally
109appropriate conduct. In the works of Mencius, we find a
reference'*'*0 to significantly framing and being framed
by the so-called Mencian 'virtues' or modes of behaviour
(in a wide meaning), namely j e,n ^  and chih ^  ,
( 3.3.)together called the four basic 'virtues'; if we add fiAin 
(sincerity, etc.), we have named the complete set of the 
so-called Confucian 'virtues' (modes of behaviour), which 
may be rendered into English (in the given order) as "hu­
maneness, dutifulness, observance of ritual, wisdom, and
111good faith [or sincerity]" , However, of all five modes
(y)
of behaviour jtn is certainly the most important topos 
to contribute essentially to the final consolidation of LL 
(infra, ad (5)); it is "the one unifying principle of all of 
Confucius' teachings" ^  ^ . The character j o,n ^  itself is a 
visible expression of a (benevolent) adjustment of human 
relations. Without such extraordinary accentuation of hu­
maneness which must govern especially the five relationships 
(n )(mi tun ), the topos of ti would remain (as has been indi­
cated) an empty vessel, a pale artificiality lacking the
108. Vide supra, II.1., II.2., II.5.; cf. A. Waley, The Way 
and its Power, ubi cit., pp. 32-5; Giles, Diet.,
no. 5454.
109. Vide Lun Y u , IV, XVI, (Legge, CC I, p. 170); Mencius,
I, I, I (the well-known opening chapter), Legge,
CC II, pp. 125-7.
110. Mencius, VI, I, VI, 7 (Legge, CC II, pp. 402-3); II, I, 
VI, 5 (ibid. , pp. 202-3); cf. Hsiin Tzu, sect. 2 (last 
sentence), transl. B. Watson, op.cit., p. 32.
111. R. Dawson, Confucius, ubi cit., p. 51. Cf. my German 
versions in Frieden und die Aufgabe des Rechts, ubi 
cit., p. 1 1 1 .
112. Y.P. Mei, The Basis of Social, Ethical, and Spiritual 
Values in Chinese Philosophy, in: Charles A. Moore 
(ed.), The Chinese Mind, (Honolulu, 1967, 1977),
pp. 149-166, p. 152.
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spirit that gives life and meaning to human relations and 
concerns. Accordingly, there are numerous passages in the 
Lun Yii, for instance:
"Of neighbourhoods benevolence is
the most beautiful. How can the man be con­
sidered wise who, when he has the choice, 
does not settle in benevolence
It remains to be mentioned that we have already touched
upon the topos of k6Zao ^  (filial piety or devotion of a
114son to his parents, grandparents, ancestors) which ap­
pears here in connection with /z n ; we read in the Lun 
Yii that k4<LCL0 ^  and brotherly respect could probably be
11 5
regarded as the root of j e.n (benevolent, humane) actions.
And the post-Confucius classic of 'Filial Piety1 
CkZng) says:
(f )"Now filial piety [ki>Zao ] is the root of 
( 0 )all virtue [to, ] , and (the stem) out of 
which grows (all moral) teaching [ chZao ^  ^  ^
11.3. Lun Yii, IV, I, transl. Lau, ubi cit. , p. 72; vide
furthermore on j_en(y), ibid., IV, II-VI; cf. Legge,
CC I, p. 165 (his comment on the heading of book IV). 
Vide also Lun Yii, VI, XXX; VI, XX (Legge) or XXII 
(Lau); XII, I ("To return to the observance of the 
rites [Z'c] through overcoming the self constitutes 
benevolence [ transl. Lau, p. 112); Mencius,
II, II, II, 6 (Legge, CC II, p. 213). Cf. also the 
discussion of the moral dimensions and relations of 
j dn <y> and £(k) with ZZ as regards Hsiin Tzu's point of 
view presented by A.S. Cua, Dimensions of li ..., ubi 
cit., pp. 375-80; and Wei-ming Tu, The Creative Ten- 
sion between Jen and Li, in: PEW XVIII (1968), pp.
29-39, esp. pp. 34, 38.
114. Vide The Hsiao Ching or Classic of Filial Piety (transl. 
by J. Legge, in: SBE, vol. Ill, pp. 447-488), the con­
cluding passage, p. 488 (ch. XVIII).
115. Vide Lun Yii, I, II, 2 (Legge, CC I, pp. 138-9).
116. The Hsiao Ching, ibid., ch. I, p. 466. Vide also supra, 
1.2. Cf.Yu-wei Hsieh, Filial Piety and Chinese Society, 
in: Charles A. Moore (ed.), The Chinese Mind, (Hono­
lulu, 1967, 1977), pp. 167-187, p. 167, 169, 175, 179, 
181, 186 (stressing the moral aspect of filial piety 
which is of paramount social relevance, esp. with ref­
erence to ancestor worship).
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Thus, h6jiao_^^ constitutes also .in a fundamental sense the
moral essence of practices, especially in the realm of
family life. Furthermore, it is a distinct and concrete
model of behaviour within the 'chain' of the five Confucian
'virtues' or basic modes of conduct, where ££_ is given some
kind of a correlative exposition. In sum, the topos of ZX_
gains or loses in social and moral esteem (not less as the
117"principle of social control and organization" ) to the 
extent that it is capable of maintaining a harmonious moral 
order within the world of man; this might be utterly imposs­
ible without the simultaneous exertion of a profound and
(s )excellent moral impetus (to, ) directed toward the expected
cultivation of j e.n ^  cJUJi^z  ^, and ,
first of all illustratively demonstrated in the chun-tzu’s ^
118('gentleman's') way of life.
Ill. 3.(4): This proposition draws attention to the topos of
119as "the principle of social control and organization"
LL is directed against the preponderance of in com-
* ( 3T )bination with statutes of h&ycng for strict and general
117. Lin Yutang, Li: Chinese Principle of Social Control 
and Organization, in: The Chinese Social and Political 
Science Review II, 1, (Peking, 1917), pp. 106-118,
p. 106.
118. If this,which sounds like a remote ideal, had always 
worked perfectly well corresponding to that which was 
firmly believed to be the Way ) of the Former
Kings, strong opposition to the Confucian emphasis of 
LL, in particul ar voiced by Lao Tzu, Chuang Tzu, and 
Mo Tzu, may not have been heard of (in the case of the 
Fa Chia's opposition the situation is somewhat dif­
ferent). Howsoever, criticism was strong enough to be 
not negligible. For instance, the Tap Te Ching, chap­
ter 38, draws attention to the gradual deterioration 
of man's 'natural morality'; it says: "... Hence when 
the way was lost there was virtue [fe^e^];
when virtue was lost there was benevolence [j
when benevolence was lost there was rectitude
when rectitude was lost there were the rites [&£]. The
rites are the wearing thin of loyalty and good faith
and the beginning of disorder ..." (transl. 
D.C. Lau, op.cit., p. 99).
119. Lin Yutang, ibid.
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application. There is a strong .conviction attributed to 
Confucius that to make statutes of h-iZng , the of
the state gives an example of illicit intercourse with
( TO )k&Zng ; the prospect of such an engagement would mean the
ruin of the state. The expression means (vide
supra) a fixed and strict model, hence similar to a written
( I* )norm or law; k&Zng means punishment.
Granted, the topos of ZZ from the Confucian point of 
view is the proper means of government and education, ca­
pable of ensuring the good of man, namely social harmony,
is, plainly speaking, superfluous. And supposing that
(n )ZZ works properly, especially within the um. Zun , and the 
ruler himself is a model (father and mother) to his people 
governing his state by observing the ZZ, little or nothing 
is left to require him to govern by . According­
ly, Confucius says;
" Is (a prince) able to govern his kingdom 
with the complaisance proper to the rules of
121propriety [ZZ], what difficulty will he have?"
Under the rule of j £ a ^ ,  k&Zng ^  becomes a hideous instru­
ment annihilating the harmonious order brought about by the 
observance of ZZ and its suasive forms of application. If 
dominated as the standard requisite of governmental 
actions it could be taken for granted that the natural and 
humane ) ties between ruler and subjects would quick­
ly dissolve without a chance of adequate compensation. Con­
fucius and his followers are firmly persuaded that confusion,
120. Vide Tso Chuan, bk. X, 29th year (Legge, CC V, pp. 
729, 732); cf. supra, II.4.
121. Lun Y u , IV, XIII (transl. Legge, CC I, p. 169). Vide 
furthermore Lun Yii (on government in accordance with 
ZZ, by good example, and sincerity): XIII, IV; XIV, 
XLI (XLIV, Legge); XV, XXXIII (XXXII, 3, Legge);
XII, XVII; XIII, I; XIII, XVI; XII, VII.
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disorder, and rebellion would b'e seen as a logical result; 
and history has verified their assumption. Furthermore, it 
has demonstrated that good chances of improving man by
example and imitation on the traditional basis of ZZ had 
been largely ruled out. This reads in the words of Confu­
cius:
"If the people be led by laws [chtng ,
and uniformity sought to be given them by
( I* )punishments [kAZng ], they will try to
avoid the (punishment), but have no sense
( 6 )of shame. If they be led by virtue [Ze ],
and uniformity sought to be given them by
the rules of propriety [ZZ], they will have
the sense of shame, and moreover will become 
,,123good.
( 3- C )With Confucius' attitude towards litigation (Aung ) it 
is comparatively similar; as long as people respond to their 
ZZ, their traditional modes of behaviour, there is little
(3.C )opportunity to be involved in a Aung (lawsuit, litiga­
tion; i.e. according to the composition of the character: 
to speak or discuss in public, thus, to accuse, to litigate). 
Confucius' treatment of such possible affairs is again his 
insistence on a positive motivation of the people to do the 
good, and so to avoid antagonistic behaviour in order to 
bring about individual success detrimental to the social
122. Legge, CC I, p. 146, explains che.ng as opposed to 
Ze^e ' in the sense of laws and prohibitions; govern­
mental orders or administrative regulations would do 
as well.
123. Lun Yu II, III (transl.Legge, CC I, p. 146; cf. Lau, 
op.cit., p. 63). Cf. Mencius, IV, I, I, 1-13 (Legge, 
CC II, p. 288-92); Hsiin Tzu, sections 9; 19 (transl.
B. Watson, op.cit., pp. 33-55; 89-111). Vide also the 
discussion by M. Granet, La pensee chinoise, ubi cit., 
pp. 456-65 (Siun Tseu [Hsiin T zu] : le gouvernement par 
les rites [ZZ]). and H.G. Creel, Legal Institutions, 
ubi cit., p. 39.
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relations concerned; to give attention to tt in action, is
that which is necessary "to cause (the people) to have no 
124litigations"
As already indicated, the second phase in the second 
movement of Lt, the phase after Confucius until the begin­
ning of the Former Han dynasty (206 B.C.), sees, apart from a 
further consolidation of the topos of ZZ, also a rather 
strong opposition to Confucius' teachings and his school.
To mention the most influential schools of opposition to 
the Ju Chia (i.e. the indigenous name for what we call 
Confucianism, and means the 'school of the literati' ,  
the most outstanding of which are the so-called successors 
of Confucius, Mencius (c. 371-289 B.C.) and Hsiin Tzu (c. 
298-238 B.C.)), we have to refer to the school of Tao 
('Taoism'), to Mo Tzu especially, and to the school of 
Fa^  ('Legalism').
Already the Tao Te Ching (attributed to Lao Tzu, poss­
ibly a contemporary of Confucius) determinedly objects to
0 ( j
the rule of ZZt seeking to preserve harmony (ko_ ) , the 
natural balance between heaven and earth, man and nature, 
without unnecessary and unnatural human interference, namely
/ a  j  \
with uju u)e.Z (or, an attitude of remaining passive).
Neither ILL practices nor promulgation of are capable
of bringing harmony about, the desired state of affairs that 
alone can cure the 'diseases' of the age of the declining 
Chou dynasty and restore the 'rule' of tao , the ever­
lasting Way.
124. Lun Yu XII, XIII (transl. Legge, CC I, p. 257); c f .
The Great Learning, ch. IV (ibid., p. 364).
124a. Cf. the explanation given by Leon Vandermeersch,
La Formation du Legisme, (Paris, 1965), p. 9,
footnote 1 .
125. Vide Lao Tzu, Tao Te Ching, chapters 57, 38 (supra,
footnote 118), and 1 as well as 81 (the final chapter); 
transl. by D.C. Lau (Penguin Classics, 1963), and J. 
Legge, (SBE, vol. XXXIX), A. Waley, The Way and its 
Power, ubi cit. Cf. J.J.L. Duyvendak, The Philosophy
of Wu Wei, in: Asiatische Studien, I (1947), pp. 81- 
102, p . 96.
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A less esoteric objection (to Confucius' advocacy of
12 6
LL has been made by Mo Tzu (c. 479- c. 381 B.C.).
His opposition is rather moderate compared to the severe
criticism in particular in the work of Han Fei Tzu (partly
attributed to Han Fei who died in 233 B.C.). Han Fei is
the outstanding and widely known representative of the Fa
1 27Chia (commonly rendered with School of 'Legalism' or Law) , 
which participated in the so-called "Hundred Schools" con­
test during the fourth and the third centuries B.C. In brief, 
their doctrine is as follows: since man's nature is evil 
(a plausible conclusion from the social reality of the age 
of constant warfare until 222 B.C.), education in morals 
through is of little effect, but the beginning of social 
disorder. In contrast the institution of order on the basis 
of a strong government sounds rather workable (one may think 
of political realism in politics), and thus it is forcefully 
aimed at by means of a strict organization and regulation 
of a centralized bureaucratic government. Fa. ^  , in the
126. Vide Reinhard May, Frieden und die Aufgabe des Rechts, 
ubi cit., pp. 136-8, 201-6 (comment with further 
references).
127. A. Waley, The Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China, 
(London, 1939, 31953), p. 199, gives the following 
plausible explanation: "... 'Realists' seems to me to 
fit the general tendency of their beliefs better than 
'School of Law', which only indicates one aspect of 
their teaching. We might, if we wanted a narrower term, 
as an alternative to 'School of Law' call them the 
Amoralists."
128. Vide H.G. Creel, The Fa-chia: "Legalists" or "Adminis­
trators" ? , in: Bulletin of the Institute of History 
and Philology, Academia Sinica, extra-vol. 4, (1961), 
pp. 607-636, p. 629. Cf. L. Vandermeersch, op.cit., 
pp. 6-9, 228, 271-4; Hsiao Kung-chuan, Legalism and 
Autocracy in Traditional China, in: Tsing Hua Journal 
of Chinese Studies (N.S. 2), 4, 2 (1964), pp. 108-21, 
p. 113; P.R. Moody jr., The Legalism of Han Fei-tzu 
and its Affinities with Modern Political Thought, i n : 
International Philosophical Quarterly XIX, 3 (1979), 
pp. 317-31, p. 325-6; Geng Wu, Die Staatslehre des 
Han Fei, (Wien-New York, 1978)/ p. 37.
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sense of strict prescription la-i-d down in writing, made 
publicly known, and applicable to everybody concerned with­
out regard for any distinction whatsoever, is their appropriate 
means and measure; it is extremely capable of exercising 
power with the instrumental use of h^Znq , esp. by way of 
rewards and heavy punishments. Comparatively, the unwritten 
precepts of ZZ seemed less useful particularly In view 
of their arbitrary interpretation. Hence, is both
means and measure of practical politics and remedy for an
129imperfect state of man's social behaviour. In Han Fei Tzu, 
we find the following passages underlining the Fa Chia's 
position, as sharply distinct from that of the Ju Chia 
(Confucianism):
"To enact the law [fja] is to lead the people,
whereas if the superior esteems literary
learning, the people will become sceptical in
130
following the law [^a]." "The law [^a] 
alone leads to political order. If laws [£a] 
are adjusted to the time, there is good govern­
ment. If government fits the age, there will be
131great accomplishment." "... speaking about
the benevolence and righteousness
(k)[Z ] of the early kings gains nothing for 
political order; but understanding clearly our 
laws [^a] and measures and determining our
129. For further discussion vide Reinhard May, Frieden und 
die Aufgabe des Rechts, ubi cit., pp. 139-43, 207-14 
(with numerous references). An instructive synopsis 
concerning a comparison between ZZ and jja^) provides
0. Weggel, o p .cit~. , pp. 17-18.
130. Fa of the following quotations is . Han Fei Tzu,
quoted after the Complete Works of Han Fei Tzu, 2 vols.,
translated byW.K. Liao (1939), (repr. London, 1959),
bk. 18, ch. 47, vol. II, p. 251.
131. Ibid., bk. 20, ch. 54, vol. II, p. 328.
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rewards and punishments* is the rouge, pomade,
152powder... of the state. M... Hence the saying: 
'The rules of propriety [ZZ] are the semblance 
of loyalty [ chung ^ae  ^] and faith [h.6Zn^ aa  ^:
13 3sincerity],and the beginning of disorder.'"
However, both the teachings of the Tao Chia and the 
Fa Chia were unable to replace the topos of ZZ or to reduce 
its influence to a considerable degree in man's social re­
lations. For different reasons, they failed to judge com­
prehensively the extraordinary complexity of ZZ, particularly 
with regard to its function,which regulates inter-personal 
behaviour into a balanced state of social harmony, despite 
many drawbacks in the centuries of decline. Likewise, they, 
specifically the Fa Chia, had been incapable of giving past 
experience, before Confucius, adequate credit as a con­
tinuum and model for present and future generations. On the 
other hand, social reality did not leave the topos of 
ZZ unaffected; it called for adaptation under new historical 
circumstances. A moderate use of could lead to an ac­
ceptable compromise from the viewpoint of the Ju Chia (Con­
fucianism) . In the Wen Tzu (Han dynasty and later), we find 
the indication of an useful compromise as to the combination 
of with Z ^  ;
"Laws (should) arise out of justice
(k)[Z ], and justice arises out of the common 
people and must correspond with what they 
have at heart.
While a further consolidation of the topos of ZZ took place 
(infra, ad (5)), the influence of the 'legalistic' position
132. Ibid., bk. 19, ch. 50, vol. II, p. 308.
133. Ibid., bk. 6 , ch. 20, vol. I, p. 174.
134. Quoted after J. Needham, SCC II, p. 545.
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of J[a^^ diminished considerably. No doubt, the preference 
of ti over j t h o u g h  modified, continues, including a 
moderate use of lining
111.3.(5) We have now reached the last of the above- 
mentioned propositions to which this section has been designed 
to lead us, namely to focus on the final consolidation of
the topos of ti as exposed in the given description (supra).
. 135
The Li Chi (the Book of Lc) most auspiciously represents
the concluding phase in the movement of the topos of ti 
which became the decisive and paramount factor of Chinese 
social and individual life. In other words, "by the incor­
poration of this work into the classical canon in the For­
mer Han Dynasty the place of ritual was firmly established 
in the educational and governmental tradition of imperial
Inasmuch as the Confucius of the Lun Yii advocated in 
more or less general illustrations the significance of ti 
both for social and individual welfare, the Li Chi echoes 
not only Confucius but the age-old experience that "of all 
things by which the people live the rites [ti] are the
135. Quoted after Li Chi, Book of Rites. An Encyclopedia of 
Ancient Ceremonial Usages, Religious Creeds and Social 
Institutions, translated by James Legge, edited with 
Introduction and Study Guide by Ch'u Chai and Winberg 
Chai, in 2 vols., (New Hyde Park, New York, 1967); cf. 
SBE, vols.XXVII,. XXVIII (designated as Parts III and 
IV of "The Text of Confucianism", transl. and intro­
duced by J. Legge), on which the 1967 edition is based 
in identical pagination. Vide also Memoires sur les 
bienseances et les ceremonies (Li Chi) par Seraphin 
Couvreur, 2 vols., in 2 parts, (Leiden and Paris, 1930), 
published with the Chinese original and translated in­
to French and Latin (quoted: Couvreur, Memoires).
136. R. Dawson, Confucius, ubi cit., p. 32. The Li Chi was 
probably at least in part inspired by the I Li.
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137
greatest" . In fact, the Li Chi accounts for the actual 
consolidation of ZZ comprising the manifestation of indi­
vidual precepts as well as the conservation of the spirit
of ZZ, first of all in the expression of reverence and 
13 8
reciprocity.
As has been pointed out, in the long run of two con­
secutive movements•the topos of ZZ emerged from the ancient 
forms of ancestor worship in combination with sacrificial 
actions and ceremonial usages and, gradually moving into 
all spheres of life, created, socially accepted, a vast 
body of concrete and distinctive rules of behaviour.138a 
Thus, ZZ became the kingly rule between heaven and earth 
and, furthermore, the ordering of affairs, without which 
neither tao ^  , tz^e  ^, j , and are accomplished.^3^
137. Li Chi, bk. XXIV, p. 261 (Courvreur, Memoires, II, 2, 
p. 362). C f . Lun Yii, XII, I (Lau, p. 112). References 
concerning the Li Chi are given in bk. (Roman figure) 
and p. according to Legge.
138. So the beginning of the Li Chi: "The Summary of the 
Rules of Propriety ZZ says: -.Always and in everything 
let there be reverence [ckZng{a '] ..." (transl. Legge,
I, p. 61). Regarding 'reciprocity' (altruism or bene­
volent (yen'yJ) actions in relation to others) the Lun 
Yii, XV, XXIII (Legge, CC I, p. 301), says when Confu­
cius was asked: "Is there one word which may serve as
a rule of practice for all one's life? The Master said, 
'Is not RECIPROCITY [ A h u ^ ^  3 such a word? What you do 
not want done to yourself, do not do to others'."
Cf. Li Chi I, 6 (23).
138a. Vide Li Chi, bk. VII, Li Yun (origin, development, and
intention of ZZ), J. Legge, I, pp. 364-393. Cf. D. Bod-
de, Basic Concepts of Chinese Law, ubi cit., p. 383 
("The in short, constitute both the concrete insti­
tutions and the accepted modes of behaviour in a civi­
lized state."); A.S. Cua, Dimensions of Moral Creativity, 
(University Park and London, 1978), p. 58; the same,
Li and moral justification: A study in the Li Chi,
in: PEW 33 (1983), pp. 1-16, p. 1.
139. Vide Li Chi, VII, 14 (Legge, II, p. 97); XXV, 8 (Legge,
II, p. 272); I, 5(8) (Legge, I, p. 63; Courvreur,
Memoires I, 1, p. 5).
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The first book of the Li Chi, In itself a summary of the 
whole, gives ample evidence of it.
In constant retrospect to its own tradition, which 
is especially visible in many quotations from the Book of 
Poetry and the Book of Historical Documents, and in drawing 
attention to those prominent topoi of social and moral esteem 
just mentioned, the Li Chi demonstrates an unflagging con­
tinuity and a deep rooted conviction that the moral 'reno­
vation' of man is better than the renovation of moral pre- 
139acepts. According to the Li Chi there are 3,300 distinc­
tive precepts or rules of behaviour made concrete in what we
denote as customs, usages, habits, ceremonies, rites,
1 40etc. On the whole they can be taken as a required situa-
139a. This idea is obvious especially from the Ta Hsueh ("The 
Great Learning"), one of the most important books of 
the Li Chi (XXXIX, Legge, II, pp. 411-4 24; published 
separately in Legge, CC I, pp. 355-381, with the Chin­
ese original); vide the beginning, ibid.
140. Vide Li Chi, XXVIII, Chung Yung ("The State of Equi­
librium and Harmony"), Legge, II, pp. 300-329, p. 323, 
published with the Chinese original in Legge, CC I, 
pp. 382-434 (transl. "The Doctrine of the Mean"), ch. 
XXVII, p. 422, saying that ZX "embraces the three hun­
dred rules (usages) of ceremony, and the three thousand 
rules (modes) of demeanour". Cf. A. Waley, The Analects 
of Confucius, ubi cit., pp. 55, 67. The Li Chi in par­
ticular explains the flexibility of the expression ZZ 
which cannot be comprehended as a well-defined concept 
or term. LZ did not only mean different things at dif­
ferent times (cf. H.G. Creel, The Origins of Statecraft, 
ubi cit., p. 336), moreover, it has given way to a wide 
range of meanings according to the situation concerned. 
Therefore an adequate translation is extremely diffi­
cult, if not impossible at all. Vide the many possible 
French translations (interpretations) quoted by J. Leg­
ge, Li Chi, Introduction, p. 11. Cf. J. Escarra, Le 
Droit Chinois, ubi cit., p. 16; A. Waley, ibid., p. 64; 
J. Needham, SCC II, p. 526; R. May, Annaherung an chi- 
nesisches Rechtsverstandnis, in ARSP, Supplementa I, 2
(Wiesbaden, 1982), pp. 105-9, pp. 105-7. This situation 
has its deep root in the Chinese language and its cor­
responding mode of thinking; in Hsiin Tzu we find the 
following instructive statement: "The meaning of ritual 
[ZZ] is deep indeed. He who tries to enter it with the 
kind of perception that distinguishes hard and white, 
same and different, will drown there. The meaning of 
ritual [ZZ] is great indeed. He who tries to enter it 
with the uncouth and inane theories of system-makers 
will perish there. ..." (transl. B. Watson, op.cit., 
pp. 94-5) .
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tive response in conduct and as a general exemplification 
of the spirit of ££; they are devised to support order 
and maintain an all-embracing social harmony, ideally,
in accordance with the highly evaluated ancient way of
, . , 141lif e .
In concluding this paragraph one point concerning our 
understanding of the topos of ££ remains to be mentioned. 
Inasmuch as the topos of ££ became a dominant factor of 
social life, the topos of ho_ (harmony), being vital as an 
eminent expression of the reality of ancient conceptions, 
had to guide the practice of ££. As regards the teachings of the 
Ju Chia (Confucianism) their advocacy of creating a well- 
ordered and harmonious society is hardly disputable. Still 
after the breakdown of the Ch'in dynasty, that terminated 
the harsh rule of , the topos of ho_^ x  ^ guided the ad­
ministrative and educational practice of the new dynasty 
under Confucian influence. Particularly in the realm of hand-
2rv
(q)
143ling social affairs a moderate compromise can be obse ed
which took place between the position of a rule with £a 
and that of a rule with ££. In theory, no doubt the
1 44Lun Yii dictum (II, III; supra) repeated in the Li Chi
still governed the anti-^fl position in favour of ££ on
the grounds of good experience and well-known motives as
stated above. In practice, however, the Ju Chia carefully
(a)145adapted the topos of £a ^ by way of a reduced employ-
141. Vide Li Chi, VII (Legge, I, pp. 365, 367, 393);
XXVIII, Chun Yung, esp. ch. I (Legge, CC I, pp. 384-5).
142. The fundamental topos of harmony and peace is greatly 
emphasized in particular by the School of T ao, esp. in 
the Tao Te Ching which, however, approaches man's life 
from a different angle compared to the Ju Chia.
143. Cf. A. Waley, ibid., p. 37; H.G. Creel, Confucius, 
ubi cit., p. 150.
144. Li Chi XXX, 3 (Legge, II, pp. 352-3; Couvreur, Memoi­
res II, 2, pp. 515-16).
145. Fa is used here in the sense of strict prescription 
(exact model) as being fixed and laid down ('positive 
law'), cf. supra, 111.3.(4).
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ment in criminal matters, yet avoiding the rude application
* ( IT )of haying (punishment) that had made the threat and in­
fliction of it a dreadful instrument of exercising power 
under the rule of the preceding Ch'in dynasty.
As known from researches concerning the completely pre-
146served T'ang Code (653 A.D.) and its fragmentary precur­
sors a gradual process of Confucianization of or,
conversely,the slow infiltration of into the realm
and relations of fx.#had taken place from the beginning of 
the Han dynasty continuing through the centuries of the im­
perial history. Apart from fragments of the Han 9- and 16- 
148Chapter Codes, little information can be obtained from 
existing material and still less can be deduced from it as 
to the new and early role of the topos of in relation
to the actual practice of ZZ on the basis of the Li Chi.
Yet, to be sure, or the inflexible enforcement of
strict prescriptions or regulations was incompatible with 
the spirit of ZZ. Hence, it is not surprising that the T'ang
Code about 750 years later than the compilation of the Li
Chi represents the new role of the topos of . As W.
Johnson has stated, "the primary purpose of law [i.e. in the 
sense of a modified understanding of j£a.^] is to maintain
a balance in society and a harmony between the human and
14 9 Co)the natural worlds" . An actual jLi and faVH' may demon­
strate this situation.
146. Cf. D. Bodde, ibid., pp. 395-6; W. Johnson, The T 'ang 
Code, vol, I, General Principles, (Princeton, New 
Jersey, 1979), pp. 5-9.
147. Vide D. Bodde, ibid., pp. 386-88; J. Needham, SCC II, 
p. 528, points out with reference to the preface of 
the T'ang Code suggesting "that it is dangerous and 
ominous to 'leave ZZ' and engage in legally fixed 
punishments ...". Cf. ibid., p. 546.
148. Vide John Y. Kwei, The Chinese Tradition and the Chinese 
Law, in: Chinese Culture IX (1968), pp. 36-51, pp. 43-4.
149. Ibid., p. 10.
149a. Thus, it is li that "sons and sons' wives, who are filial 
and reverential, when they receive an order from their 
parents should not refuse, nor be dilatory, to execute 
it". Li C h i , bk. X, (ch. XII), ubi cit., vol. I, p. 455. 
Article 37 of the T'ang Code reads: "In all cases where 
there is confession of crimes that have not yet been dis­
covered the crime will be pardoned." (Johnson, ibid.p.201).
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Inasmuch as the topos of ZZ can be considered as com­
prising in toto an internally created and commonly accepted 
way of life/all parts of the social stratum are necessarily 
involved and under the obligation of their respective ZZ 
practices which admit no exclusion of any part. Apart from 
a slightly misleading passage in the Li Chi (which we find 
often misinterpreted), viz, "the rules of ceremony [ZZ] do
( 3T )not go down to the common people, the penal statutes [h&Zng ,
1 50punishments] do not go up to great officers" , there is
151on scrutiny no such broad demarcation; however, we find
quite naturally, that irrespective of the general commitment
to ZZ each individual situation calls for an adequate and 
, 152
distinctive response. Moreover, the Li Chi leaves no 
doubt that ZZ is universally valid and obligatory, includ­
ing all parts of society, though with proper distinctions 
and effects. Failure and shortcoming in one's ZZ duty usually 
entails a socially agreed and sanctioned correction, a kind 
of disciplinary measure; both exhortation and punishment 
are seen to be appropriate consequences in a programme of 
moral education, in order to secure a better social behav­
iour in future.
In the social realm of non-criminal affairs the preven­
tion of any form of litigation is regarded as far better than 
(even successful) efforts in arbitration which can only
work after disturbances have been caused. But what matters
155is that there should be no cases for arbitration. ^  In re­
peating Confucius' statement thereon the Ta Hsueh ('The Great
150. Li Chi, I, 10 (50-1), (Legge, I, p. 90; Couvreur, 
Memoires, p. 53).
151. vide e.g. Li Chi, I, 6 , (25), (Legge, I, p. 65; Couv­
reur, Memoires, p. 8 ).' Cf. Legge and Couvreur, ibid. ; 
also H.G. Creel, Legal Institutions, ubi cit., p. 39.
152. Vide for instance Li Chi, I, part IV.
153. Vide Li Chi XXXIX (Ta Hsueh), ch. IV (Legge, CC I,
p. 364; cf. E.R. Hughes, Ta Hsueh, ubi cit., p. 151);
also J. Needham, SCC II, pp. 544-5.
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Learning1), the most valuable b,o.ok of the first class series
of the Li Chi, adds that "then inhuman men would be barred
from acting out their (inhuman) contentions, and people's
154private-mindedness would be greatly checked" . Continuous 
endeavours at giving no rise to litigation through moral 
education reveals once more that there is in fact an alter­
native in a self-regulating procedure of ZZ tt.he substantial 
consolidation of which is capable of maintaining social 
harmony on a broad scale, and thus making the old 'legal­
istic' use of j { a ^  and the handling of Aung (litigation)
completely undesirable and in practice possibly superfluous.
154. Ibid., ch. IV (transl. E.R. Hughes, ibid.).
§ 15 Origin and Developmenttof nomos (voyoc)
The subject of nomos (voyoc) including various related 
topoi has especially attracted scholarly attention with 
sometimes exhaustive treatment during the 19th and the pre-
1
sent centuries, not to mention the previous investigations. 
Taking advantage of this situation but excluding details of 
philological, historical, or philosophical interest the fol­
lowing survey exclusively attempts, in a reasonable scope, to 
present a general understanding of the basic ideas for
comparative purposes, hereafter in § 16.
1 cl1.1. Tracing the early 'imagination' of nomos as 
being ideally existent in prephilosophic sources in Greece 
we find its first mention in Hesiod (c. 700 B.C.)':
1. Cf. Max Pohlenz, Nomos, in: Philologus, Bd. 97 (1948), 
pp. 135-142, where the learned author commences his ar­
ticle saying "zu den meistgebrauchten und bedeutungs- 
schwersten Begriffen des hellenischen Denkens gehort der 
Nomos. Fur die klassische Zeit ist der Sinn im wesent- 
lichen klar" (p. 135). Cf. furthermore Viktor Ehrenberg, 
Anfange des griechischen Naturrechts, in: Archiv fur Ge- 
schichte der Philosophie, Bd. 35 (1923), pp. 119-143. 
Werner Jaeger, Die Anfange der Rechtsphilosophie und die 
Griechen, in: ZphF, Bd. 3 (1948), pp. 321-338, p. 323 
with reference to his work Paideia. Die Formung des grie- 
chischen Menschen, 3 Bande, (Berlin, 1934, 1944, 1947)
where "Recht" centres in the ancient Greek civilization. 
Erik Wolf, Griechisches Rechtsdenken I: Vorsokratiker und 
friihe Dichter, (Frankfurt a.M. , 1950), esp. "Problemstel- 
lung und Leitgedanken" (pp. 9-18), p. 11: "Ebenso ist das 
bleibende "Wesen", was den Nomos in einer friihgriechischen 
Polis als "Recht" erscheinen laBt, heute wie damals das- 
selbe." Martin Ostwald, Nomos and the Beginnings of the 
Athenian Democracy, (Oxford, 1969), esp. pp. 1-57. Jac­
queline de Romilly, La loi dans la pensee grecgue des 
origines a Aristote, (Paris, 1971), esp. pp. 24-29. Cf. 
also Rudolf Hirzel, ATPA^OZ NOMOE, in: Abhandlungen d. 
Koniglich Sachsischen Gesellschaft d. Wissenschaft, phil.- 
hist. Cl. XX, 1 (1903) pp. 1-100.
1a.'voyoc' (to be distinguished from voyoc: pasture) goes 
back to veyeiv (so does voyoc) which means to dispense, 
deal out, or pasture cattle; vide also footnote 19.
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"For the son of Cronos has ordained this law 
[voyov] for men, that fishes and beasts and 
winged fowls should devour one another, for 
right [6 ikti] is not in them; but to mankind 
he gave right [6 iicriv] which proves far the 
best.
Whereas Hesiod uses nomos in several instances (vide infra)
this topos does not occur in Homer, neither in the Iliad
3
nor in the Odyssey. However, Hesiod’s usage, and apparent­
ly his understanding of nomos is not unrelated to some dis­
tinct ideas of Homer.
1.2. There are Homer's themistes (SsyiQTeC: decrees 
of the gods, oracles), and themis (sing, of themistes, 
QeyiC: that which is laid down or established), furthermore 
dike (6 ikti: order, right, judgement (that which is right)), 
and eunomia (etivoyia: good order (that which is well estab-
4
lished)) to mention only the most significant. Of the the-
5
mistes Homer says that they come from Zeus "the counsellor
2. Hesiod, Works and Days 276-280, quoted after the original 
version with an English translation by Hugh G. Evelyn- 
White, Hesiod, (London-Cambridge, Mass., 1914, repr.
1967), pp. 22-24, hereafter only: WD; the same applies
to Hesiod's Theogony and the Fragments of Unknown Position 
(both quoted after H.G. Evelyn-White, ibid., [hereafter 
only Th. and Frg.].
3. Vide Liddell/Scott/[-Jones], A Greek-English Lexicon, 
(Oxford, 1843, 91940, 1968, repr. 1977), [hereafter only: 
Liddell, Lexicon], p. 1180, and W. Jaeger, Anfange ..., 
ubi cit., p. 323.
4. As to those topoi and their possible English translation, 
vide Liddell, Lexicon; cf. also the German versions in 
Gemoll, Griechisch-Deutsches Schul- und Handworterbuch,
(Miinchen/Wien, 1 954 , 9 1 965).
5. Vide Homer, The Iliad (original version), with an English 
translation by A.T. Murray, 2 vols., (London, 1924, repr.
1 965), [hereafter only: The Iliad or IjL. ] ; and Homer,
The Odyssey (original version), with an English transla­
tion by A.T. Murray, 2 vols., (London, 1924, repr. 1966), 
[hereafter only: The Odyssey or Od.].
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most high" (II. VIII, 22) and that they are based on him. 
Zeus acts as "the father of gods and men" (Od. I, 28), to 
whom 'civilized' man owes the necessary institutions for his 
'regular' communal life, such as the king (0aaiAstic) , the 
assembly (ayopfj) and the 'advice' or council (8 ouAn) . 'Un- 
civlized' man lacks these institutions, and correspondingly 
he is regarded as living and dying without themistes.
"Neither assemblies nor council have they
[the Cyclopes], nor appointed laws [0eylaxecJ".^
Hence themistes are of vital importance in the evol­
ution of a 'civilized' life of man. Throughout Homer and 
still in the later compositions of Hesiod themistes are to 
be considered as originally divine regulations or ordinances 
being issued by Zeus and imposed upon, or better granted to, 
mortal mankind for their benefit in. life. A king, instituted 
by Zeus, is in charge of themistes, says Homer:
"To thee Zeus hath vouchsafed the sceptre 
and judgements [0 eyiaxa(,], that thou mayest
7
take counsel for thy people."
Acting on earth in place of the god the king is obliged to
6 . The Odyssey IX, 112, cf. ibid. IX, 215; for the transla­
tion of themistes cf. Liddell, Lexicon, p. 789. Cf. W. 
Jaeger, Anfange ..., ubi cit., p. 324 ("Die barbarische 
Welt der Kyklopen, die noch in einem primitiven Naturzu- 
stand leben, ist eine Welt ohne Gesetz (themis). Jeder 
einzelne von ihnen ist Herrscher und Richter iiber seine 
Frau und seine Kinder. So maBt er sich die Macht an, die 
in der homerischen Gemeinschaft nur die Konige und be- 
stellten Richter ausuben. Cf . also Rudolf Kostler, Die 
homerische Rechts- und Staatsordnung, in: the same, Home-
risches Recht, (Wien, 1950), pp. 7-25, pp. 7-10 ff, with 
further references.
7. The Iliad IX, 98-9.
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care for order in communal affairs taking themistes as both 
means and measure.
1.3. Once divine regulations have been transferred to 
the world of man they command due attention and visible re-
9
action in order to secure a minimum of good order (etfvoy iot) . 
But with man's growing selfconsciousness the imagination of 
divine order could gradually retreat. This process takes 
place with shifting emphasis from themis to dike, and, by a 
second step (though some time later), from themis or themis­
tes to nomos or nomoi.
> 10Any regular exercise of power (avdaaeiv), , namely to
be a master, is regarded as a fundamental function of a 
ruler, however, not without a limitation on the ruler's part 
and responsibility concerning the correct assessment of no­
moi . The steadily unfolding presence of nomos becomes a 
lucid though not often verbalised feature in Hesiod's imagin­
ation of reality still only to be visualized in an undistinc-
11tive mixture of mythos and logos. Comprising the divine
8 . Vide The Iliad I, 237; II 102, 204-206. Cf. M. Pohlenz, 
Nomos, ubi cit., p. 136; R, Kostler, o p .cit., pp. 13-16; 
E. Wolf, op.cit., pp. 72-76; Nelly Tsouyopoulos, Strafe 
jm friihgriechischen Denken, (Freiburg/Munchen, 1 966), 
pp. 13-17 ("Themistes sind immer mit der Tatigkeit des 
Konigs und vor allem mit der ... [beratenden Versammlung] 
verbunden." p. 15).
9. Cf. the discussion of the "conception of eunomia" in 
Victor Ehrenberg, Aspects of the Ancient World, (Oxford, 
1946), pp. 74-77.
10. Vide Liddell, Lexicon, p. 121; Rudolf Kostler, Zum Ver- 
standnis der homerischen Rechts- und Wirtschaftsordnung, 
in: the same, Homerisches Recht, (Wien, 1950), pp. 26- 
28, p . 27.
11. Cf. W. Jaeger, Anfange ..., ubi cit., pp. 324-5 (Hesiod's 
"Theogonie beschreibt die Genealogie der Gotter in einer 
Weise, die Aristoteles spater [Metaph. B 4, 1000 a 18
cf. 9] treffend als "rationales Denken in mythischer 
Form" [ibid.] definiert."). Cf. furthermore Alfred Ver- 
droB, Die Begriindung der antiken Rechtsphilosophie durch 
Hesiod, (Graz-Wien-Koln, 1966), pp. 24-5; Bruno Snell,
Die Entdeckung des Geistes, Studien zur Entstehung des
europaischen Denkens bei den Griechen", (Gottingen, 1975,
5 1980), pp. 30-55 ("Der Glaube an die olympischen Got­
ter" and "Die Welt der Gotter bei Hesiod"), esp. pp.
38-41 .
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and human spheres where gods and men 'live' and play their
respective parts Hesiod reveals (in his "Theogony" and his
1 2"Works and Days") the subtle complexity of nomos, a topos 
which occurs in three nuances.
First, there is nomos (vide WD 276-280, quoted above,
1.1.) as an entity being established and ordained by Zeus
in place of Homer's themis (vide 1.2.) and consequently being
1 3of necessity for life as such and thus including already
an organized conduct of communal man who needs nomos as a
directive or guiding principle, as an indication of a "ma-
1 4niere correcte d'agir" ; and only in concrete situations
is nomos bound to secure the realization of dike (i.e. that
which is right). Although nomos did exist in the divine
1 5world it is no initial divine word.
Secondly, nomos appears as an independently established 
practice or habit (usage), something that is practised over 
and over again anticipating a beneficial result; eventually 
nomos may be an advantageous rite of a goodly age. Hesiod 
says (Theogony 416-418):
"For to this day, whenever any one of men 
on earth offers rich sacrifices and prays 
for favour according to custom [leara voyov], 
he calls upon Hecate."
A similar idea is expressed in a fragment of unknown posi­
tion attributed to Hesiod:
12. For the references vide supra footnote 2.
13. Somewhat differently Erik Wolf, op.cit., explaining no­
mos as the " 'objektiv' Giiltige, woraus erst jeder 1 sub- 
jektive1 Anspruch (6 fieri) folgen kann, ... Der Nomos ist 
'naturhafte' Ordnung, tragt noch gar keinen 'politi- 
schen' Zug" (p. 151).
14. Marcel Hofinger, Lexicon Hesiodeum, (Leiden, 1978), 
p. 457.
15. Vide E. Wolf, op.cit., p. 169.
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"Howsoever the city does sacrifice, the ancient
? 16 custom is best [voyoc 6 'apxouoc fipiOTOCl."
And thirdly, nomos may be understood as that which con-
1 7forms to the regularity of nature; that which is natur­
ally given, says Hesiod (WD 383-388) :
"When the Pleiades, daughters of Atlas, are 
rising [early in May], begin your harvest, 
and your ploughing when they are going to 
set [in November]. Forty nights and days 
they are hidden and appear again as the year 
moves round, when first you sharpen your 
sickle. This is the law [voyoc] of the 
plains, ..."
In another instance (Th. 6 6 ) Hesiod makes the Muses cel­
ebrate with a song the nomoi of all so as to praise his 
new insight into the ways of nature (in an all-embracing 
sense) including the realm of regular human activities 
which is not different from "the goodly ways of the immor­
tals" (Th. 66-7) . 18
1.4. Obviously there is some correspondence between 
Homer's conception of themistes and Hesiod's nomoi, namely 
when Homer points out that he "whoso obeys the gods, to him 
do they gladly give ear" (II. I, 218) and when Hesiod re­
fers to the advantage of action in accordance with nomos 
[KaTa voyov]. On the one hand "all men have need of the 
gods" (Od. Ill, 48) and their (divine) themistes and on the 
other hand the same holds true of Hesiod's nomoi, which may
16. Frg. 20, quoted after the English version of Evelyn- 
White, Hesiod, ubi cit., pp. 278-9.
17. Cf. E. Wolf, op.cit., p. 151.
1 8 . Ibid.
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be understood in Homer's perspective as the emancipated 
issues of themistes.
Hesiod's imagination of reality represents the complex­
ity of nomos in at least two distinct aspects (combining 
the three above mentioned nuances), namely as that which may 
be comprehended as the given, general and regular way of 
life, whether as granted divine directions (according to 
man's fancy) or 'communicated' usages, and the non man-made, 
pre-existing (natural) phenomena of visible regularity en­
abling iwi t\jincz. reactions.^ The first aspect is
not far from the (later emerging and influential) idea of 
living according to cultivated standards commonly accepted, 
dcvJ and sanctioned for the benefit of communal life as 
an organic whole.
19. Cf. Alfred VerdroB-DroBberg, Grundlinien der antiken 
Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie, (Wien, 2 1 9 4 8), p. 17
("Hesiod nimmt also eine doppelte Gesetzlichkeit der 
Welt an: den Nomos der vernunftlosen Natur und den der 
verniinftigen Wesen. Jener ist das Gesetz der Gewalt 
(Bia), dieser das Gesetz des Rechts (Dike). Bia ist der 
Ausdruck des naturgesetzlichen Miissens, Dike das Symbol 
des sittlich-rechtlichen Sollens. Doch ist dieses Sollen 
nicht freischwebend, sondern kosmisch verankert. Hinter 
ihm steht die Gottheit, die es tragt und gegen die 
Rechtsverletzer durchsetzt."). Cf. also V. Ehrenberg, 
Aspects, ..., ubi cit., p. 75. Furthermore Felix Heini- 
mann, Nomos und Physis, (Basel, 1942, 21972), pp. 61- 
65; M. Pohlenz, Nomos, ubi cit., p. 139; M. Ostwald, 
op.cit. , pp. 21-2; J. de Romilly, op.cit., pp. 24, 27-
8. J. Walter Jones, The Law and Legal Theory of the 
Greeks, (Oxford, 1956), p. 34; Douglas M. MacDowell,
The Law in Classical Athens, (London, 1978), p. 44.
As to the etymological evidence of nomos that ought to 
complete the previous investigation and may underline 
our present understanding of nomos, vide the following 
explanations: F.M. Cornford, From Religion to Philosophy, 
(London, 1912), p. 29-31 ("The connection of Nomos (Law) 
with the verb nemein, to 'distribute' or 'dispense', 
was clearly felt by the Greeks." (p. 29)). Concerning 
the various meanings of the verb veyeiv, vide Liddell, 
Lexicon, p. 1167. Cf. also F. Heinimann, op.cit., pp. 
59-61, with further valuable references. M. Pohlenz,
Nomos, ubi cit., pp. 139-142. E. Wolf, o p .cit., p. 169.
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Still within Hesiod's imagination of reality dike 
stands for the right that one deserves, or, in other words, 
for the correct treatment of the individual according to 
the nomos (in the first aspect) which calls for general 
attention and permits no transgression.^0
1.5. The original close connexion and consistency of 
Mythos and Logos surfaces in man's manifold activities as 
there arise his speculations and observations, his invention 
of distinctive topoi to govern his behaviour and to handle 
concrete situations, on the whole his unceasing endeavours 
to achieve a good result fit to be appreciated by gods and 
men alike. There is no abstract problem of truth but of con­
crete arete (apexn: excellence [goodness] of any kind, e.g.
21of prosperity or merit), the 'virtue' of communal man,
22the man of the polis (ttoA iC: city).
This situation is still on the whole characteristic 
of the initial complex imagination of nomos, however, it is 
soon seen to be changing and giving way to a new understand­
ing of nomos corresponding to the developed imagination of 
reality. The specific relation of thesmos Oeayoc: divine
'law', ordinance [reminiscent of GeyicJ that which is laid 
23down, fixed) with nomos illustrates the significant shift
20. Dike denotes in Hesiod a share of earthly 'justice' be­
tween human beings. Yet, there was no problem of abstract 
justice. Cf. E. Wolf, op.cit., pp. 139-141 ( "6 iKy-haben 
ist ein Wesenzug des Menschen, der ihn vom Tier unter- 
scheidet." (p. 139). "Was er [Zeus] den Menschen an
"6 ikti" zuteilt [i.e. in the sense of nemein (vide above)] , 
ist eine Anerkennung ihres Soseins und DemgmaB-Handelns 
von Fall zu Fall." (p. 140)). Cf. also R.J. Bonner/G.
Smith, The Administration of Justice from Homer to Aris­
totle , 2 vols., (Chicago, 1930), pp. 10 ff.
21. Vide Liddell, Lexicon, p. 288; F.E. Peters, Greek Philo­
sophical Terms, (New York-London, 1967), p. 25; W. Jae­
ger, Anfange ..., ubi cit., p. 322.
22. Cf. E. Wolf, op .cit., p. 169; for the word polis vide 
Liddell, Lexicon, pp. 1433-4.
23. Vide Liddell, Lexicon, p. 795. Cf. Max Pohlenz, Nomos 
und Physis, in: Hermes, vol. 81 (1953), pp. 418-438, 
p. 428. Concerning the problem of synonymity of themis 
and thesmos vide E. Wolf, op.cit., p. 33, footnote 6 
with further references.
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of emphasis that is more than the disclosure of a hitherto 
merely unknown aspect; it is the emergence of a new topos 
in.the old guise of the expression nomos, the comprehension 
of which partakes in our modern topos of custom or custom­
ary law, authoritatively laid down as a binding precept.
The fixed thesmoi of Solon (c. 634-560 B.C.) replace
the ancient nomoi (and neither the goddess Themis nor the
divine word themis appears in his works), if not always in
content yel m II is- form of his thesmoi; however, the topos of
nomos does not virtually disappear thereafter, it assumed
during a later period the meaning of thesmos, i.e. a fixed
decree of authoritatively stated (written) law, namely that
which is laid down to be practised for the benefit of the
24whole community. The meaning 'a law' especially 'statute
24alaw' appears (obviously) still later.
1.6. With the developing imagination of reality under 
the emerging rule of logos and abstract reasoning divine 
words lose their influence as topoi and are ever more ne­
glected in thinking until they are virtually out of date as
24. Cf. W. Jaeger, Anfange ..., ubi cit., p. 337, footnote 
39; and E. Wolf, op.cit., I, pp. 124, 192, esp. 210-214 
(passages V and VI with an exposition of the lines of 
development); cf. also H.J. Wolff, Vorgeschichte und 
Entstehung des Rechtsbegriffs im friihen Griechentum, 
in: Fikentscher, Franke, Kohler, Entstehung und Wandel 
rechtlicher Traditionen, (Freiburg/Miinchen, 1980), p.
562; J. Walter Jones, op.cit., p. 33.
24a. M. Ostwald, op.cit., points out in a careful and de­
tailed investigation that "thesmos and nomos do not
overlap chronologically in the sense of 'statute'" (p. VII); 
there are thesmoi until at least 511/10 B.C. (pp. 5, 173), 
however, "no example of a legal-political thesmos [Vs. found j 
Athens enacted after 464/3 B.C. and no example of a 
legal-political nomos before that date" (p. VII) . "We know 
that nomos was firmly entrenched in Athens as the proper 
term for 'statute' by 403/2 B.C. and that thesmos had 
lost this meaning in Athens more than a hundred years 
earlier ..." (p. 10). From then on "the law intended to 
deprive of legal validity any nomos which was not writ­
ten and, we may assume, officially published in an auth­
oritative manner" (p. 1). The author concludes from his 
enquiry that there are "strong reasons for the adoption 
of nomos in place of thesmos as an integral part of
Cleisthenean policy (p. VIII), cf* p. 173.
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25is the case with themis and thesmos, the latter of which
2 6retains the meaning of "sacred nomos" . Presocratic think­
ing then slowly but steadily draws the curtain aside to give
27view to an unbroken development from mythos to logos
25. However, themis did not completely disappear, it fig­
ures for instance in Parmenides, Frg. B 1, 28 [Diels I, 
230, 10], in Empedocles (ibid. together with nomos),
Frg. B 9, 5 [Diels I,- 313, 2] and in Plato's "Nomoi"
875c. Diels, abbr. for Hermann Diels/Walther Kranz,
Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, Griechisch und Deutsch,
3 Bande, (Berlin/Zurich (Weidmann), 1903, 151975); on 
thesmos which appears in Pindar vide E. Wolf, Griechi- 
sches Rechtsdenken, Vol. II: Rechtsphilosophie und 
Rechtsdichtung im Zeitalter der Sophistik, (Frankfurt 
a.M., 1952), pp. 185-7
26. "Sakrale 1voyoi'", E. Wolf, o p .cit., vol. I, p. 213.
27. Early evidence of a gradual change from mythos to logos 
goes back as far as Homer where hints of a process of 
decomposition of mythic imagination of reality are al­
ready transparent. Vide B. Snell, Die Entdeckung des 
Geistes, ubi cit., pp. 202-4. Mistrust in mere 'activ­
ities' of ©auyaCsiv (to wonder at), namely at incompre­
hensible phenomena, eventually stimulates the new way of 
©cmpetv (to contemplate, to consider rationally). Vide 
Kurt Riezler, Das Homerische Gleichnis und der Anfang 
der Philosophie, (1936), in: H.-G. Gadamer, Urn die Be- 
griffswelt der Vorsokratiker, (Darmstadt, 1968), pp. 1- 
20, esp. p. 20; Wilhelm Nestle, Die Vorsokratiker, (1956), 
(Wiesbaden, 1978), ibid. Einleitung, pp. 7-93, esp. pp. 
20-21; cf. the same, Vom Mythos zum Logos, (Stuttgart, 
1940, 21941 , repr. 1 975), pp. 1-3, 13, 18 ff, 80-82. In 
contrast Nelly Tsouyopoulos, op.cit., argues as follows 
(p. 11): "Der Mythos ist eine Mitteilung des Wesentlichen 
und als solche nichts anderes als Logos. ... Demnach
laBt sich die griechische Philosophie nicht als der Weg 
vom Mythos zum Logos, von der mythischen zur logischen 
Auffassung der Wirklichkeit begreifen, sondern eher als 
die Kraft des Griindens und Gestaltens, die aus dem Stau- 
nen (0auya££iv) entspringt, aus jener Haltung namlich, 
welche das Selbstverstandliche aufhebt, indem sie es 
nach dessen Sinn befragt. Mythos und Logos sind gleicher- 
maBen urspriingliche Ausdrucksweisen des 0auyaCe i v . . . "
On the peculiar relation of religion and early forms of 
'rational' thinking vide Eduard Zeller, Die Philosophie 
der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, vol.
I, 1, (11855, repr. Darmstadt, 1963), pp. 55-7; Eduard
Meyer, Geschichte des Altertums, vol. I, 1,(Stuttgart- 
Berlin, 1884, Sonderausgabe: Darmstadt, 1981), pp. 130- 
33; F.M. Cornford, o p .cit., p. 39. Cf. furthermore G.F. 
Else, God and gods in early Greek thought, in: Transact. 
Proceed. Amer. Philol. Assoc., vol. 80 (1949), pp. 24- 
36; 0. Gigon, Die Theologie der Vorsokratiker, in: La 
notion du divin depuis Homere jusqu'a Platon, (Paris,
1954), pp. 127-55.
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whose decisive pioneering step leads to a continuous search
> 28 for an arche (apxn: first principle) or, in other words,
to.the obstinate question of what is the beginning and basic
2 9'stuff' (Urstoff) of what .is. Anaximander is the first 
Greek 'scholar' to think this 'problem', into which (in­
cluding delicate translation problems) we need not penetrate 
at present. However, broadly speaking, Anaximander makes 
sure that whatever exists does so in being inevitably ex­
posed to the order of time ( "K a i a  Trjv t o u  x p ° v o u  T a ^ i v " )  
an idea that is suggestive and by no means negligible with 
respect to Heraclitus' comprehension (below) of nomos.
II.1. Abstract reason and pure intellect being set
into creative and speculative motion with Heraclitus' (c.
31540-475 B.C.) observation and contemplation adds a third 
aspect to our previous understanding of nomos. His famous 
saying (Frg. 114) speaks of a nomos theios (divine nomos) 
in contrast to all anthropeioi nomoi (human nomoi). Both 
topoi are only comprehensible within the framework of some 
other of his more important sayings to which I shall refer 
incidentally. In full length fragment 114 (91b) reads as
28. Vide Liddell, Lexicon, p. 252; F.E. Peters, Greek Philo­
sophical Terms, ubi cit., p. 23.
29. On Anaximander (610-547 B.C.) vide (for general infor­
mation) William L. Reese, Dictionary of Philosophy and 
Religion, Eastern and Western Thought, (New Jersey, 
1980), p. 15; on Thales (640-546 B.C.) vide ibid., p. 
573; according to Aristotle Thales initiated the ques­
tion of an arche; cf. also Capelle, Die Vorsokratiker, 
(Stuttgart, 1963), pp. 5, 70-1 (with ref.); W.K.C. 
Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. I, (Cam­
bridge, 1962), pp. 78-9; furthermore F.M. Cornford, o p . 
cit., pp. 40-1; G.E.R. Lloyd, Polarity and Analogy, Two 
Types of Argumentation in Early Greek Thought, (Cam­
bridge, 1966, repr. 1977), p. 213.
30. Anaximander B 1 [Diels I, 89, 15].
31. Vide Heraclitus, Frg. B 1, and the following Frg. B 40; 
41; 50; 108; 112 [Diels I, 150-176].
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follows:
"Men must speak with understanding and hold
fast to that which is common to all, as a
city holds fast to its law [voyw], and
much more strongly still. For all human
laws [av 6 pmireioi voyoi] are nourished by
the one divine [Beiou] law. For it prevails
as far as it wills, suffices for all, and
32there is something to spare."
Nomoi comprise everything that exists in a perceptible
3 3regularity including the pattern of change within opposites.
34
They belong to the uncreated cosmic totality whether m  
the sphere of man's practices and habits or in the realm of 
nature, of non-human (non man-made) phenomena. Whatever hap­
pens does so according to an underlying organizational scheme 
35(Kaxa Aoyov) that makes sense even of the changing phenom-
3 6ena in the world, as there are, for instance, man's vari­
able nomoi (in the meaning of usages and customs) within 
one city (polis) and even more between different cities.
However, nomos is still the dominant constitutional element
37of the polis without which the polis could not exist.
32. Heraclitus, Frg. B 114 (91b) [Diels I, 176], trans. 
after W.H.S. Jones, Heracleitus, in: Hippocrates, vol.
IV, (London-Cambridge, Mass., 1931, repr. 1967), p. 499.
33. Vide Heraclitus, Frg. B 10 and 67 [Diels I, 152 and 165].
34. Vide Heraclitus, Frg. B 30 ("Diese Weltordnung ["icoayov
t o v 6 e " ] ,  dieselbige fur alle Wesen, schuf weder einer 
der Gotter noch der Menschen, sondern sie war immerdar 
und ist und wird sein ewig lebendiges Feuer, erglimmend 
nach MaBen und erloschend nach MaBen." [Diels I, 157-8].
35. Vide Heraclitus, Frg. B 1; 2 and 50, also 126a (doubt­
ful authenticity) [Diels I, 150; 151; 161; 179].
36. Vide Heraclitus, Frg. B 49; 91; and 88 [Diels I, 161;
171; 170].
37. Cf. E. Wolf, op.cit., vol. I, pp. 270-1, 274-5.
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In this sense we may refer to Heraclitus' illustration where 
he says:
"The people should fight for their law
O O
[voyov] as for a wall."
Within the polis1 walls, the proper domain of nomos,
it constitutes the ordinary, regular and traditional way of
life supported and nourished by the 'aspirations', demands,
39and determinations of the one nomos , the nomos theios of 
the above quoted saying (Frg. 114), which may be taken in 
consideration of its context as the invisible basic struc­
ture, the holding-together of all the human nomoi, the el-
40ements of existence despite struggle and dispute.
II.2. Although there are immense difficulties in under­
standing Heraclitus' crisp sayings I should try to state 
what Heraclitus neither said nor meant when he used the to­
pos of nomos theios (in my opinion) in a metaphorical sense 
to elucidate the great significance of the human nomoi.
First of all, nomos theios is not to be conceived of exist­
ing outside the imaginative sphere of logos (vide II.1.) 
and therefore not in a 'higher' domain of the gods. It is 
by no means a divine command with respective consequences, 
not the expression of the will of a celestial lawgiver, it 
is neither ius divinum nor lex ycr Gesetz, and it is no fixum 
in a static sense. There is also no room for a divine per­
sonification in Heraclitus' basic imagination of reality. 
Therefore, if we can go thus far, we might (positively)
38. Heraclitus, Frg. B 44 (100) [Diels I, 160], trans. after
W.H.S. Jones, Heracleitus, in: Hippocrates, vol. IV, 
(London-Cambridge, Mass., 1931, repr. 1967), p. 503.
Vide also W. Jaeger, op.cit., pp. 334-5.
39. Vide Heraclitus, Frg. B 33 [Diels I, 159].
40. Vide Heraclitus, Frg. B 53; 80 [Diels, I, 162; 169].
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expound nomos theios as the logos of nomos, or the inherently 
creative principle that arises with man's developing imagin­
ation of reality that is thus capable of embracing a world
41of gods and men alike; in other words, nomos theios is 
not 'above' the world but 'within' the different realms of 
the natural human world as well as the non man-made 'na-
Heraclitus' nomos theios slightly touches upon the 
(about half a century) later most influential and contro­
versial distinction between nomos and physis (vide infra). 
Moreover, the tendency to an abstract conception of nomos
is close at hand. Yet it is still a metaphor not unlike Pin-
42dar's topos of "King Nomos" (voyoc BacnXeuc) . Both topoi
41. Cf. Marcello Gigante, Nomos Basileus, (Napoli, 1956, 
repr. New York, 1979), pp. 50-5; Uvo Holscher, Anfang- 
liches Fragen. Studien zur friihen griechischen Litera- 
tur, (Gottingen, 1968); Rene Marcic, Geschichte der 
Rechtsphilosophie, (Freiburg, 1971), p. 162; Wolfgang 
Rod, Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. I: Die Philosophie 
der Antike 1: Von Thales bis Demokrit, (Miinchen, 1 976), 
pp. 89-90.
41a. M. Ostwald, op.cit., p. 28, gives the following not
completely satisfying interpretation (leaving aside the 
logos problem) when he states: Nomos "is not the norm 
itself [nomos theios] but the fountain-head of norms, 
which it issues and which are regarded as binding by 
those who, in the words of frg. 114, 'speak with intel­
ligence '" •
42. Pindar, Frg. 169 (quoted after F. Heinimann, op.cit., 
p. 67). As to the general relationships of theology, 
religiosity, poetry, and philosophy Olof Gigon, Die 
Kultur der Griechen, (Frankfurt a.M., 1 969, repr. Wies­
baden, 1979), gives the following suggestive exposition 
that should be quoted at some length: "Die theologische 
Substanz wird aufgezehrt durch den Mythos auf der einen, 
die philosophische Theologie auf der anderen Seite. ... 
Bei den Griechen zuerst beobachten wir, wie Dichtung 
und Philosophie sich bemiihen, dieses Pathos [in Religion 
und Kultus] fiir ihre Zwecke nutzbar zu machen. ... die 
dichterische Arbeit und der philosophische Erkenntnis- 
weg werden mit Begriffen umschrieben, die eigentlich 
die Beruhrung mit dem Gottlichen meinen. ... Die Ent- 
wicklung kann dazu fiihren, daS mindestens bei den Ge- 
bildeten das gesamte Pathos des Religiosen aufgesogen 
wird durch Bereiche, die es gar nicht als solches im 
Sinne haben, sondern lediglich metaphorisch ausbeuten." 
(pp. 95-6).
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share the idea of nomos that is.universally valid and per­
sistent despite all varieties and irregularities of individ-
n . 43ual nomoi.
II.3. Pindar trusts that nomos still is king, namely 
the supreme ruling authority of the polis, and so do the 
great poets, Aeschylos, Sophocles and Euripides, who have 
an unwritten nomos (voyoc aypa^oc) in mind when they advo­
cate the good old traditional order in the sense of Hesiod's 
above quoted (1.3.) saying, that "the ancient custom is 
best". Nomos agraphos means in substance a constitution of 
the polis such as is pleasing to the gods; it deserves sub­
mission with due acknowledgement and true honour; deviation 
from it leads to destruction and decay of the good 'politi­
cal' order (eunomia) and favours absence of individual jus-
44tice (in the sense of the word dike). If nomos is deprived 
of its authority whether in form of the gods' receding and van­
ishing or a weakened trust in its essence as moral force of 
traditional sanctity, it sinks down to a mere (unwritten)
43. Heinimann, ibid., remarks "daB nomos bei Pindar nicht 
bloB heiBt "wie es die Menschen gelten lassen", sondern 
daB "dem Begriff immer etwas Ehrwiirdiges, gewissermas- 
sen Geheiligtes innewohnt" [with references]". Cf. also
E. Wolf, op.cit., II, pp. 187-94; W. Jaeger, op.cit., 
pp. 335-6; M. Gigante, op.cit., pp. 72-102, 103 ff.
(with a detailed discussion on Pindar's Frg. 169); H.E. 
Stier, Nomos Basileus, in: Philologus 83 (1928), pp. 
225-258; R. Marcic, op.cit., pp. 159-60; William Chase 
Greene, Moira. Fate, Good and Evil in Greek Thought,
(Cambridge, Mass., 1944), pp. 415-16.
44. Cf. E. Wolf, op .cit., I, pp. 342-5, II, pp. 215-6, 454; 
J. Walter Jones, The Law and Legal Theory of the Greeks, 
(Oxford, 1956), pp. 35-6. In stressing the significance 
of nomos agraphos Aristotle refers in his "Rhetoric" 
(1373b) to Empedocles' most distinctive evaluation which 
may allude to the comprehension of moira (fate), namely 
as "... the supreme power in the universe [which] was 
very closely allied to Nomos, in the sense of constitu­
tional order" (F.M. Cornford, op.cit., p. 54); vide 
also Rudolf Hirzel, Agraphos Nomos, in: Abhandlungen 
der Koniglich Sachsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaft, 
phil.-hist. Classe XX, 1 (1903), pp. 1-100, p. 94.
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expression, to a 'shallow status' without effect on individ-
45ual conduct and communal integrity. In fact, the 5th cen­
tury B.C., celebrated as the "Grand Century" and known as 
the age of the sophists, sees a strong devaluation of trust 
in nomoi, especially of unwritten traditional customs (voyoi 
aypa^cu) on the one hand, and on the other of codified (writ­
ten) precepts (laws), the given communal constitutions 
(voyoi yeypotyy evo i) .
Casting a cursory glance at history we learn that after 
the early epic period 'laws' ('communal charters') were 
usually put down in writing (codified) to ensure their pub­
lic validity as a set of precepts of an individual lawgiver
47who was supposed to act for the benefit of the polis.
However it was not before the constitution of Cleisthenes
48
that the 'laws' of Athens were called nomoi (vide 1.5.) . 
Irrespective of differences in terminology there is alto­
gether little respect for unwritten customary rules (nomoi 
agraphoi) and the application of equity rules. Strict codi­
fied 'laws' as such (not an individual ruler) mark the key 
to good order in the course from the 6th to 5th centuries
45. Cf. J.C. Stobart, The Glory that was Greece, (London, 
1911, repr. 1978), pp. 64, 73? Kurt Latte, Heiliges 
Recht. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der sakralen
Rechtsnormen in Griechenland, (Tubingen, 1920), p. 1;
F. Heinimann, op. cit. , p. 72; Louis Gernet, Einfiihrung 
in das Studium des alten griechischen Rechts, in:
E. Bernecker (Hrsg.), Zur griechischen Rechtsgeschich- 
te, (Darmstadt, 1968), pp. 4-38, p. 31.
46. Vide supra (I.5./6.).
47. Cf. Bonner/Smith, op.cit., pp. 67-8, 72, 74-5; John 
Burnet, Law and Nature in Greek Ethics, in: Essays 
and Addresses, (London, 1929), pp. 23-28, p. 27.
48. Vide F. Heinimann, o p .cit., p. 72; also supra foot­
notes 24, 24a. ~~
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B.C. However, by the middle of,the 5th century the so- 
called sophists declare both kinds of nomoi to be merely 
unreliable, arbitrary and perishable products of man. 
Eventually this conviction surfaced in the well-known anti­
thesis of nomos and physis and led to the inauguration of 
distinctive ethical speculation.
III.1. Observation of manifold 'inconstant' nomoi 
raised the problem of their capability to do justice to 
those concerned, especially when nomoi agraphoi were deemed
50insufficient as a regular basis for decision in litigation.
It was held true by eminent thinkers of the 5th and 4th cen­
turies B.C. that neither unwritten, customary regulations 
(nomoi agraphoi) nor written, statutory regulations (nomoi 
gegrammenoi), once the conviction of divine beneficency had 
given way to the superiority of the products and insights 
of man's reason, were able to constitute (according to their 
imagination of reality) the necessary basic state of order 
whereupon justice could be founded. The traditional divine 
word, Dike, is seen to become gradually supplanted and dis­
placed with the new abstract conception of dikaiosyne
51(righteousness, justice). Man-made and conventional nomos 
is the new topos (irrespectively whether they have been at­
tributed to the gods or a heroic lawgiver inspired by the
49. Cf. Olof Gigon, Die Kultur der Griechen, ubi cit., pp. 
22-5; D.M. MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens, 
(London, 1978), p. 44 ("Nevertheless, by the fourth 
century nomos was the normal word for a statute, a law 
published in writing and validated by a political pro­
cess."); cf. furthermore Martin Ostwald, Nomos and the 
Beginning of the Athenian Democracy, (Oxford, 1969), 
pp. 137-73.
50. Vide, H.J. Wolff, op.cit., pp. 566-7.
51. The origin of nomos and dike is no longer envisaged as 
a "Wohlthat der Gotter, sondern lediglich eine Leistung 
menschlicher Klugheit" (R. Hirzel, op.cit., p. 83). The 
new word dikaiosyne appears for the first time in Theo- 
gnis (about 546 B.C.); vide John Ferguson, Moral Values 
in the Ancient World, (London, 1958), p. 42; and E. 
Wolf, op.cit., I, p. 33 4.
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gods) and the opposite of that which is the product of 
physis (<j>v3aic).
III.2. Considerations on physis had a good tradition
in Pre-Socratic thinking (e.g. Xenophanes and Heraclitus 
52"repi cj)i3aea}C" ) so it was a natural consequence to contra­
distinguish nomos from physis, in other words, to observe
the natural order of things in contrast to the mere conven- 
53tional. Physis denotes that which is not man-made, no prod-
54uct of culture,but a process or result of growth, an 'ele-
55mentary' phenomenon subject to metron and number, self- 
supporting, independent, resting in oneself; thus Democritus 
(460-370 B.C.) states: "<}>ucn.c 6 e a&T&picnC11
Quite generally physis is often (inadequately) rendered
'nature' which misses the early topos of physis as regards
57Pre-Socratic sources; nomos and physis are not merely our
52. In Diels I, pp. 135, 150.
53. Still in Heraclitus, B 123 (10), [Diels I, 178, 8-9] we 
read that physis loves to hide herself ("(})\3aiC ••• 
KptiTTTeaBou 4>iAei").
54. Vide Liddell, Lexicon, pp. 1964-5; J. Burnet, o p .cit., 
pp. 23-4. "Der Begriff der Physis ist eine Schopfung 
der ionischen Wissenschaft [with references], die in 
ihm ihr ganzes neues Weltverstandnis zusammenfaBte. ... 
Auf diesen Begriff griindete sie die Naturwissenschaf t , 
die dem Orient fremd war" (M. Pohlenz, Nomos und Physis, 
ubi cit., p. 426); cf. J. Burnet, ibid.
55. Like the sun in Heraclitus, B 94 (29), [Diels I, 172,
8-10].
56. B 176 (64N), [Diels II, 180, 10]. "Als Naturforscher 
hat Demokrit ein ganz neues physikalisches Weltbild be- 
griindet. Sein Grundgedanke war die unaufhorlich aus sich 
selbst heraus stattfindende Bewegung der Atome, der un- 
teilbaren Grundeinheiten des Weltstoffes. Sie geschieht 
nach strenger Notwendigkeit ..." (E. Wolf, op.cit., II, 
p. 338). Vide esp. Democritus B 125 [Diels II, 168, 5-6], 
namely, that in reality there are atoms and the void.
57. Cf. W. Jaeger, Die Theologie der milesischen Naturphi- 
losophen, in: H.G. Gadamer (Hg.), Um die Begriffswelt 
der Vorsokratiker, (Darmstadt, 1968), pp. 49-87, p. 53;
J. Burnet, op.cit., p. 23.
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'law' and 'nature'.
In antithesis to his understanding of physis (as the
real) Democritus emphasizes with nomos "the unreal charac-
5 8ter of our everyday knowledge of the world" . Antiphon, a 
contemporary of Socrates, offers the following clear-cut 
distinction between nomos and physis:
"For the [orders] of nomoi are arbitrary,
those of physis, by contrast, necessary;
the [orders] of nomoi are conventional,
not grown; those of physis are grown,
59and not conventional."
Accordingly physis suggests a 'fundamenturn inconcussum* that 
stands for the trustworthy, real order of things; as such 
it is also able to disclose the true basis for justice to 
be granted both in the realms of moral and legal conduct, 
of nomos agraphos (in the sense of ethos) and nomos ge- 
grammenos (in the sense of statute law).
58. J. Burnet, ibid., p. 26. However, Democritus never re­
fused to pay due attention to the actual nomos of the 
polis. For "er sah namlich im Nomos der Polis ein Ab- 
bild der kosmischen Geordnetheit; wie diese, so ist je- 
ner notwendig" (E. Wolf, op .cit., II, p. 342). Rudolf 
Hirzel, Themis, Dike und Verwandtes, (Leipzig, 1907), 
p. 388), points out that already the (below quoted) 
statement of Antiphon refers (in its context) to the 
concept of a 'necessity of nomos1 or a 'nomos of nature' 
[voyoc (^uacon;]; cf. F. Heinimann, op. cit. , p. 131.
59. Antiphon Frg. 44 (Col. I), [Diels II, 346-7, 23-34],
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IV.1. The intention and scope of this enquiry do not
permit us to go into details neither of the highly suggestive
60physis-nomos controversy nor of the following period of 
Greek philosophy, when Plato and Aristotle exercised their 
great and .lasting influence on occidental legal thinking. It is 
also impossible to discuss the view of historians and ora­
tors, who, broadly speaking, did not develop a distinctively
60. Max Pohlenz, Nomos und Physis, ubi cit., observes
(p. 434): "Wer zuerst programmatisch vom Nomos an die 
Physis als die hohere Instanz appelliert hat,... 
konnen wir nicht sagen." However, a reliable point of 
reference seems to be a contemporary of Democritus, 
namely Hippocrates "On Airs, Waters, Places", where 
for the first time physis and nomos appear in a fixed 
terminology (M. Pohlenz, ibid., p. 419; Heinimann, 
op.cit., p. 13); eventually after 430 B.C. the physis- 
nomos controversy was firmly established and exercised 
great influence in the realm of moral philosophy which 
was just emerging and well represented in Socrates 
(4 69-3 9 9 B.C., a contemporary of the above-mentioned 
so-called (from Socrates' viewpoint) Sohpist Antiphon). 
The literature on this problem is very extensive. W.C. 
Greene, Moira, ubi cit., gives a helpful arrangement 
of works in a roughly chronological order, beginning 
with 1889 and ending with W. Jaeger's Paideia (op.cit.; 
Engl, trans., 1939). As to the period pre-1889 I should 
add Eduard Zeller, op.cit., I, 2, pp. 1384-1428, with 
valuable and copious footnotes, and post-1939 Felix 
Heinimann's "Nomos and Physis" (op.cit., originally 
Diss. Basel 1942) and Erik Wolf, op. cit. , II:..Rechts- 
philosophie und Rechtsdichtung im Zeitalter der Sophi- 
stik, (Frankfurt a.M., 1952), vide esp. pp. 9-17 (intro­
duction) .
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4- iT 61new aspect of nomos.
We have already touched upon an abstract ideal of right, 
a conception of to 6 ‘iKaT.ov that was unfolded out of the 
strict antithesis of (frticre i 6 \ icai ov and voyw 6 1 kou ov , yet 
firmly based upon the clearly visualized reality of physis. 
Henceforth the new conception of abstract justice in agree­
ment with the re-evaluated topos of nomos brings about the 
widely acknowledged 'intrapolis' orientation of nomoi on a 
broad scale. These become the general signposts for justice 
to be sought individually and for communal ('political') 
constancy. At the basis of legal thinking surfaces the syn­
thesis of 'natural' nomos as a necessary result of the 
rigid nomos-physis antithesis, or, as John Burnet has put 
it, "a compromise of 'natural rights'" with respect to a 
a society demanding a reasonable solution. Already Democritus 
(9 years younger than Plato's teacher Socrates) indicated
61. The historians regarding (most generally) nomos as being 
quite transitory take interest in the function of nomoi 
in their historical continuity and leave aside the 
'ideological' aspect of nomos. Vide E. Wolf, op.cit., 
vol. Ill, 2: Die Umformung des Rechtsgedankens durch 
Historik und Rhetorik, (Frankfurt a.M., 1956), pp. 14-
16. Herodotus and Thucydides conceive the function of 
nomos as law-and-order; the positivity and validity of 
nomoi are strongly accentuated. Vide M. Ostwald, o p . 
cit., p. 31; E. Wolf, ibid., pp. 42 ff, esp. 45-6, and 
68-80. "Most famous in Thucydides is the nomos ... that 
both gods and men rule whatever they have in their 
power" (M. Ostwald, ibid., p. 23). On the orators' con­
ception vide E. Wolf, ibid., pp. 157 ff.
As to inscriptions with respect to various kinds of 
nomoi (a subject which I shall leave aside as being 
only marginal for our general understanding of the to­
pos of nemos) we know that the 5th century B.C. meant a culmination 
of inscriptional fixations, a fact (irrespective of content) that 
we should keep in mind for comparative purposes. Vide Wilhelm 
Larfeld, Handbuch der griechischen Epigraphik, (Hildes- 
heim-New York, 1971), vol. I, pp. 174-5, and e.g. pp. 
451-460 (nomoi of non-sacral and sacral kinds outside 
of Attica), and M.N. Tod, A Selection of Greek Histori­
cal Inscriptions, 2 vols., (Oxford, 21946, 1948), re­
ferred to by M. Ostwald, op.cit., p. 1, footnote 4 
with details).
62. Op.cit., p. 28. Cf. R. Hirzel, Agraphos Nomos, ubi cit., 
p. 97.
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the step to overcome the gap between the pro and contra 
nomos arguments. For him it was quite evident that men need 
to obey appropriate nomoi for their own welfare because of 
their natural (<f>tfcrei) tendency to do harm to each other.
IV.2. Also Plato and Aristotle deal with the nomos- 
physis controversy in order to overcome and to adjust its 
excesses.64 For Plato (427-347 B.C.) nomos65 is acceptable 
and valid to the extent that it participates in the idea of 
justice.66 Thus Plato distinctly reacts against a material­
63. Vide Democritus, Fragments 245 (140 N ) , 248 (139 N ) ,
249 (138 N ) , [Diels II, 194-5]; cf. E. Wolf, op.cit.,
II, pp. 342-49.
64. Vide Plato, Gorgias 483 e, 484 c; Protagoras 337 c/d; 
Nomoi [Laws] 889 d/e- 890a; Aristotle, Nicomachean 
Ethics 1094b 13. The works of Plato are quoted after 
"Werke in Acht Banden", Griechisch und Deutsch, h g . v. G. 
Eigler, (Darmstadt, 1973 ff); Parmenides (infra) is 
quoted after the edition of "The Loeb Classical Library", 
Plato in twelve volumes, IV, with an English transl. by 
H.N. Fowler, (London-Cambridge, Mass., repr. 1970), pp. 
198 ff. The works of Aristotle are also quoted after
the edition of "The Loeb Classical Library", Greek with 
an English translation.
65. In his early Socratic period we find alongside the re­
vival of the old pre-philosophic mythos a personification 
of nomoi (Kriton 50a-52a); finally in his last work 
"Nomoi" [Laws] the indication of a theology intertwined 
with cosmological (also astronomical) and legal-philo­
sophical considerations, variously culminating in sug­
gestive statements like god is the measure of all things, 
not man (directed against Protagoras, that man is the 
measure of all things), vide Nomoi 716c, or, with re­
ference to Thales [A 22; Diels I, 79, 27] that all is 
full of gods, vide Nomoi 899b. For men it is not only 
indispensable to enact nomoi and to live according to 
nomoi in order to be different from wild animals (Nomoi 
874e/875a), but moreover, to serve the nomoi, since this 
is a service to the gods (Nomoi 762e). On Plato's "No­
moi" and therein the "Motiv des Seoc" vide Hans Erich 
Stier, Nomos Basileus, in: Philologus 83 (1928), pp. 
225-258, pp. 255-57. As to different meanings of the 
word nomos, vide the list given by M. Ostwald, op.cit.,
p. 1 n. 3.
6 6 . On the participation (vi£0e£ic) in the ideas,vide Plato, 
Parmenides 132 d (c-e). Cf. Emmanuel Michelakis, Platons 
Lehre von der Anwendung des Gesetzes und der Begriff 
der Billigkeit bei Aristoteles, (Munchen, 1953), p. 9; 
Carl J. Friedrich, Die Philosophie des Rechts in histo- 
rischer Perspektive, (Berlin, 1955), pp. 7-8.
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istic conception of physis and declares the divine nous 
(intellect, as being immanent in human souls) to be the 
creative, vital, and true physis wherein nomoi participate. 
Hence nomoi (justified from the existing difference between 
divine and human reason) are necessary for the regular life 
of human beings, although nomos and taxis (order) are in­
ferior to nous (intellect and reason) which comprises the 
divine, cosmic, and human spheres. Nomos rules over the 
polis as a second best possibility and nous rules over those 
three spheres, so that nomos is a just rule as it complies 
with this overarching nous. In his "Nomoi" Plato gives the 
following statement:
"... for no law [voyoc] or ordinance 
is mightier than Knowledge, nor is it right 
[0eyiC] for Reason [vouv] to be subject or 
in thrall to anything, but to be lord of 
all things, if it is really true to its name 
and free in its inner nature [Kaxa 4>uaiv].
But at present such a nature [i.e. a human
ability to do the best] exists nowhere at 
all, except in small degree; wherefore we 
must choose what is second best, namely or­
dinance and law, which see and discern the
general principle, but are unable to see
6 7every instance in detail."
IV.3. Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) rejects Plato's con­
ception of nomos as a participation in the idea of the good 
and the just, but agrees with him that it is inevitable for
man to have nomoi and to live accordingly, because other­
wise man will be not different from wild beasts. Aristotle's 
realistic imagination of reality conforms to the demand that
67. Nomoi [Laws] 875 c-d. Vide also ibid. 890 d.
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nomos ought to rule over man as a 'political animal' that 
has to exercise virtue as a citizen, in the last resort ac­
cording to the moral (habitual) way of life ( e t h o s ) T h i s  
conception reads in the words of Aristotle's "Politics'1 as 
follows:
"He therefore that recommends that the law 
[i.e. nomos] shall govern seems to recommend
that God and reason alone shall govern, but
he that would have man govern adds a wild 
animal also; ... Therefore the law is wis­
dom without desire."^
For Aristotle all that which happens according to the rule 
of nomos (in the above given connotation) enables the real­
ization of justice, the practised virtue of which essen-
71tially makes for the quality of the polis. The supreme
position in the polis, however, pertains to the 'autonomous'
man. He is a man who by virtue and ability excels all others
and thus can never more be subject to the law, for he is 
72himself a law. All this 'speculation' on nomos and jus­
tice, to be sure, is not unrelated (if not explicitly di­
rected) to the regulations of daily life, in particular dis­
putes between citizens, or citizens and their cities, or 
even between cities.
6 8 . Aristotle, Politics 1253a 1-5 (Bk. I.I.9), pp. 8-9
(for references on Aristotle vide footnote 64).
69. Vide Aristotle, ibid. 1287b 5-10 (Bk. III.XI.6-7), 
pp. 26 6-7.
70. Aristotle, ibid. 1287a 25-35 (Bk. III.XI.4-5), pp.
264-5.
71. Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. V.I.12, pp. 
256-7; Poiitics 1 253 a 30 - 1253 b (Bk. 1 .1 .12), pp. 
12-13. Cf. the exposition of J. Ferguson, o p .cit., pp. 
43-44, esp. on the different positions held by Plato 
and Aristotle regarding the problem of justice.
72. Vide Aristotle, Politics, 1284a 10-15 (Bk. III.VIII.2),
pp. 240-1.
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In his conception of the nomos idios (special) and 
nomos koinos (universal), the former distinction of nomo 
dikaion and physei dikaion has been overcome in favour of 
the new topos of 'natural law'. This reads in Aristotle's 
"Rhetoric":
"Now there are two kinds of laws, particular 
[ 1 6 1 0 V  ( v oyov)] and general [k o i v o v  ( vo y o v ) ] .
By the particular laws I mean those estab­
lished by each people in reference to them­
selves, which again are divided into writ­
ten [yeypayyevov] and unwritten [aypot(J)ov]; 
by general laws I mean those based upon na­
ture [k o i v o v  6e t o v  Kara <J)daiv]. In fact, 
there is a general idea of just and unjust 
in accordance with nature [^daei k o i v o v  
6 i k c u o v  k ou a 6 iKov], as all men in a manner
divine, even if there is neither communi-
73cation nor agreement between them."
To complete Aristotle's conception given in his own words 
we should add a previous statement, namely:
"By particular [ ^ 6 i o v  ( v o y o v ) ] ,  I mean the 
written law [ y e y p a y y e v o v  ( v o y o v ) ] in accord­
ance with which a state is administered; by 
general [k o i v o v ], the unwritten regulations 
which appear to be universally recognized 
[or admitted]. " ^
73. Aristotle, The "Art" of Rhetoric (short: Rhetoric) 
1373b (Bk. I.XIII.2), pp. 138-9.
74. Aristotle, ibid. 1368b (Bk. I.X.3), pp. 104-7.
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To sum up, we can take notice of Aristotle making those 
clear-cut distinctions which are significant for a concep- 
ticrn of the developed topos of nomos. Particular (the 
special and practicable) nomoi comprise both the statutory 
laws (nomoi gegrammenoi) and the customary observances 
(nomoi agraphoi) as well as the inter-individual moral con­
duct (ethos) of an overarching validity; the latter two of
which are the unwritten sources of equity considerations in
75addition to the imperfect body of written (positive) laws. 
Taken together both sets of nomoi may be typified as the 
necessary body of man-made 'conventions' (in a broad and 
general artificial sense, one could also say: 'conglomer­
ations') which ought to govern the state (polis), the natur­
al unity that binds human beings together for the benefit 
of each other in an organic whole.
The man-made 'conventions' or standards of living with 
binding force (of both types, statutory and customary laws) 
are just in that they are not in contradiction to the uni­
versal (koinos) unwritten nomos, the natural order of things 
perceptible and present under the rule of god (theos) and 
reason (nous). And yet, this order of things is not unchange­
able or static in the concrete and real phenomenal world, 
however, it is basic and firm enough to ground the true
75. Vide Aristotle, Rhetoric 1374a 13 (Bk. I.XIII.13:
"... equity is justice that goes beyond the written 
law." (trans. J.H. Freese)), pp. 144-5; The Nicomachean 
Ethics, Bk. V.X.1-8, on equity and justice in general 
("... equity ... is not legal justice, but a rectifi­
cation of legal justice ... it is a special kind of 
Justice, not a different quality altogether" (ibid..), 
trans. H. Rackham), pp. 313-17. Jacqueline de Romilly, 
op.cit., p. 38, has highlighted the essence of equity 
in saying: "l'equite comporte ... que l'on soit indul­
gent aux faiblesses humaines, que l'on considere non 
la lettre de la loi, mais son esprit."
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7 6'political' constitution. Considering this well-developed 
conception, which encircles theory and practice without ex­
cluding the facts of historical reality, it is not difficult 
to argue substantially that there may well be just actions 
opposed to statutory law (e.g. in the case of Sophocles' 
Antigone) though with only little chance of recognition in 
the 'political' reality.
IV.4. Regarding the present stage of development it 
appears to me that two lines of development of the topos 
of nomos can be envisaged being interrelated in Ari­
stotle's philosophy of nomos, the interrelation of which 
accomplished a development of its own reality exerting a 
significant influence in the history of occidental legal 
philosophy, and still, as it seems, is not brought to an 
end.
Nomos (agraphos) developed, including the interplay of 
thesmos and retaining the aspects discussed above, without 
disappearing or falling out of use, into the intra-communal 
('political') most powerful, influential, clearly and in­
disputably stated nomos (gegrammenos), which could come into 
at first sporadic then common practice with the invention 
and diffusion of the art of alphabetical writing, a fact 
that must be taken into account. Nomos gegrammenos (first 
as thesmos, namely as that which was authoritatively fixed 
and laid down) was handled according to given provisions in 
often changing codes, the early species of which "contained
76. Vide Aristotle, Politics 1282b (Bk. III.VI.13); The 
Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. V.VII.3-4. Both, Plato and 
Aristotle are quite aware of the dependence of the ef­
fectiveness of their 'legal' conceptions on appropriate 
means of education, for the nomoi themselves have an 
educational function; vide e.g. Aristotle, Politics 
1280b 1-10 (Bk. III.V.11), pp. 214-15; Plato, Apology,
24 d-e; cf. with further references Herwig Gorgemanns, 
Beitrage zur Interpretation von Platons Nomoi, (Miinchen,
1960), pp. 16-19, 21.
provisions regarding assault, housebreaking, arson, all 
sorts of family matters, debt, slavery, transfer and dis­
tribution of property, business relations, perjury, relig-
. - 77
ious matters, homicide, sumptuary legislation"
The great mass of subjective (individual) 'rights' con­
cerning relevant provisions enabled and often resulted in 
antagonistic litigious behaviour demanding an appropriate 
court-decision. In agreement with Aristotle's conception, 
private or public nomoi (not sharply distinguished) were 
"regarded as essential not (as the Romans mainly considered
it) to adjust the relationships of individuals, but as a
7 8means of supporting the constitutional structure" . It is,
therefore, readily accepted that one may find social peace
largely depending on reasonable nomoi gegrammenoi, and a
7 9fair jurisdiction bound to apply them; yet apparently with
little success considering that "the litigiousness of the
80Athenians was proverbial" . Even the 'idealist' Plato who
conceived the object of rule to be the true and objective
good (that is a just social order in an abstract sense)
did not reject or condemn (in his "Politeia") the use of
81litigation as a weapon in political disputes.
The other line of development follows a slowly but 
steadily growing tendency, namely to think in general and 
abstract terms rendered possible under the impact of the
77. R.J. Bonner/G. Smith, op.cit., II, p. 2.
78. Colemann Phillipson, The International Law and Custom 
of Ancient Greece and Rome, 2 vols., (London, 1911),
I , p. 52.
79. Vide Victor Ehrenberg, From Solon to Socrates, (London,
1968), p. 70.
80. R.J. Bonner, Lawyers and Litigants in Ancient Athens, 
(Chicago, 1927), p. 96.
81. Cf. R.J. Bonner, ibid., p. 101.
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8 2Greek language-structure. Thus., we are able to observe 
such a line, for instance, in the voyoc 6 sio^ of Heraclitus, 
to.the to Beiov of Empedocles and the voyoc k o i v o c  icaia 
4>\3aiv (including the abstract term of physis) of Aristotle, 
that represents a rather conclusive development towards a 
firmly based abstract legal thinking; however, this may en­
counter all the difficulties inherent in mediating the con­
crete with the abstract, or the world of phenomena with the 
mere noumenon. Concluding and characterizing the topos of 
nomos (in sum) it may be comprehended as a constituted (ver- 
fafite) order of society, a partially fixed way of life com­
prising individual duties as well as subjective individual
• 83rights.
V. For reasons of a comparative chronology I should
still mention that the Stoa added nothing decisively new to
the development of nomos as described above. There may be
one exception concerning the evolution of the nomos topos
84with regard to the nomos of physis (the law of nature),
82. Vide Julius Stenzel, Uber den Einflufl der griechischen 
Sprache auf die philosophische Begriffsbildung (1921), 
in: the same, Kleine Schriften zur griechischen Philo­
sophie , (Darmstadt, 1972), pp. 72-84, pp. 82-84. Rein- 
hard May, Frieden und die Aufgabe des Rechts, (Wiesba­
den, 1979), pp. 14-16, 83-93.
83. M. Ostwald, op.cit., has similarly pointed out (now sum­
marized) "although the origin of this norm [nomos] may 
on various occasions be attributed to the gods, to.a 
lawgiver, or to an enactment by a society as a whole, 
the crucial point is that, regardless of origin, it is 
recognized and acknowledged as the valid norm within a 
given milieu" (p. 2 1 ); "they [the nomoi] denote a gen­
eral order of life" (p. 33). However, the decisive el­
ement of this order is that it is firmly constituted as 
the ruling factor of an emancipating society.
84. Vide Edgar Zisel, The Genesis of the Concept of Physical 
Law, in: The Philosophical Review L I ,3 (1942), pp. 245- 
279, p. 251; Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization
in China, vol. II: History of Scientific Thought, (Cam­
bridge, 1956, repr. 1975), p. 534 (pp. 533-539, on 
"stages in the Mesopotamian-European differentiation 
of natural law and laws of nature"); Klaus Reich, Der 
historische Ursprung des Naturgesetzbegriffs, in: Fest­
schrift Ernst Kapp, (Hamburg, 1958), pp. 121-134, p. 133.
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a problem of great significance,that emerges already, as I 
would suppose, with Hesiod's "nomos of the plains" (vide 
supra). But this problem will be discussed elsewhere.
The school of the Stoa regarded nomos (characteristi­
cally) to be of divine universal rationality wherein every
8 5human nomos is incorporated. The idea of nomos empsychos 
is visualized. Finally, we learn from Cicero (106-43 B.C.) 
in a passage of his "De legibus" where he compares (in I,
6 , 19) the Greek word nomos (from nemein in the sense of 
'to distribute') with lex, the word of his language (from 
legere meaning to pick out, to select, to choose), that 
lex, which also agrees with the meaning of nomos (as men­
tioned) , is supreme reason incorporated in nature commanding 
that which ought to be done and prohibiting the contrary.
"... lex est ratio summa, insita in natura,
quae iubet ea quae facienda sunt, prohibetque 
,,86contrana.
85. Vide Max Pohlenz, Die Stoa. Geschichte einer geistigen 
Bewegung, 2 Bande, (Gottingen, 1943, ^1970), I, p. 132-
3. A. VerdroB-DroBberg, o p .cit., p. 159. The philosophy 
of the Stoa regarding the problem of nomos and physis 
goes back as far as Heraclitus, and remains more in the 
tradition of Plato than of Aristotle in attempting to 
overcome the opposition of nomos and physis. Vide Maxi­
milian Forschner, Die stoische Ethik, (Stuttgart, 1981), 
pp. 18-19, p. 15. ("Die Stoa wird den Gedanken der Rela- 
tivierung von Gesetz und Sitte zugunsten der Physis und 
die Begriindung der RechtmaBigkeit oder UnrechtmaBigkeit 
des Nomos aus der Natur bewahren und teleologisch umin- 
terpretieren."). Chrysippus (c. 280-206 B.C.), the com­
pleter of the stoic philosophy, resumes Pindar's nomos 
basileus as the supreme ruling authority for men in 
their 'political' community; vide Stoicorum Veterum Frag- 
menta, ed. by H. von Arnim, 4 vols., (Stuttgart, repr. 
1964), vol. Ill, VI De iure et lege, § 2, 314, p. 77.
8 6 . Marcus Tullius Cicero, De legibus I, 6 , 18 (quoted after 
Cicero. Staatstheoretische Schriften. Lateinisch und
Deutsch von Konrat Ziegler, (Berlin (Ost), 1974 21979),
p. 2 2 2 .
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Though god (deus) is according to Cicero (De re publica)
the inventor, transmittor and keeper of the one eternal and
unchangeable law ("... una lex et sempiterna et immutabilis
..., ille [deus] legis huius inventor, disceptator, lator;
8 7..." ) there is still a good distance to the conflation
with the Jewish-Christian tradition and Aquinas' signifi­
cant distinction between lex aeterna, lex divina,and lex 
naturalis.
87. Cicero, De re publica III, 33 (for reference vide supra), 
p. 150.
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CONCLUSION .*
§ 16. Similarity and Disparity between dharma, A A , and nomos
No doubt our comparative enquiry so far leads to the gen­
eral conclusion that the three topoi of dharma, L A , and nomos
took, each of them without foreign influence, their peculiar
1
and unmistakable course of formation. At the end of it they 
continued to exist disparately in what I have described as a 
distinctive post-formative process of promotion in the case 
of dharma, of extension and consolidation in the case of L A , 
and of development in the case of nomos.
In contrast to the many obvious disparities which the ccxnpara-
tive juxtaposition of dharma, LA., and nomos has produced, now
easily obtainable from §§ 1-15, it is in fact rather difficult
2to account for distinctly similar features which might induce 
us to speak of a sound parallelism instead of more or less 
vague correspondences. Though, broadly speaking, as key topoi 
of their respective cultures, seeking to find plausible and last 
ing answers in the form of mental and physical activities to 
the fundamental problems of world-orientation and communal life 
we are at most entitled to say that they found corresponding 
answers. However, bearing in mind that all three topoi exhibit 
quite diverse intra-cultural relations, we can only conclude 
on good grounds that dharma is for India (Hinduism) what L A is
1. That is about 500 B.C., the so-called "Achsenzeit" of world 
history; vide K. Jaspers, Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Welt- 
geschichte, (Frankfurt a.M./Hamburg, **1 957), p. 14.
2. We must be aware of the fact that the descriptive use of 
the English language often produces an impression of simi­
larity where the juxtaposition of Chinese, Sanskrit, and 
Greek take us on quite different ways of thought with some­
times remarkable differences, which are rather difficult to 
express appropriately when we only have for instance a choice 
between one or two words. I have dealt with this problem
at some length in "Frieden und die Aufgabe des Rechts"
(3. Sprachkritische Einsicht im rechtsvergleichenden Be- 
reich, pp. 9-10, 61-8, including the problem of cross- 
cultural translations), o p .cit.
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for China, and both are counterparts of what nomos was and
became in ancient Greece (and eventually in the earliest
3
strata of Judaic-Christian cultures) . Yet, it would be en­
tirely misleading to suggest that these topoi were equi­
valents .
Each culture, of course, independently formed its in­
digenous pattern and exists as a whole, within which its 
basic topoi circulate in mutual connection consistently with a 
general world outlook. But though cultures fulfil some 
similar function for their societies there is not, and ought 
never to have been, a serious suggestion that their 'world- 
conceptions' and their basic topoi overlapped or entirely 
corresponded inter se. There is the problem of non-overlap-
3. It is beyond the framework and scope of this enquiry to 
suggest that in a comparative study of nomos the Jewish 
topoi of Torah translated in ancient times into Greek 
should figure (likewise the Buddhist topoi of dharma 
translated into Chinese in the early centuries A.D.), or 
the subtle blend of Jewish and Hellenistic ideas which 
surfaced under the protean expression nomos in the 
earliest Christian texts, viz. Paul's letters and some 
deutero-Pauline letters. Vide Gerhard Kittel, Theologi- 
sches Worterbuch zum Neuen Testament (IV), (Stuttgart,
1933 ff). Cf. John C. Plott, Global History of Philos­
ophy I , (New Delhi, 1963), pp. 6 6 , 72. Nevertheless with­
out the Hellenistic inheritance of nomos from the clas­
sical age the topos could not (probably) have been used 
in religion. Its adaptation to the religious sphere is
a testimony to its vitality by the end of the classical 
age. It is of signifance that at 1 John 111,4 we gather 
that sin is anomia ("Whosoever commits sin transgres­
ses also the law: for sin is the transgression of the 
law."), which by this date could not have meant "breach 
of the Torah". This development of the topos of nomos is, 
like other ancient Greek topoi, e.g. logos, contained in 
potentia within the classical Greek conception of reality 
(its specific world outlook) even if instances of such 
use cannot be found, except by implication, in, e.g. Plato. 
The bridge (as I have indicated, at the end of the enquiry 
in nomos, vide § 15 V) was apparently the Stoa, particu­
larly the later Stoa.
4. On the disparity between the Chinese and the Occidental 
world outlook ("Vorstellungswirklichkeit und Wirklich- 
keitsvorstellung") vide Reinhard May, Frieden und die Auf- 
gabe des Rechts, ubi cit., pp. 22-3, 104-6, 108-12,
151-64.
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ping. An idea might be present in dharma which is absent in
ZZ, and again nomos may provide a presupposition absent from 
5
both. In the comparison of these three topoi we must be con­
stantly on our guard against assuming an overlapping, or en­
tire correspondence, which never existed in any mind, still 
less in any state of facts; and we must be prepared for what 
I shall call 'Leerstellen1, i.e. empty spaces where our cross- 
cultural comparisons produce a zero response. These are of 
great interest in themselves, but to analyse them is much 
easier than to account for them, as this must take us into
g
aetiological speculations foreign to this thesis.
As to an account of similar features in the course of 
formation of these three topoi we may find that they share 
to some degree a conception of order. In the early topos of 
dharma the idea of order is significantly present in refer­
ring to an eternally constituted and support providing state 
of the world as a whole, where every part of it is in its 
functionally right position, so that such stability could be 
conceived as the very basis of all human activities or, in 
other words, the factor of an all-embracing scheme of exist­
ence. This conception of order, at first visualized in the
7
expression rta, was incompatible with the idea of a creator 
to whose ingenuity man owed his worldly existence.
In comparison with nomos there is no hint of an idea of 
divine agencies creating the universe nor an existing imagin­
ation of gods issuing commands or fixing rules directed to
5. E.g. the idea of karma in connection with the promotion
of the topos of dharma, or the Confucian interrelation be­
tween the topoi of Z'L and j an , or nomos containing the 
potential of 'legislation', of man-made law, a potential 
absent from dharma and ZZ.
6 . Cf. the quite different intention directed to aetiological 
speculations from an Occidental point of view in Max Weber, 
Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Religionssoziologie, (Tubingen,
71978), Vorbemerkung, pp. 1-16.
7. Vide W. Halbfass, Indien und Europa, (Basel/Stuttgart, 
1981), p. 360-66.
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govern and control the world, and there is no reference to 
usages and habits of men, no separation between determinants 
of cosmic and social norms though both topoi are corresponding 
in that they refer to supernatural spheres, which, however, 
are differently related to the worldly existence of man.
Whereas the topos of ZZ conveys the idea of order in an 
almost exclusively intramundane context relating to appropri­
ate ways of conduct, product of the human ingenuity to in­
fluence and regulate man's worldly existence in harmony with 
nature in an all-embracing sense, the topos of dharma pro­
duced a viable conviction of man's duty to comply with the
g
pre-existing order, or the cosmic constitution of the world. 
If we should like to have a comparative formula, it may be 
worth while to consider the difference or incongruity between 
the early topoi of dharma, ZZ, and nomos in relation to the 
idea of order in terms of the following general types: dharma, 
as an existent, preordained order, an uncreated exstatum; 
nomos, as an instituted constitutional order granted from 
without; and LZ, as an adapted order granted from within.
In contrast to nomos neither the topos of dharma nor the 
topos of ZZ prepared for an idea of law governing the affairs 
of men from outside through divine agencies. While dharma in­
augurated an authoritative corpus of texts devoted to teaching 
man his duty in order to support and to preserve the dharmic 
state of the world (and thus expostulating the conception of 
karma which produces a comparative zero response in nomos
8 . The invention of the idea of a cosmic world pre-existent 
to divine or extra-mundane forces (gods) cannot only be 
ascribed to the Greeks' mind as has often been (falsely) 
suggested, thus, e.g. H. Blumenberg, Die Genesis der ko- 
pernikanischen Welt, (Frankfurt a.M., 1975), p. 16; ob­
viously, the Indian mind via sruti grasped this idea,
first of all in the conception of rta, some 500 years
earlier, cf. supra, § 3 II.2.
9
and 1 1 ) , 1 1 became the social Qbligation of distinct behav­
iour directed to fit into the harmonious or balanced state of
the world as existing in the Chinese reality of conceptions
10(or the realisation of their ideas [Vorstellungswirklichkeit]).
The post-formative phases see all three topoi in an 
increasing significance; their status being raised corre­
spondingly, in the cases of dharma and to a general way 
of life serving respectively as an organizational pattern of 
human existence, however, on different levels, with different 
purposes, and with different effects.
This, however, is only partly true with nemos, namely to the 
extent that it marks a specific, partially fixed (and codi­
fied) way of life, especially in its later restricted sense 
of nomos gegrammenos as opposed to nomos agraphos, a distinc­
tion of utmost importance to the developed state of nomoi, 
but absolutely disparate to the all-embracing and all-per­
vasive tendencies of the 1 1 - and dharma-orientated societies 
in China and Hindu India.
The validity of the topos of 11 never depended (in con­
trast to nomos) on the fact that individual 1 1  precepts were 
authoritatively stated and fixed to be laid down in a codi­
fied form being publicly available in a written edition.
And unlike in ancient Greece it did not occur that 11 was 
ever attributed to the work of a divine lawgiver or to a 
deified person. Such attribution was also foreign to dharma, 
though in contrast to 1 1  a sacred literature of eternal
9.Only vague correspondencies exist for instance in rta, 
dike, and tao, or between 1 ' Xe.n-mZng (d) and natural law 
(in the sense of nomos koinos kata physin, vide § 13 IV) ; 
but it has been suggested as if these were equivalents, 
vide e.g. the references given by J. Needham, SCC II, 
p. 571, and H.J. Kim, Fundamental Legal Concepts of 
China and the West, Port Washington, N.Y./London, 1981), 
pp. 25 ff, 145 ff, as to the problem of natural law.
10. Cf. supra, fn. 4, also Kitaro Nishida, Fundamental
Problems of Philosophy, transl. (Tokyo, 1970), pp. 237, 
248, 250.
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validity (sruti) figured as the allegedly unchangeable basis, the
11authority of which could not be replaced, howsoever.
Both India and China emphasized in the topoi of dharma
and LL the possibilities of man's education, and therefore
(last not least for reasons of effectivity) they relied on
person to person (oral) transmission (not because of a lack
of facilities), which was part of the educational programme
of man; to be effective age-old practical wisdom, whether
moral, or, religious and moral (in the case of dharma), had
to be translated into concrete ways of life (a corpus of
manifold individual rules) which resulted reciprocally from
the practical application of its precepts and the conception
of its practicability, in the case of dharma to secure social
order and to realize the supreme goal of man, moksa, and in
the case of LL to achieve social harmony and a balanced state
1 2in the relation of man to nature. Hence, the topoi of 
dharma and LL were far from being only "the second best" as 
Plato had admitted of the rule of nomos.
11. An association with Heraclitus' nomos theios, the early 
expression of an all-encompassing 1fundamentum inconcus- 
sum', is near at hand; however there seems to be only
a vague correspondence; vide § 13 II. 2.
12. In a very brief article, C.P. Ramaswamy Aiyar, Doctrine 
of Li and Dharma, in: Indo-Asian Culture, vol. XV, 2
(19bb), pp. 129-33 , concludes in contrasting both topoi 
that "Dharma regulates human conduct with advertance to 
cosmic views and Li emphasizes the practical regulation 
of life and of government by means of reliance on com­
mon sense and the recognition of human and domestic 
values" (p. 133). Cf. the articles by R.M. Gimello,
The civil status of li in classical Confucianism, in:
PEW 22 (1972) , pp. 203-11 {LL and dharma are exposed as 
normative principles, thus touching upon one important 
aspect of both topoi), and A.C. Danto, Role and rule in 
Oriental thought: Some metareflections on dharma and 
li , ibid. pp. 213-20 (his apprehension of dharma
"in its extraordinary and extramoral sense" (p. 217) is 
in my opinion rather misleading as I have attempted to 
demonstrate, vide supra, §§ 10-13).
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As to the dharmic way of life the Indian mind success­
fully attempted to abstract (idealiter) and to promote an 
imperative under the presupposition of sruti and within the 
scope of smrti, namely dharma, the ever present imperative, 
from an infinitely varied corpus of data of actual practices 
(including superstitious, intuitive, rational, empirical 
standards), so that (not unlike the imperative ascribed to 
the spirit of LL) this imperative, presupposing varnasrama,
was sufficiently well-linked to the rules of behaviour as they
1 3existed in form of all kinds of usages, customs, or habits.
A workable corpus of enforceable (legal) rules emerged from
1 4it, even at the hands of European administrators. On the
whole the topos of dharma gives custom an underlying basis
without denying the self-regulating force of custom within
varnasrama. Custom, therefore, can be means of a court deci-
1 5sion apart from the question of support by the smrtis.
In comparison to the situation of nomos it was a rare
exception when nomos agraphos (the unwritten customary law)
played any role as an accepted rule of law equivalent to
1 6nomos gegrammenos. Only written and codified rules were
13. Cf. K.V.R. Aiyangar, Some Aspects ..., ubi cit.,pp. 157-8.
14. For an illustration, vide infra.
15. P.V. Kane, History of Dharmasastra, ubi cit., vol. Ill,
pp. 260-1.
16. R. Hirzel, Agraphos Nomos, ubi cit., p. 98, draws at­
tention to the significant fact: "Dass agraphoi nomoi 
in die athenische Gesetzgebung bei der Revision Auf- 
nahme fanden, ergibt sich aus dem Verbot, in Zukunft 
sich nicht mehr auf ungeschriebene Gesetze zu berufen."
No doubt the Greeks preferred and insisted on written 
(constituted) laws, at best with eternal validity, even 
if these laws are not 'the best' possible; vide M. Miihl, 
Untersuchungen ..., ubi cit., pp. 88-9, with reference 
to Plutarch's reports on the laws of Lycurgus, and those 
of Solon which should remain in force for 100 years. Cf. 
furthermore H.J. Wolff, Vorgeschichte ..., ubi cit.,
p. 560, and the same, Gewohnheitsrecht und Gesetzesrecht 
in der griechischen Rechtsauffassung, in: Deutsches 
Landesreferat zum VI. Internationalen KongreB fur Rechts- 
vergleichung in Hamburg, 1962, pp. 3-18, pp.6 , 17.
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respected and qualified as nomoi- -(laws); in this sense they 
became the key to good order in the polis. This must be also 
considered in relation to the Legalists' and the
Confucian aversion against i t . ^  In the existence of 
we can see some kind of a parallel to nomos gegrammenos, 
but without assuming that they are equivalents.
Whereas the topos of dharma and all related conduct in
1 8man's varnasrama fixation rests on a "suprasensible basis" ,
(n )the topos of ti. is anchored within the lou L ulyi scheme of
relationship, totally intraworldly orientated, deriving its
authority from the past, from the experience with a perfectly
1 9cultivated social organism. An 'evolutionary' step from the 
concrete to the abstract (for several reasons, I guess), 
with which we are accustomed through the Greeks' ways of
17. That the Chinese have had written records of precepts 
(jjo.^)) at a comparatively early date can be taken for 
granted, however, they never emphasized their existence, 
but widely preferred (evaluating the spirit of Ix-bound 
ways of life) "custom, arbitration, compromise, confining 
positive law to purely penal (criminal) purposes ..."
[so to say in profound accordance with their proverbial 
wisdom that] "for each new law a new way of circum­
venting it will arise" (J. Needham, SCC II, pp. 519,
522). In contrast, we find in the Greek tradition the 
intriguing idea "what does not harm law (nomos), then, 
does no harm to citizen or city" (Marcus Aurelius 
Antoninus, X, 33, 4; quoted after C.R. Haines (LCL), 
London-Cambridge, Mass., 1916, repr. 1970).
18. K.V.R. Aiyangar, o p .cit., p. 62.
19. Cf. Lin Xiaoyan, Review: Yao Gongxian, The Rites [ ]
- Spiritual Civilization - Patriotism, in: Social
Sciences in China IV, 1 (1983), pp. 224-6.
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20thinking, took place neither in .India nor in China. With 
some restrictions Heraclitus' nomos theios may have been the 
intellectual opening in Greece, full of consequences, to be 
demonstrated in a successful development towards the emerg­
ence of Aristotle's nomos koinos kata physin, generally re­
presented as natural law with universal validity.
As to such (rather intricate) development, to which only 
the Occident owes (for good or bad) the early insight into 
the existence of laws of nature (already indicated, yet un­
scientifically, in Hesiod), the Indian (Vedic) conception of
dharma (the same is true for the topos of tL) does not seem
21
to have inspired a speculation on 'laws of nature'. Even 
in pursuit of the promotion of the (inherited) topos of 
dharma under the authoritative impact of a literature devoted 
to the task of promoting dharma, there is not even the 
slightest hint of it. On the contrary, as regards the dharma- 
sastris' occupation, they never engaged in attempts to dis­
cover the ways of the - non-human nature, in order to establish 
a rule over nature in analogy to a (instituted) law-bound rule 
over man. Indeed, no research was conducted into behaviour- 
patterns of human beings other than caste Hindus. The line of continuity 
between sruti and smrti did not allow a deviation frcm the primordial paths
20. This is not the opportunity to penetrate into this highly 
interesting philosophical and linguistic topic; vide for 
instance the discussions in: Betty Heimann, Indian and 
Western Philosophy, (London, 1937), pp. 48-9; J. Escarra, 
Le Droit Chinois, ubi cit., p. 26. From a comparative 
philosophical point of view, including all three cultures, 
vide for instance: Hajime Nakamura, Ways of Thinking of 
Eastern Peoples, (Honolulu, 1 964 , 51 971 ) , pp. 3-38, 130- 
SI, 185-95; R.T. Oliver, Communication and Culture in 
Ancient India and China, (Syracuse, N.Y., 1971), pp. 258- 
61, 265 ff; W.S. Haas, The Destiny of the Mind, (London, 
1956), pp. 159-84; P.T. Raju, Introduction to Comparative 
Philosophy, (1962, London and Amsterdam (Southern 111. 
Univ. Press), 1970), pp. 270-83; Ben-Ami Scharfstein, 
et al., Philosophy East / Philosophy West, (Oxford, 1978), 
pp. 116-127.
21. Cf. W. Halbfass, op.cit., p. 365; J. Needham, SCC II, 
pp. 521 ff, 582.
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of action and knowledge (karmamSrga and jnanamarga), both of
which exist only under the eternally fixed obligation of Hindu
man to adjust his own way of life in accordance with the
support of dharma (order), even by means of non-action (so
in the fourth asrama), so that man may be finally released
from the bondage of life. Therefore, it became the dharma-
sastrls' duty to tell man his duty, to give guidance in close
adherence to sruti, that is to expound and teach what lay
22beyond their own competence of invention or innovation.
To speak of promotion of dharma, as I have proposed, seems 
entirely apt to the Indian situation post-sruti. Such promo­
tion of enjoined patterns of social and religious behaviour, 
to be taught to the extent of an all-embracing duty-bound way 
of life, and not to be laid down in cold materialized letters, 
was apparently little conformable with any general idea of
stating and distributing (in the sense of veyciv) individual 
2 3rights. Likewise, the consolidation movement of the topos 
of Li. sees no disposition for anybody's rights, deduced from 
whosesoever authority. The conception of an all-pervading 
harmony to be practically sought within all human relations 
excluded such means that permitted or paved the way for anta­
gonistic behaviour instead of stimulating a diaHlagmatic at-
24titude toward each other. The Athenian proverbial litigious-
22. Vide J.D.M. Derrett, Religion, Law and the State in India, 
ubi cit., pp. 153-4, with reference to Medhatithi on 
Manu 11,6.
23. However, we find the topos of 'right';verbalized, but 
merely as a counterpart of duty, or as reciprocal ties 
of duties; the predominance of the latter is distinctly 
stressed, thus K.V.R. Aiyangar, op.cit., emphasizes 
"'dharma', as enjoined duty" (p. 155); cf. for China,
H.J. Kim, op.cit., p. 148.
24. DiaHagmatic: in the sense of a harmonious (or concord­
ant) behaviour; an attitude of (ex ante) conciliation.
Vide Reinhard May, Annaherung an chinesisches Rechtsver- 
standnis. Diallaktik und Antagonistik im Unterschied zwi- 
schen chinesischem und abendlandischem Rechtsdenken, in:
ARSP, Supp. I f 2, (Wiesbaden, 1982), pp. 105-9; cf. the 
same, Frieden ..., ubi cit., pp. 107, 144-9, 217 ff.
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ness under the impact of nomoi i§ .just the opposite, a 
'struggle for lav; and justice1 fatal to harmony.
- The internal coherence of duty-bound ways of life, pre-
* 25ordained and promoted in the topos o f ’dharma, and socially 
created and accepted in the consolidated topos of -Lt, makes 
enough provision (though the contents of duties given with 
the topoi of dharma and JLL may and, in fact, do widely differ) 
to cope with human habits, usages, or customs. These are not 
the 'third best' so to say, after Plato's nomoi, but integrated 
and utilized patterns of conduct, expression of human cul­
tivation, under the impact of the spirit of or, in the
25. Cf. P. Hacker, Dharma im Hinduismus, in: Kleine Schriften, 
(Wiesbaden, 1978), pp. 496-509, p. 506 (characterizing 
the topos of dharma as "ein konkretes, positiv-heilswer- 
tiges Verhaltensmodell"); W. Halbfass, op.cit., p. 366, 
describes 'dharma' (rather congruous with my approach) 
as "der in sich differenzierte "Brauch", der die Lebens- 
form der Arya konstituiert, der ihre Identitat gegeniiber 
den Mleccha gewahrleistet, ..." It is worth while to con­
sider that the basis of adherence (rather than mere obedi­
ence) being the voluntary submission of groups to the 
teachings (sasana) of the sages, the dharmasastra however 
has no 'imperialistic', 'missionary' attitude towards 
Mlecchas (foreigners) or 'insufficiently Hinduised' peoples. 
What is true for the caste Hindus' dharmic way of life has 
never been true for others. It is therefore debatable to 
speak of an 'orthodoxy' or an "orthopraxie" (J.F. Staal, 
Uber die Idee der Toleranz im Hinduismus, in: Kairos 1959/ 
60, pp. 215-18, p. 217) in this context. Though one must 
admit that the dharmic way of life nowadays has somehow 
succumbed to modern occidentally infiltrated conceptions 
of a 'law'-bound way of life, it does not imply, as shown 
by contributions in 0'Flaherty-Derrett, The Concept of 
Duty in South Asia, op.cit., that the topos of dharma has 
vanished from consciousness of Hindus, since the expression 
dharma/dharm/taruma is till a 'trigger'-word in all cul­
tures utilizing an Indo-Aryan or a Dravidian language from 
Kashmir to Cape Comorin. Although dharma/dharm/taruma 
may not supply rules of law, nor even norms of social 
intercourse (both in the broad sense of a regulative way of 
life), but it supplies as such motivation in any sphere 
where a supersubstantial 'ought' arises, precisely the 
sphere in which the old Mimamsakas declared it operated.
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case of dharma, social and religious practices, and valid 
as 'legal' rules to the extent that their qualification can 
be ascertained in terms of dharma, even if they conflict 
with the dharma s~5str a 1 s dharma!
In particular behind and beyond the smrti, 'law' (in
the sense of such rules that are "capable of being enforced
2 6by, or recognised as essential by, state courts" ) existed 
as rules of customary origin and development, being observed 
from a sense of inner constraint under the impact of the relig­
ious (also superstitious) compulsion often associated with
27 28it. "Dharma is thus above law, and within law!" Apparent­
ly the smrtis and nibandhas sought to supply answers to the 
usual question: In this specific doubt - whether or not a 
dispute - what legitimation or authentication can one offer 
for a solution which is not arbitrary nor subjective, and 
which can be remembered as an appropriate (if not an ideal) 
resolution of a doubt thrown up by change of situation.
The task consists in seeking an enduring and permanent answer
29 rarising out of a flux. By way o-j contrast one may suggest 
that it is rather doubtful whether there is more than a vague 
correspondence in both JLL and nomos, on the one hand, in con­
nection with the Imperial codes as exemplification of li ^
26. J.D.M. Derrett, Dharmasastra ..., ubi cit., p. 2. Most 
disputes were settled in a decentralized manner through local pro­
cedures, in village or caste panchayats. Vide J.D.M. Derrett,
et al., Beitrage zu Indischem Rechtsdenken ..., ubi cit., 
pp. 61 f f ; cf. furthermore K. Gnanambal, Religious In­
stitutions and Caste Panchayats in South India, (Calcutta,
1973), for instance pp. 176 ff; N.K. Bose, ed., Data on 
Caste, Orissa, (Calcutta, Memoir No 7, 1960), pp. 179-1 92.
27. Vide N.C. Sen-Gupta, Evolution of Ancient Indian Law, 
(London, 1953), p. 3.
28. J.D.M. Derrett, The Hindu Conception of Law, ubi cit., p. 111.
29. Cf. the editors' preface to J.D.M. Derrett, Beitrage ..., 
ubi cit., Studien zu nichteuropaischen Rechtstheorien, 
hg. v. Th. Viehweg und R. May, pp. VIII-IX.
30. Vide D. Bodde/C. Morris, Law in Imperial China. Exemp­
lified by 190 Ch'ing Dynasty Cases, (Cambridge, Mass.,
1967), pp. 29 ff.
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and on the other hand in the rei'ation of the topos of nomos 
(agraphos as well as gegrammenos) to dike.
The following EXCURSUS jriust~ be understood as an illus­
tration of a particular situation of the recognition of 
dharmasastra in relation to the significant role of usage or
custom (caritra), to be applied as 'legal1 rules or not in
31a lawsuit (vyavahara), a role which is generally rather
32foreign to customary law in classical Greece; and in China,
33for instance, as we know from the T 'ang Code, there is only 
a vague correspondence.
As to the Indian situation, it is a reasonable question
whether vyavahara within the 'four feet decision-basis'
34 35maxim implied the independence of any particular court
from dharma precepts, so that the contents of the dharma-
sastra could be reduced to the status of a visionary cata-
3 6logue of what the sastrls thought ought to be 'law' in
31. Vide supra, esp. § 13 II, III. It is perhaps superfluous 
to add that concrete records of customs (which seem to 
have existed at different times and places in ancient 
India) are not what is meant by caritra in the 'four 
feet decision-basis' maxim. To enable caritra to be 
voiced and to claim priority over dharma in a given piece 
of litigation the written and authentic record of long­
standing custom may have a part to play (and so might 
the testimony of living witnesses) but this alone would 
not determine whether caritra was decisive in the over­
arching sense of dharma.
32. Vide supra, footn. 16, and the orations by Demosthenes 
as being referred in the discussion by E. Wolf, Griechi- 
sches Rechtsdenken, III, 2, ubi cit., pp. 359-65.
33. Vide W. Johnson, The T'ang Code, ubi cit., pp. 5-6; cf.
J. Needham, SCC II, p. 546, and 0. Weggel, Chinesische 
Rechtsgeschichte, ubi cit., pp. 170 ff.
34. Vide supra, § 13 II.
35. Vide footn. 26.
36. Vide J.D.M. Derrett, Religion, Law and the State in India,
ubi cit., pp. 35-55, 171 ff; the same, Essays ..., I,
ubi cit., p. 142.
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ideal conditions, which might never exist. Additionally, one 
may be reminded that the vyavahara portions of the dharma­
sastra were never absolutely binding (in general, an idea 
which is quite foreign to nomos gegrammenos, and to the 
Chinese , but not absent from £>l precepts) ; for they were
open to rational arguments and modifications in 'legal' 
practice.
The problem was brought to light when British courts 
were endowed with the responsibility to enforce dharmasSstra 
as the 'personal law' of Hindus. A large number of sastric 
precepts would, if understood as 'rules' (in the above­
given sense), produce undesirable consequences with a
37change of time and situation. It is not necessary to enter
here into a list of the occasions on which then sastric
material was recognized, scrutinized, debated, and either
set aside or manipulated to produce results other than those
3 8within their authors' contemplation. Three examples may 
suffice for all.
It seemed that the dharmasastra prohibited the alien­
ation of self-acquired immovable property by the acquirer 
when he was a member of a joint family (strictly 'copar­
cenary'). After almost interminable debates it was held that
although one should not make such alienations they were,
39after they were made, valid. A study of a wide range of 
prohibitions ended with the recognition that 'factum valet1: - 
a prohibition which the court could recognize as 'moral'
40
would not affect the 'legal' validity of the transaction.
37. Vide J.D.M. Derrett, Forbidden Occupations in Smrti and 
their Aftermath, in: Ludwik Sternbach Felicitation Volume, 
(Lucknow, India, n.d.), pp. 189-197, 196.
38. Vide Derrett, Religion ..., ibid., pp. 274 ff (ch. 9).
39. Ibid., pp. 78, 417 with footn. 3.
40. Ibid., pp. 122 ff (ch. 5); cf. the same, Essays ..., I, 
ubi cit., pp. 266 ff.
For a second example we may .take the question of a 
woman's inheritance from a woman. The dharmasastra was clear 
that women inherited the property of women for an absolute 
estate, i.e. that they could alienate freely that which they 
had inherited. The Privy Council however held that they must 
inherit for a limited estate, with no right of absolute dis­
posal, the next heirs of the former owscrfafcfalthe residue after
41 *
the heiress's death.
The third example is of the 'right' of a woman to re­
tain property she inherited from her husband if she became 
unchaste during her widowhood. The dharmasastra almost cer­
tainly implied that she should be divested of such property 
for her unchastity. The courts held, ultimately, that so to 
hold would be unreasonable; that a widow unchaste at the time 
of her widowhood would be disqualified from inheriting her 
husband's estate, but that subsequent unchastity could not 
divest h e r . ^
It is more than probable that in all three cases the 
British version of vyavahara put into effect not what dharma 
propounded, and in a sense expected, but what custom, and 
'good morals', in the ultimate analysis, would countenance. 
The courts never operated specifically on this principle, 
nor expressly referred to it; but it seems this is the na­
ture of vyavahara within the overarching requirement of 
dharma. As to rajadharma, it requires the ruler to deviate 
from dharma precepts as and when these would be unpropitious. 
This is particularly possible in the solution of social and 
property disputes. Economic considerations are notoriously 
subject to fluctuation, however gradual.
41. Vide Sheo Shankar v. Debi Sahai (1903) 30 I.A. 202; 
Derrett, Religion ..., ibid., p. 310, footn. 3; the 
same, Introduction to Modern Hindu Law, (Bombay, 1963),
§ 627.
42. Vide Moniram Kolita v. Kerry Kolitany (1880) 7 I.A. 115; 
cf. Derrett, Religion ..., ibid., p. 297, footn. 5, and 
the same, Essays ..., II, ubi cit., p. 211, footn. 22.
An answer to the problem which confronted the Occiden­
tal, administrators of law in the first half of the nine­
teenth century may therefore be that the British court, 
with its closely defined jurisdiction and limited functions, 
operated a version of vyavahara, and that therefore the non­
congruence of Anglo-Hindu law with dharmasastra was generally
4- 43acceptable.
As to the 'visionary' character of the dharmasastra, 
one could not take a better example than its provisions 
concerning the mixed castes. These combine cosmogony and 
a teleologically orientated scheme of analysis of a hypo­
thetical, timeless, universal (Hindu) caste and subcaste 
44structure. This, so far as we know, never corresponded to 
any framework actually enforced or even recognized by any 
Hindu monarch; yet that Hindu monarchs were concerned with 
varnasramadharma is certain.
Before closing I want to make two remarks. First,
it seems evident that India in contrast to the development 
of the early topos of nomos, namely from the unwritten cus­
tomary nomos and the eminent idea of an 'instituted' nomos, 
to the highly evaluated nomos gegrammenos, the positive law, 
on the one hand, and on the other in contrast to the idea of
43. Vide Theodor Goldstiiker, On the Deficiencies in the 
Present Administration of Hindu Law, (London, 1871).
L. Rocher, Indian response to Anglo-Hindu Law. in- 
JAOS 92 (1972), pp. 419-24.------ -------------- -
44. Vide Manu X; Bharuci on Manu X, 1-73 (Derrett, o p .cit.) 
which is subject to Horst Brinkhaus, Zu J.D.M. Derretts 
Textausgabe und Ubersetzung von Bharucis Manusastra- 
vivarana-Fragment, in: Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde 
Siid- und Ostasiens, XXIV (1980/81 ), pp. 147-80; cf. the 
same, Die altindischen Mischkastensysteme, ubi cit.,
L. Rocher, Notes on mixed castes in Classical India, 
ubi cit., pp. 132-46.
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nomos koinos kata physin, the patural lav, took the direc- 
tion "from dharma to law" , that is from order to 'law' 
without losing cohesion with usage or custom (acara and cari­
tra) , and not from custom to law and thus to order. This re­
mains true even though customs themselves played a large 
(though undefined) part in the formation of smrti precepts, 
though custom went a long way towards defining what was sad- 
acara (the usage or custom of the good) - itself a source of 
dharma (vide supra, § 9), and though custom (caritra) could 
overrule dharma in the judicial solution to 'legal' problems 
(vide supra, § 15). The process of thought, however, was from 
dharma (order) to 'law1, custom being wholly ancillary.
China on her part arrived at no time at the conception
46of natural law (in the above sense) , already the idea of 
a divinely 'instituted' nomos is foreign to her, whereas the 
topos of had acquainted her with positive 'law', which
stood, however, in no relation to the idea of any divine law­
giver. Neither the 'positivation' of LL precepts nor the LL- 
bound correction of f a ^ ^  demonstrate similarity with the de­
velopment of the topos of n o m o s , and, I should say, with the 
promotion of the topos of dharma.
Secondly, from a trans-cultural comparative point of view 
it is now rather doubtful whether we remain justified in 
evoking the assumption of universality of the 'natural law' 
conception; indeed even the expression 'law' in relation to 
the Hindu Indian and Chinese regulative ways of life should 
be used with appropriate caution. In order to do justice to 
their own (juris-)prudential achievements, both non-Occidental 
cultures should be considered in the light of their own 
merits, in terms that evoke as little confusion as possible, 
last but not least in view of their still living cultural 
heritage.
RTO• p-
45. J.D.M. Derrett, Dharmasastra ..., ubi cit., p. 2.
46. Cf. J. Needham, SCC II, p. 579; R. Moore, The wider 
lessons of Chinese law, in: PEW 26 (1976), pp. 229- 
35, p. 2 32; the same, Review Article on: V.H. Li, Law 
without Lawyers: A Comparative View of Law in China 
and the United States, (Stanford, 1979), in: PEW 29 
(1979), pp. 237-40.
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FINAL REMARKS
The following issues may be considered in addition:
1. Granted that nomos is visualised as arising externally to the 
individual (the same is the case with the Torah), the Western 
idea of law assumes that obligation starts from outside. Hence 
law is easily identified with codes, statutes, by-laws, case-law.
2. The coexistence of law and religion can thus be visualised as 
both forces operating on the individual from outside. The 
individual must react, sooner or later, to demands made upon him 
from others.
3. In dharma the focus of obligation is the self (atman), and karma 
is made and unmade by the self. Attempts are made in religion 
to identify (mystically?) the individual self with the Great 
Self, etc. But these attempts show that this was never self- 
evident .
4. In China _li suggests spontaneous expressions, and is not imposed 
on individuals from without. There is no suggestion that 
villagers get together and make up a li_ Which is different from 
one made up by the villagers next door. Li is therefore very 
different from fa, which occurs externally, and is imposed from 
without (but not from 'above') . The authority of Li and dharma 
is similar, in that they purport to originate in the individual 
and community. Scriptures in both cultures do not deny this, 
for even sacrifice is optional. On the contrary they reinforce 
the notion that li is a reality of more or less natural origin.
5. Therefore both in (Hindu) India and China law, as understood in 
the West may be sensed only as a temporary expedient, unworthy 
of reflective study, unsuitable for pedagogic purposes.
6 . Where obligation arises from without and is an intrusion upon 
the person, there occurs a need to justify and defend individual 
laws. There can be a'conflict between customary 'law' and 
statutory 'law', and differences of opinion as to which is more 
effective-or more worthy. Where obligation arises from within, 
the only questions are devoted to discovering what it is, and 
drawing out the hidden or obscure sources of obligation.
7. The great discovery in such comparisons of nomos with dharma and 
li probably lies not in any of them but in the light this throws 
on a system not studied in the thesis, namely Torah. But, that 
apart, the thesis attempts at providing the most eloquent proof 
of the different characters of discipline in West and East, with 
obvious implications for inter-personal and inter-group, and 
inter -national dealings. An individual or corporation which 
has a different inside (internal essence and quality) cannot 
share a common dharma or 1^; and machinery to impose a common 
disciplinary organ, instrument, or technique is bound to be 
futile: So long, at least, as the internal qualities of human 
beings remain unknown or controversial.
8 . The assertion found in Gaius and in Ps.Plato, Minos, to the effect 
that human beings in general share many important laws, is a 
misunderstanding and misleading. It betrays an optimism 
characteristic of the West, that if there are discrepancies 
someone's will-power can iron them out.
GLOSSARY
I India (Skt.)
in Roman afyki&d'iaorder
acara ................. good behaviour, an established rule
of conduct, manner of action, esp. 
religious usage
ahimsa ................  non-injury, abstaining from doing in­
juries to men and animals
artha ................. wealth, material prosperity as one of
the four aims of human existence
arthasastra ..........  teaching (science) of gaining material
prosperity, of means and measures, in­
cluding political government
asrama ................  a stage in one's life (there are four
asramas)
atman .................  breath; the essence of life, the self,
the soul
brahma (brahman) ..... the one self-existent Spirit, the Ab­
solute having neither beginning nor 
end, the only real entity
b r a h m a n a ..............  (1) portion of the Veda, (2) one of
the four main classes of Hindu society; 
the supreme priestly class whose duty 
is to sacrifice and to teach
caritra ...............  custom, usage, conduct, behaviour esp.
of a secular character
danda .................  lit.: a stick; punishment; application
of power
darsana ...............  'looking at' the meaning of Vedic texts
later used as signifying the 'views' of 
the six (orthodox) Hindu schools of 
learning
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jati ..................  (birth), sub-caste
jnanamarga ........... . the way of knowledge, esp. esoteric
or mystical knowledge
kama ..................  pleasure, enjoyment; love, esp. sexual
love or sensuality
karma .................  act, performance; effects of actions
upon the actor's destiny, or the causal 
principle whereby deeds are recompensed 
either in this life or another
ksatriya .............. a member of the military or kingly
order which constitutes the second 
varna (class of society)
mlmamsa ............... school of text-interpretation, inter­
ested in the solution of problems 
(e.g. moksa) by critical examination
mleccha ...............  non-Hindu, foreigner
moksa .................  salvation or final release from the
cycle of rebirth; one of the four 
goals of human existence
purusartha ............ any one of the four objects or aims
of human existence
raja (rajan, raja) ... king, sovereign
rajasasana ...........  edict of the king, royal order
rsi .................... ancient legendary sage who is said to
have 'heard' the hymns of the Veda
sabha (samiti) ....... public audience, assembly, council,
meeting
sadharana-dharma ..... common dharma or residual dharma
samhita ...............  collection of texts, esp. of the four
Vedas
samnyasin ............. wandering ascetic in the final stage
of life (the fourth asrama)
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samsara .................  the cycle of transmigration, the
bondage of life, death and rebirth
samskara ................  initial preparatory rite, purificatory
ceremony, sacrament
sastra ..................  an authoritative treatise (of scien­
tific character)
sastrl professor of the sastra, scholar
smrti .................... sacred (remembered) traditional litera­
ture; texts of less antiquity and 
sanctity than sruti, i.e., the epics, 
Puranas, and Dharmasastras
sruti .................... sacred knowledge orally transmitted
by Brahmins from generation to gener­
ation
sudra ...................  member of the fourth varna (class of
society)
svadharma ...............  one's own duty, namely that which has
to be done as a member of a specific 
class in society
vaisya ..................  member of the third varna (class of
society)
varna .................... lit.: colour, outward appearance; the
four classes of society
veda ..................... sacred texts which constitute the
basis of 'knowledge'
vyavahara ...............  litigation; a method of judicial de­
cision
yajna sacrifice or worship
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II China
/.v \
cke.ng ...............  administrative prescription; admin­
istration of affairs
ckZao^^ ................  moral lesson, doctrines; to teach
* ( z )ckZh .................  wisdom; (practical) knowledge
(s)ckZh .................  regulations
c h Z n g ...............  reference, respect
/ Q 0  j
chung ...............  loyalty, faithfulness
ckun Z z u l ............. gentleman, perfect man; a man who is
a model for other men
.................... (written) regulations, rules, prescrip­
tions, statutes, laws
ho ^  .................... harmony
k&Zao ^  or ^  ........  filial piety
# . (1) or (aa) . . , -. _fi.6-t.ft ........  sincerity; confidence
k&Zng ; wu h&Zng .... punishment; the five punishments
fi6uefi^ u  ^ ................  learning; teaching; studying
* (k)Z ..................... righteousness, that which is right to
do as someone's duty
..................  benevolence, humaneness; "an inward
and spiritual love for all mankind,
• (k)of which Z is the outward and 
visible manifestation" (Giles, Diet.)
ZZ^a  ^ ...............  a vessel used in sacrificing
Ahang ZZ ^  ............. ruler above, supreme ruler
/ I* \
AhZh  ................  to sign, to show, to signify, to ex­
hibit, to make known
.................  altruism; reciprocity; to be humane
in a devotional manner
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(ac) -i • •Aung ................  litigation
+ (m)Zao..... .................. way, course
(s)to,...... .................. virtue in the sense of moral impetus
excellent in character
ZZ^^  .................... earth
(c )Z'Zo.n ................  heaven, sky
/  T_ \
Z'Z2.n kAZa ............ under heaven, on the earth, in the
world
/ j \
Z x Zzn mZng .......... mandate, appointment or decree of
heaven
V  Zun Zao ...........  way or course of heaven
(n )u)u tun ...............  the five human relationships
u)u ZZe.n^°^ .............. the five sections or relations of
society and the duties attached to than
u)u ivzZ^ac^  ^ .............. non-action, non-interference; to
remain passive
III Greece
agore (ayopn) .......... assembly, the council of chiefs
(in the Iliad)
anassein (avaoaeiv) .... to rule, to be lord or master
arete (apexfi) .......... excellence (of any kind); goodness;
virtue of the man of the polis
arche (apxn) ...........  first principle, basic 'stuff1, under­
lying substance
basileus (BacriAeOc) .... ruler, king, master, lord
boule (BouAn) .......... council of elders; will; determination
dikaiosyne (6 i <ai oatfvri) . righteousness, justice
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dike (6 iKri) ............. right, order, judgement (that which
is right), justice
eunomia (euvoyia) ...... good order (that which is well estab­
lished)
methexis (ye0 e£ic) ....  participation
nomos agraphos
(voyoc aypac^oc) ....  unwritten nomos
nomos gegrammenos
(voyoc yeypayyevoc) • written nomos
nomos idios
(voyoc ’iSioc) ....... particular nomos
nomos koinos kata physin
(voyoc koiVoc Konra cj)\3aiv) universal natural law (nomos)
nous (vouc) ............. mind, reason, intellect
polis (ttoA i c ) ..........  city
physis ((J)\3oic) .........  nature, natural form or constitution
of person or thing
themis, themistes
(0 eyiC/ 0 eylaxec) ••• that which is laid down or established
(by custom); decrees of the gods;
oracles
thesmos (0 eayoc) ....... divine 'law', that which is laid down,
ordinance
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INDEX of Chinese Characters
li f f
( r )
f f i j
(a) o
XL.
(s)
(b) TIT
Ct)
7 ^  H
(c) %
(u )
(d) f a
(v )
#
(e ) (w)
( f ) %
(x)
f a
Cg)
. h  %
(y )
f a
(b ) fa T Cz)
( i )
f a
(aa)
0 0 %
Cab)
ftz
(1 ) I t
Cac) si;
Cm) 'V -
I E
Cad) / —  \L.w  is/ 1 IV VV'\
(n) ± L  IOr
Cae)
(o) Caf)
-w- / _
b I X
(p)
Cag) - g o
v. vL^ >
(q) > £
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